

WIMAYA

Interdisciplinary Journal of International Affairs

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Aim and Scope

WIMAYA is an international scholarly journal devoted to international affairs. Published twice a year by the International Relations Department, Pembangunan Nasional Veteran East Java, the journal aims to promote the importance of interdisciplinary approach to analyze various international issues. The journal welcomes empirical and theoretical research articles that seek to cut across disciplines in order to capture the complexity of a phenomenon. The editors also welcome discursive book reviews that contribute to the literature.

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Research Article

Prospects for Digitalization of ASEAN Smart Cities Network Securization: Case Studies Indonesia

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Abstract

This paper aims to explain the opportunities and challenges of securitization in the digitization of ASCN. This paper uses qualitative methods with case study methods and uses library review data collection techniques. The results found that the digitalization of ASCN is a form of ASEAN's commitment to innovate and digital transformation of the government, society, and the business world. ASCN is a concrete form of public service governance to create connections and integration between cities in ASEAN so that they can collaborate and synergize. However, from this cooperation, several opportunities and challenges can be obtained by ASEAN. This means that ASCN cooperation must be well controlled because the city is a major player in the cooperation even though the agreement is at the national and regional levels.

Keywords: ASCN, digital, ASEAN, Collaboration, Innovation

I. Introduction

International relations in the digital era have undergone significant changes both from the substance of the issue and the increase in actors to the policy response to be able to adapt to these changes. The state as a rational actor must be able to innovate and adapt so that it collaborates with other actors to be able to meet their needs. This means that the State must be able to calculate all the possibilities and consequences of each policy

response in the digital world. The digital age is inevitable by the State and the State is most responsible for safeguarding the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of its citizens from threats that can come from within as well as from outside. This threat can also be carried out by state actors and non-State actors.

Why this State is important in responding to this, Hamilton (1995) said that the development of international relations and diplomacy will always change based on four factors, namely a) changes in the international order, b) changes in the threat of the nature of war c) revolution of the role of the State and d) integration of Information Technology (Carlnaes, 2013). Therefore, these four points must be responded to creatively and innovatively by the State with a collaborative approach.

The author defines digitization citing the FDFA as writing that digitization is the technical process of changing the format of information from analog to digital format. This process results in structural changes in the form of new applications and systems to the economic, social, political, security, etc. fields. Digitalization is a new space just like land, sea, and air. A digital space is a space that provides the interaction of processes and not just devices but actors. The digital space provides a cross-border format (FDFA, 2020). Furthermore, in addition, the change in the direction of international relations in the digital arena: a) changes in the political, social, and economic environment in which diplomacy is carried out (e.g. the nature and distribution of power, new types of conflict, and the changing and interdependent nature of sovereignty in international relations); b) the emergence of new policy issues in foreign

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policy such as cybersecurity, data governance, e-commerce, and cybercrime, and; c) the use of digital tools in practice in international relations such as social media privacy, online conferencing, and big data analytics (Hone, 2021) (diplomacy.edu, 2021). Thus, these changes are both an opportunity and a challenge for the State in dealing with the threat of securitization in international relations.

Bjola and Holmes write that changes in the international system should make the State able to respond quickly because of the State. That this system change is called international management, meaning that in the digital era international relations practice must be able to innovate. Furthermore, that system changes in the digital era are called top-down structural exogenous shock. Exogenous means efforts to establish deep interactions through face to face. Still, the challenge is to build face-to-face communication in cyberspace. Furthermore, button up incremental endogenous shifting. Endogenous is defined by synthesis and analysis, technology, and big data. Thus, two things must be done, namely policy innovation and change adaptation (Holmes, 2015).

The international system is a structure composed of new hybrid C international relations actors, nonlinear, and only vaguely restricted. The new capabilities of the armed forces create new opportunities for the use of kinetic and non-kinetic forces in cyberspace (Neittaanmäki, 2011). Cyber security or Cyber security quickly evolved from a technical discipline to a strategic concept. Globalization and the Internet have given individuals, organizations, and countries tremendous new powers, based on ever-evolving network technologies. For everyone - students, soldiers, spies, propagandists, hackers, and terrorists - information gathering, communications,

fundraising, and public relations have been digitized and revolutionized.

As a result, all political and military conflicts now have a cyber dimension, their size and impact are difficult to predict, and the battles that take place in cyberspace can be more important than events that occur on the ground. Like terrorism, hackers have found success in pure media hype. Like Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it is difficult to retaliate against asymmetric attacks. The astonishing achievement of cyber espionage serves to demonstrate the high return on investment that can be found in computer hacking. The dynamic nature of the Internet offers benefits to attackers and defenders. Many cyber battles will be won by parties that use cutting-edge technology for greater gains. Although attackers have more targets to attack and More ways to attack them (Geers, 2011).

However, on the other hand, ASEAN countries form cooperation with cities to protect cyber security in each country. However, at the same time, these countries have the potential to create new threats by securitizing technology into digitalization. Currently, the agreement of ASEAN countries has reached the level of cities in each country. At the 32nd ASEAN Summit meeting, each ASEAN country agreed to form the ASEAN Smart City Network or (ASCN) cooperation.

ASCN is an innovation platform to create ASEAN as a smart city. ASCN is a form of ASEAN's commitment to creating connectivity between cities. As a result of the Report from ASCN 2022, there are 26 ASCN member cities. Some of these cities are Bandar Seri Begawan, Battambang, Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Banyuwangi, Jakarta, Makassar, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Johor Baru, Kota Kinabalu, Kuala Lumpur, Kuching, Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay, Yangon, Cebu City, Davao City, Manila,

Singapore, Bangkok, Chonburi, Phuket, Da Nang, Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City (ASCN, 2022).

At the East Asia Summit on November 15, 2018, which was attended by ASEAN countries, and joined by several other countries such as Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, and the United States, ASCN's main objective is to improve the lives of ASEAN citizens, using technology and digital infrastructure to support the activities of ASEAN countries. By focusing on adopting an inclusive approach to smart city development that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the ASEAN Charter. The Smart Cities Network in ASEAN also contributes to enhancing cross-cultural mutual understanding. ASCN cooperation uses an inclusive, transformative, innovative, and integrated approach. EAS fully supports cooperation to obtain economic, social, environmental, security, industrial, infrastructure, and health benefits. Previously, the commitment to the ASEAN Vientiane Smart City meeting was created in 2016 and adopted the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan 2025, so all countries involved agreed to develop smart cities.

So that in the development of smart cities planned by ASEAN members, especially Indonesia, must prepare cyber security domestically and regionally in the face of cybercrime to protect people's networks and personal data. In addition, in building smart cities, they must also pay attention to various aspects that must be considered such as governance, human resource readiness, infrastructure readiness, finance, digital society, and sanctions that are prepared to reach the level of ASCN development idea. The author argues that the formation of ASCN is like a double-edged eye. It has a positive impact and has negative implications. For this reason, the author will describe and explain

the prospects of ASCN digitalization as a threat as well as opportunities for cooperation at the city level.

II. Cybersecurity

Alford (2009) and Lee (2013) argue that cyber defense uses a variety of different sources and methodologies to mitigate active threats, using areas such as incident response, malware analysis, digital forensics, and event defense-driven intelligence. Cyber warfare is perhaps the biggest threat countries have ever faced. There has never been anyone who has the potential to affect the security of an entire country. And, never before has one person been able to cause the greatest possible damage in a cyber war. Cyber power will be revolutionary for warfare like air power, but the current domain vector will determine which country will hold cyber domination and what effect it will have (Neittaanmäki, 2011).

Cybersecurity and cyber resilience are the number one concerns for companies today. Organizations must protect their assets and defend themselves from threats and attacks to stay in business. A breach or breach can destroy a company's assets and/or reputation within minutes. Readiness is key, so if the unthinkable happens, your company will have the tools and action plan to counter and recover from the attack. Developing a cybersecurity and cyber resilience strategy that supports business and saves resources requires strategic planning. So, what must be accepted is that the war has not changed with the advent of cyber keywords. Cyber is just another way to conduct war, such as trench warfare, nuclear war, and other categories of wars established throughout history (Sweeney, 2020). Cyber is the domain of war, This means that computer networks become seen as

spaces where we can maneuver, attack, and defend as we do in wars conducted in other domains (Oakley, 2017).

Then, cyber warfare, meaning cyber aggression between countries, is a phenomenon that is emerging increasingly important in international relations, with attacks on computer networks regulated by the state (or regulated by the state) that occurred in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Iran (2010). This method of warfare - given its potential to, for example, make planes fall from the sky or cause nuclear power plants to melt - can be as devastating as conventional means of conducting armed conflict.

Cyber from a technological point of view; the extent to which cyber attacks can be attributed to state actors; strategic value and the dangers posed by cyber conflicts; legal regulation of cyber attacks, both as a use of international force and as part of an ongoing armed conflict, and the ethical implications of cyber warfare. Thus cyber should be part of the State policy as a form of extension of policy by actions taken in cyberspace by state actors (or by non-state actors with significant state direction or support) that constitute a serious threat to the security of other states, or similar actions taken in response to serious threats to state security (actual or perceived) (Green, 2015).

III. Discussion

a. Digital Policy and Cooperation in ASEAN

Indonesia's policy regarding the implementation of smart cities has been going on for a long time. This is proven by the establishment of a Presidential Instruction in 2003 on governance based on e-government

technology. The purpose of the instruction is to integrate accountable, flexible, and transparent governance. Effective, transparent, and accountable. E-Government is a form of technology-based management to its citizens by methods (G to C), (G to B), and relationships (G to G). The purpose of this service is to welcome the era of a Digitally Interconnected Community (DIC). The application of e-government as a means of creating good governance. Law No. 25 of 2009 concerning Public Services was issued to support the integration of governance based on Affirmation and Communication Technology (ICT), then issued No. 25 of 2009. From these rules, Indonesia adopted information technology integration in the public service governance system first.

Meanwhile, ASEAN, only started at the 28th ASEAN Summit on September 6, 2016, in Laos. Then on January 10, 2017, a Stand-Alone ACCC Meeting was held on the MPAC 2025 Implementation Arrangements. This collaboration contains points a) physical connectivity/infrastructure (physical), b) institutional, and c) inter-community (people to people). To implement MPAC, several mechanisms have been established to monitor and support its implementation. The mechanism in question includes the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee (ACCC) (ASEAN, 2017).

Cooperation in the field of digital innovation ASEAN has the potential to make a profit of US\$ 625 billion by 2030 or around 8% of ASEAN's estimated GDP in 20230, which comes from increased efficiency, new products, and services, new digital services (such as data management and digital financial services); exchange of best practices for open data; and increased access to digital technology by Micro Enterprises, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) (ASEAN, 2017).

In addition, the ASEAN ICT Masterplan (AIM) 2015 was ratified at the 10th ASEAN Telecommunication and IT Ministers Meeting (TELMIN) in January 2011. The document includes 6 strategic thrusts, namely: (i) economic transformation, (ii) community approach and empowerment, (iii) innovation, (iv) infrastructure development, (v) human resources improvement, and (vi) digital divide liaison (ASEAN, 2017). The implementation of AIM 2015 is coordinated by TELMIN by involving the ASEAN Telecom Communications and IT Senior Officials Meeting (TELSOM) and the ASEAN Telecommunication Regulators' Council (ATRC) in supporting policymaking. AIM 2020 prioritizes aspects of (i) ICT in the Single Market, (ii) New Media and Content, and (iii) Information Security and Assurance, without neglecting the 6 strategic thrusts listed in the document (ASEAN, 2017).

b. Securitization of Smart Cities Digitalization as Part of Cybersecurity Prospects

Cyber Age Command Control Theory According to USAF Col. John Boyd argues that in cyberspace what should be crippled is its physical and mental morals. In doing this, the actor can map the threat of uncertainty in cyber and direct the enemy to situations that are beyond its capacity. Furthermore, USAF (retired) Cyber Age Effect-Based Operations Theory Colonel John Warden argues that the most important thing is to paralyze the enemy's center of gravity through overall operation so that it quickly and precisely paralyzes the opponent (Neittaanmäki, 2011). This opinion shows that the securitization of cybersecurity is a concrete step by the state to prevent threats from the advancement of information technology and digitalization. This means that securitization is very important to show the quality, and capacity of the country in maintaining cyber resilience in the country.

Cybersecurity and cyber resilience, there are 6 steps to take. If done, an organization's cybersecurity and cybersecurity strategy will be comprehensive, functional, and durable, and receive ongoing support from cybersecurity governance management. The first step, initial planning, is the preparation of the second strategy development, strategy prospect management, third, cyber threat mapping, vulnerability, and intelligence analysis, fourth, risk calculation and cyber control, fifth, current threats and sixth target status assessment, Performance Measurement of Strategic Plan and Year-End Project (Sweeney, 2020). Although cybersecurity is securitized by the role of the state, the executors and impacts are local or local governments. Moreover, in a country in the form of unity and decentralization like Indonesia, of course, macro cooperation at the ASEAN regional level remains the executor area. This means that cyber resilience in the regions is very important to maintain cybersecurity stability.

The author has previously conveyed that this collaboration in digitalization has good prospects in the form of opportunities as well as challenges. Moreover, the cooperation carried out is on behalf of the region. The problem that exists is when the cooperation is carried out in multilateral meetings which are carried out only in the form of a Ministerial Conference or Ministerial Conference. This means that regional involvement is very small in obtaining knowledge socialization related to this digitalization cooperation. Meetings at the ASEAN regional level involve only Ministers, high-ranking officials, or relevant agencies. Meanwhile, the regions were not involved in the meeting as a form of contribution and participation. Kuznetsov said that the involvement of local governments or para-diplomacy in foreign policy should be synergistic. But it depends on the pattern

applied. Kuznetsov said that there is a formula used in the relationship between the center and the regions. However, what is relevant to the role of local governments in foreign policy, especially crucial issues, is the cooperative-coordinated and cooperative-joint formula. In addition, of the 12 elements of the para-diplomacy study dimension, cybersecurity is included in the dimensions of globalization and security/geopolitics. This means that globalization has implications for the country's activities in controlling its geopolitics, especially in the regions (Kuznetsov, 2015).

The involvement of local governments in ASEAN regional cooperation in the field of technological innovation and digitalization has been agreed upon in the establishment of ASCN. The goal is to create digital-based connections and cooperation for the ASEAN community and ASEAN countries. Smart cities as a form of ASEAN's commitment to follow up on several previously agreed meetings. Therefore, the existence of smart cities can create intense cooperation between ASEAN member states, especially implemented at the level of cities in ASEAN through ASCN.

There are five reasons why ASCN is important for ASEAN: a) to respond to urbanization and as a cultural heritage of ASEAN. At this point, ASCN will open opportunities for tourists to enter and travel in several cities in ASEAN more easily. With so many cultures available, it is enough to contribute 12 percent of ASEAN's GDP in the field of tourism; b) lifestyle health and welfare. At this point, it shows that the integration of technology in the health sector is a form of commitment to the SDGs, especially to protect the ASEAN community from extreme poverty which has been reduced from 138 million to 44 million people. The CLC survey shows that health and welfare issues are the main focus of ASCN; c) safety and security mean that this

point shows that the progress of ASEAN's digital economy potential of up to \$1 trillion is also threatened by cybersecurity. For this reason, the adoption of technological equipment, and the readiness of resources are needed to maintain cyber safety and security in ASEAN cities, c) environmental safety, at this point shows that the threat of disasters in ASEAN is quite large. ASEAN's losses reached 91 billion USD. The integration of technology in responding to disasters can minimize the casualties and implications of disasters such as early warning technology etc. d) Infrastructure development, this point shows that the construction of digital infrastructure development can increase the contribution of ASEAN opinions to 1.6 \$ trillion. Then e) the progress of the digital industry and innovation, at this point ASEAN can be the key to global trade, especially in major cities in ASEAN.

There are about 144.800 pounds /100 or 100 people beating the United States and Europe which are only on 124 mobile phones/100 people. In addition, trade profits in ASEAN reach 5.3 \$ USD annually. With the existence of digitalization and innovation, e-commerce opportunities in ASEAN are increasing (Hartati, 2022). That is why smart city cooperation is very important to create connections between cities.

Smart City has 6 indicators, namely Smart Governance (transparent, informative, and responsive government), Smart Economy (growing productivity with entrepreneurship and the spirit of innovation), Smart People (increasing Human Resources and decent living facilities), Smart Mobility (providing transportation and infrastructure systems) and Smart Environment (environmentally friendly natural resource management), and Smart Living (realizing a healthy and livable city) (Fathun L. M., 2018). From the meaning of smart cities, the 3 Indonesian cities involved in

ASCN do not include cyber security as part of the anticipation of ASCN digitalization. Based on data from shows that (ASCN, 2022) Banyuwangi City is the city that has the most projects, namely education, smart villages, tourism, stunting care, and plastic waste care. Then Jakarta only focuses on integrated transportation programs through JAKI, Jak Lingko, and health data (Corona). On the other hand, Makassar has projects in the field of smart care and tax services.

One example of Makassar Smart City Makassar consists of six modules. First, Smart Governance is optimizing public services by the city government. Second, smart branding is to increase awareness of the character of the city, especially for tourism. Third, Smart Economy is to build a good ecosystem and encourages a less-cash society. Fourth, Smart Living is how to create a comfortable life and increase awareness of health. Fifth, a Smart Society is to build an interactive and humanist society. Sixth, Smart Environment is to reduce and utilizes waste and creates a better source of energy. Makassar City was selected as one of the smart cities out of the government's 100 targets to create 100 smart cities in Indonesia in 2017 at the 2017 Smart City Award event which was handed over directly by Mengkominfo Rusdiantara. Moreover, Makassar City was selected for the Indonesia Smart Nation Award (ISNA) 2018 with the Most Perform in Smart City Initiative category in 2018 (Fathun L. M., 2018).

ASCN cooperation needs to get control from the central government. The securitization of smart cities is very important because the availability of resources in the regions is not good enough to counteract the potential for cybercrime in the regions. This means that there must be good training and debriefing so that smart cities do not become disasters in the regions. If you look at the data

and representation of Indonesia's cybersecurity, according to the Director of e-Business of the Directorate General of Informatics Applications of the Ministry of Communication and Informatics Azhar Hasyim stated that Indonesia has the potential to become a major player in innovation and digital business. The strategy used is to increase start-ups. According to the Director of e-Business, to move towards the largest digital economy in Southeast Asia, several issues will be considered. Issues related to consumer protection, logistics problems of readiness, HR problems, and how the internet network can reach all regions and implement cyber security, one of which is with a partiality program or affirmative policy. Providing coverage to economically unfit areas with the Palapa Ring which will be supported by Broadband access. Also, the acceleration program later with data-driven satellites or High Throughput Satellite (Veren, 2016).

Regarding the needs of a smart city, according to the Director of e-Business, a cyber-based life with much greater challenges is needed. How is the implementation of IoT or the Internet of Things? Because this will enter all lines of life, as a reader of the situation, as a controller, and as a cyber-based mover going forward. The smart city once again returns to business processes, to problems that are then actualized into solutions by utilizing digital. IoT has a role in the future, but of course by creating these IoT-based solutions. One of the basic ways to overcome Smart City security gaps is a firewall, a network security system that monitors and controls outbound and inbound network traffic based on established security policies. Usually, firewalls provide a barrier between secure and trusted inner networks and external networks that are assumed to be unsafe, such as the Internet. But in certain cases, some systems are so

important that it is better not to connect to an outside internet connection at all.

Policies regarding data access control are also important steps to implement. In addition to guarding the system against cyberattacks, the human aspect of a system is also important. Establishing policies on who can access data, can provide strict access restrictions on data, and avoid unwanted access to important data (Veren, 2016). That is why smart cities promise great opportunities for collaboration but also promise potential cyber threats to private data.

The author interprets ASCN as governance of ASEAN's progress in making cities partners in foreign relations. But still, the city needs control and guard from the state to secure the data available in the city. Logically, cybersecurity in cities does not have implications for national security but will show national weaknesses. Because if cyber data is breached, it does not also dissolve the country or the city. But it only shows mental readiness and the quality of governance. Suddenly the government website is breached or in e-commerce, someone sends goods to a city government while the sender's data is unclear and the city government must pay the fee. And there are many other examples. Therefore, some of the arguments below as the main arguments in the prospects for cyber security in ASCN cooperation are:

1. The opportunity for ASCN to be processed (James, 2016):
 - a. Realizing transparent, flexible, accountable city governance towards e-governance and good governance.
 - b. Being able to show the competitiveness of the city based on integrated information technology connectivity will create security, comfort, and order in public services.

- c. The transformation of ASEAN society into a resilient digital society and towards good welfare.
- d. Make efficient use of physical infrastructure such as roads, environment, and economic instruments to create connectivity.
- e. Creating public participation in various state events both nationally and locally such as elections, regional elections, and other public participation that are integrated with information technology.
- f. Creating adaptation skills, and innovations in various crucial fields such as education, health, and social services. So, city life is needed to support the national interests of the country.

2. The challenges of ASCN

- a. Availability and Management of Information Data

ASCN has the challenge of creating smart cities with urban governance to provide actual, factual, and accessible data in real-time. In addition, the data must be continuous and open to the public. So that the services and information provided to the public can be a reference for decision-making.

- b. Security Challenges in Smart Cities

Smart Cities are usually handled by different institutions, without central management that can set standards for cyber security management throughout the organization. Another problem is the large number of devices connected to Smart City networks or systems, from water pumps to traffic lights, which were not originally designed to connect to the internet, so

they are not built with a cyber security approach (Kristo, 2015).

c. Smart City Development Investment is huge

The construction of smart city investment requires large funds. Therefore, the method of sharing management, sharing knowledge, and sharing donor investments will facilitate collaboration.

According to Setiawan, according to PwC's 2022 Digital Factory Transformation Survey, 64% of companies are still at the beginning of their digital transformation and only invest highly in high-income, a solid foundation driving scalable digitalization. Five factors must be prepared in digital transformation, namely a) organizational business strategy, b) increased internal resources, c) consumer experience design d) breaking through employee skepticism e) agile decision-making (Setiawan, 2023).

d. Information Technology Infrastructure

The construction of ICT infrastructure, from communication channels to sensors and actuators in physical space remains a major obstacle in taking the initiative of smart cities. Lack of infrastructure is a significant obstacle to achieving smart city goals. David Simon says that the world is heading towards digital democracy or internet democracy. Democracy is simply about the freedom to make responsible choices. He explained that information technology changes the format of political democracy and communication. This can be seen in

the pattern when information is an important content in a democracy, the resulting impact is a) there is a gap between areas that have good internet access and infrastructure and minimal areas. The impact is clear on the regions will be minus information, b) the possibility of privacy violations because if it is connected to a connection, the world no longer has a private space, c) there is a change in the pattern of digitalization-based cooperation economy, the impact is that people are still dominant in the conventional economy whose basis is cash, and d) information technology makes the development of crime more flexible, more modern with all its models (Fathun L. M., 2018).

e. Social Adaptation

Social adaptation is like a system that requires social change from the habits of citizens in general and the people of the city in particular. If there is no control, it will create new social conflicts. Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (ed) are in a latent pattern of conflict where conditions have been broken where the forces that are part of the conflict become part of the complexity of the internal conflict. In a sense, the emphasis is conflict with positive and negative behavior. Positive in the sense that the structure is running and the negative is that it inflicts social-political losses. Therefore, it must be interpreted that what happens in the era of digital democracy is a method of meaning political conditions that are adversarial, (losing wins with risks), reflective (negotiation), or integrated (balancing of power) (Fathun L. M., 2018).

f. App development

Faster development of new and innovative applications will be necessary for citizens to take maximum advantage of the data being collected. If the development of the application is limited to the management of the city people will likely be disappointed with the slow development of the application. For example, one of the main reasons behind Android's success and the wide adaptation of its play store is a huge app base where countless apps are uploaded every day (James, 2016).

Furthermore, McQuail grouped the new media into four categories (McQuail, 2000). The first interpersonal communication media consists of telephone, handphone, and e-mail. Second, interactive playing media such as computers, video games, and games on the internet. Third, information search media in the form of search engines.

Fourth, the medium of collective participation such as the use of the internet to share and exchange information, opinions, and experiences through computers where its use is not only for tools but also creates affection and emotion. It is undeniable that the presence of new media in society itself creates a new order of society, namely the birth of the concept of an information society. As McQuail points out that society will then depend on electronic information and complex communication networks and allocate most of its resources to communication activities (McQuail, 2000).

Furthermore, Kaplan divides six types of social media, collaboration projects (e.g., Wikipedia), blogs and microblogs (e.g., Twitter), content communities (e.g., Youtube, social

networking sites (e.g., Facebook), virtual games (e.g., World of Warcraft), and virtual social (e.g., second life). Social networks are central to the birth of virtual society. Everyone in cyberspace can connect with their community to communicate. Some of the big social events include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Path, and Snapchat (Kaplan, 2010).

The presence of social media in politics does not only add to the positive impact where in the era of digital democracy social media is often used to provide knowledge related to certain candidates. Social media in the era of new media is a concrete instrument for conveying messages to unreachable constituents. This means that the new media has a different where without having to meet face to face but every biased idea is obtained through the media. Collaboration between politics in the digital era and social media is also an instrument of the increasing maturity of a country in making democracy a political system of government. Social media is an inseparable instrument in the era of digital democracy. This means that social media complements the model of political communication carried out by candidates through the classic verbal way of political rhetoric. Social media provides a democratic space to advise, provide arguments and critique the political system of government.

IV. Conclusion

The author argues that ASCN cooperation is an advancement in public service governance in the ASEAN region. ASCN governance will create connections between cities and government making it easier to collaborate. ASCN is an innovation to answer the challenges of advances in information technology in public service governance. But it

should be noted that progress always goes hand in hand with challenges. Therefore, because of the ASCN, agreements at the regional level carried out by Ministry and high-ranking officials must involve the local government. Because although the cooperation is at the level of high-ranking officials, the execution is at the local level.

ASCN's cooperation through smart cities is a commitment to creating a digital society and digital connections in every area of life in the ASEAN region. It is hoped that through the cooperation of ASCN, it will create good benefits for the government and society and the progress of ASEAN innovation. However, it must be noted that such progress is a potential opportunity and a challenge. So, collaboration, coordination and sharing, and socialization are needed in policy making. It takes good knowledge to manage so that it does not become a target for hackers to carry out data security cybercrimes in the area. Especially Indonesia, which is still relatively weak in data protection and privacy on the internet. Though ASEAN is the most mobile phone user in the world. With this collaboration, it is hoped that it will be able to increase synergy and collaboration at the local, national, and regional levels.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Practice of Managing Policies of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Handling Gender-Based Violence

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Abstract

This study analyzes the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in overcoming gender-based cyber violence. Good governance within the policy and institutional framework is necessary to meet cybersecurity needs in an inclusive and gender-sensitive manner. A gender analysis tool for actors working in or with the security and justice sector to ask cross-dimensionally specific questions. The NAPRI (Need, Access, Participation, Resources, and Impact) policy tool helps its users analyze how the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina can apply the principles of good governance and gender inclusion. This study uses qualitative methods with descriptive analysis using secondary data. The findings of this study are that the legal framework of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is regulated within the framework of gender equality, the framework of violence against women, criminal law, international agreements, and conventions. The law analyzes cybersecurity and gender mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Institutional governance practices are catalysts for countering the gendered impact of cybersecurity incidents and accelerating strategies to improve representation, oversight, decision-making, and service delivery. Although the legal framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely in place, laws on violence against women are not well implemented, especially when trying the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, there is a need for better cohesion and cooperation between different stakeholders.

Keywords: NAPRI tools, governance, Bosnia and Herzegovina, gender, cyber violence, gender-based cyber violence

I. Introduction

Online gender-based violence is increasing in the Balkans, with more than 35 examples of online gender-based violence against women and girls from January 2021 to March 2022 in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia (B.I.R.D, 2022). It is rooted in patriarchal norms and spread through social media. While both men and women are victims of violence perpetrated through digital means, almost, as a rule, online violence is not a gender-neutral crime. Even as people have access to and use the Internet, women, and girls worldwide must think twice about what they say, how they say it, and with whom they interact, as countless forms and manifestations of violence lurk before their eyes. Online gender-based violence tends to reflect and exacerbate gender norms and inequalities in the real world.

Technology-facilitated abuse silences individuals and suppresses their opinions, violating free speech and human rights advocacy. Women in public and political roles are disproportionately subject to cyber violence and gender disinformation campaigns, which aim to discredit, humiliate, intimidate and silence them in all areas of public life. This can negatively impact women's participation in the democratic process and intrinsically undermine government structure. According to the monitoring Balkan Investigative Reporting Network revealed six general trends in which digital violence occurs

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(1) Online attacks with clear manifestations of hate speech; (2) online attacks that follow domestic violence; (3) Online attacks that lead to physical violence; (4) Online attacks that involve or cause a breach of privacy; (5) Online attacks against publicly exposed groups of women, particularly journalists and politicians; (6) Online attacks against already vulnerable groups, particularly minorities, and migrants (Karic & Ristic, 2022). Cyber violence can lead to further acts of transnational crime with profound human rights implications. Connections made in cyberspace and misuse of social media networks are the most commonly used by traffickers to trap victims into sexual exploitation schemes through various manipulation tactics (UNODC, 2018).

The Digital Rights Monitoring Database report explains that a case in Bosnia and Herzegovina published articles that described women's physical appearance as sexist and humiliating for their age. The article resulted in verbal abuse, ridicule, stigmatization, and further discrimination against women by social media users in the comments section. In that case, neither the media outlet nor the social media platform removed the content even though it violated journalistic ethical standards and community guidelines. In addition, domestic violence is a trigger for online attacks and gender-based violence. In addition, news about the murder of women and stories about victims reporting rapists attracted misogynistic and offensive comments, with particular regard to "blaming the victim" and "victim humiliating" comments from users who claimed that the victim "got what she wanted, deserved" (B.I.R.D, 2022).

Figure 1 shows the database found in 2019 - 2023, with the highest cases in 2021 related to digital environmental manipulation

and propaganda. The database resulting from Digital Monitor covers the status of digital rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The database will document violations of digital rights and freedoms, with case descriptions and citations to appropriate sources to provide data on violations and highlight the use of technology to highlight social issues in the target country. The database categorizes cases by type of violation, means of attack, and actors, including affected parties and attackers. Understanding the social context and monitoring trends in digital rights and freedoms violations is important. Ongoing monitoring of digital threats and reporting of digital freedom violations will be carried out according to a detailed methodology, using guidelines based on the knowledge and expertise of the SHARE Foundation. The database is part of the wider BIRN (The Balkan Research Network) Research Resource Desk (BIRD) (B.I.R.D, 2022).




Fig. 1. Overview of Violations of Digital Rights and Freedoms in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: B.I.R.D. (2022)

Based on the survey findings, OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) published a 2019 report investigating women's experiences of group violence and dedicated to how conflict affects women's experiences of violence. Figure 2. Findings from the OSCE quantitative and qualitative study in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on violence against women (VaW) showed that the most serious incident of sexual harassment for 28 percent of women surveyed was

inappropriate stares or looked that made them feel intimidated, followed by intrusive questions about someone's private life (16 percent), unwanted touching, hugging, or kissing (15.3 percent), sexually suggestive comments or offensive jokes (10.7 percent), inappropriate invitations for dating (8.1 percent), disturbing comments about someone's physical appearance (7.4 percent), inappropriate advances on social networks (6.2 percent) (OSCE, 2022).

Type of sexual harassment	OSCE survey average	BIH	FBIH	RS
Inappropriate invitations to go out on dates	9.8	7.1	7.3	6.8
Intrusive and offensive questions about private life	14.2	11.6	10.6	13.7
Intrusive and offensive comments about appearance	11.4	8.5	7.5	10.4
Inappropriate staring or leering	19.2	16.4	15.8	17.8
Inappropriate offensive advances on social networking websites or in internet chat rooms	6.6	6.6	6.1	7.7
The most severe forms				
Unwelcome touching, hugging or kissing	11.4	7.3	7.0	7.8
Sexually suggestive comments or offensive jokes	12.0	8.9	7.8	11.1
Sending or showing sexually explicit pictures, photos or offensive gifts	2.7	1.7	1.3	2.1
Indecent exposure	4.2	2.3	2.5	2.0
Being forced to watch/look at pornographic material against one's wishes	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.2
Unwanted and offensive sexually explicit emails or text messages	4.0	3.3	3.2	3.9

Note: All women aged 16-74 (regions: IS, FY, BIH, 2, RS, FBH+RS, RS+10,20)
Source: OSCE-led Survey on Violence against Women, 2019

Fig. 2. Prevalence of different types of sexual harassment, %

Source: OSCE (2022)

Good security sector governance is a valuable concept for framing governance standards for advancing gender equality in cybersecurity. D.C.A.F., OSCE/ODIHR, U.N. Women Gender and Security introduce tools and policy briefs focusing on specific security and justice issues and providers of security sector governance, security sector reform, and gender, with more focused attention on what gender equality is. Moreover, how to achieve it in specific sectors. The tool, called N.A.P.R.I. (needs, access, participation, resources, impact), is intended for anyone involved in the design, implementation, monitoring, or evaluation of programs and projects related to the security and justice sector, whether at the

international, regional, or national level. This paper uses a case study of the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina to analyze how government governance (legal frameworks and institutional institutions) overcomes gender-based cyber violence with the DCAF NAPRRRI toolkit (Serrana, 2019). This research uses qualitative and descriptive research to provide a more profound interpretation through secondary data from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina publications, journal articles, and others.

II. Theoretical Framework

The security and justice sector is the political environment that decides what has been measured is political because what is measured refers to what will do. Suppose the project design does not integrate a gender perspective. In that case, gender will not count, and the project will not promote gender equality, which is an integral part of good security sector governance. Gender analysis is "a critical examination of how different gender roles, activities, needs, opportunities and rights affect women, men, girls and boys and other gender identities in particular policy areas, situations or contexts." Gender analysis examines, for example, the relationship between women and men, their access to and control over resources, and the constraints they face relative to one another. Concerning the security and justice sector, gender analysis may focus on women, men, girls, and boys and other forms of insecurity and gender identity barriers to accessing justice and the quality of their representation and participation in the security and justice sector.

A good SSG applies the principles of good governance in the security sector,

including Accountability, Transparency, Rule of Law, Participation, Responsiveness, Effectiveness, and Efficiency (DCAF, 2015). Good security sector governance further requires the justice and security sector to understand the diverse needs of society and meet these needs as part of security provision, management, and oversight (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN Women, 2019). The following explains these principles and how they can apply in cybersecurity (Klopper, Rizmal, & Sekulosk, n.d.). First, accountability has clear expectations for the provision of security, and independent authorities monitor whether these expectations are met and effectively impose sanctions if they are not. Cybersecurity requires more close cooperation between public and private actors than any other security sector. For example, state cybersecurity actors must work closely with online service providers and telecommunications networks, usually owned by private businesses. Therefore, surveillance actors must look beyond state actors' work and consider the roles and responsibilities of non-state actors involved in cybersecurity. Second, Transparency information is freely available and accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and their implementation. The principle of transparency also needs to be applied to cyber security. In addition, the division of roles and responsibilities of various cybersecurity actors must be clearly defined. It can be verified transparently so that the process of providing security can run smoothly with multiple actors working together.

Third, in the rule of law, all persons and institutions, including states, are subject to publicly known laws enforced impartially and consistent with international and national human rights norms and standards. Cybersecurity governance requires a new approach to regulation as it needs to consider

the roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors in providing effective cybersecurity. The legal and regulatory framework relating to the provision and oversight of cybersecurity should be based on the rule of law. It should be developed in line with sound governance principles. Fourth, Responsiveness. The Institute is sensitive to the different security needs of all sections of the population and carries out its mission in the spirit of a service culture. Cybersecurity must take an approach where the security needs of individuals and the people are at the core of protection. Therefore, policies relating to the provision and supervision of cybersecurity must ensure that the needs of all members of society to participate fully and safely in online life are accurately reflected and protected. Fifth, Effectiveness: Institutions fulfill their respective roles, responsibilities, and missions with high professional standards. Cybersecurity needs to be delivered effectively to networks and citizens, with clearly defined parameters based on an analysis of the country's needs and population. Finally, in Efficiency, Institutions make the best possible use of public resources in fulfilling their respective roles, responsibilities, and missions. In addition, cybersecurity governance and oversight processes need to be adapted in a way that allows them to support the efficient provision of security for various actors in cyberspace.

The DCAF NAPRI tool is simple for thinking about how good governance and gender equality principles can be applied to the security and justice sector. This tool enables actors working in or with the security and justice sector to conduct gender analyses by encouraging users of the tool to ask questions across multiple dimensions of a specific context (DCAF; OSCE/ODIHR; UN Women, 2019). This tool can help users

analyze the context, project ideas, policies, laws, or other actions/interventions that use nothing more than research or reflection. It can also serve as a framework for extensive participatory gender analysis using various data collection methods (DCAF; OSCE/ODIHR; UN Women, 2019). The NAPRI tool can be adapted to any context and is based on the principles of good governance in the security sector. This provides a good starting point for identifying how and to what extent gender has been considered in the context of a good SSG. Applying the NAPRI gender analysis tool to a cybersecurity context reveals the following list of possible questions:




Fig. 3. List of possible questions by applying the NAPRI gender analysis tool to a cybersecurity context

Source: processed by the author from Serrano Lorraine Andaya, DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN Women (2019)

From the questions posed in the NAPRI toolkit, it may be useful to focus on the principles of responsiveness and participation and advance a gender perspective at the institutional level. Responsiveness as a governance mechanism needs to apply a gender perspective and build sensitivity to the security needs of individual internet and ICT users in their constituencies. The safety needs of women, men, girls, boys, and people of different gender identities and expressions online can be very different. Therefore, evaluating and analyzing those needs and supervision are important before initiating policy changes. Participation is useful for combating the gender impact of cybersecurity incidents and addressing critical issues such as cyber VAWG, government actors tasked with the provision, management, and oversight of cybersecurity must be able to understand and represent the perspectives and security needs of the people they serve to protect. Therefore, the governance of provision and oversight of cybersecurity needs to be carried out with a participatory approach (Dorokhova, Vale, Laçi, & Mahmutovic, 2021).

III. Results and Discussion

3.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina Government Policy Governance Instruments in Overcoming Gender-Based Virtual Violence

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are three gender centers established as public institutions (government bodies), namely the BiH Gender Equality Agency, the BiH Federation Gender Center, and the Republika Srpska Government Gender Equality Center. Gender Agencies and Centers are essential instruments in initiating and implementing activities in the field of gender equality. In both

the executive and the legislature, institutional mechanisms on gender equality include agencies at the municipal, canton, entity, and state levels. The Gender Equality Committee of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly (Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.) exists at the state level. At the entity level, there is the DPR, the Gender Equality Committee and the BiH Federation (House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH, n.d.) and the DPR RI Equal Opportunities Committee Republika Srpska (Equal Opportunities Committee of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska website, n.d.). The cantonal assembly in the BiH Federation has established a committee for gender equality. At the local level, there are committees in municipal assemblies in almost all municipalities throughout BiH. The law in BiH does not explicitly regulate online gender violence. However, several frameworks and conventions can form the basis for such regulations: gender equality frameworks, violence against women frameworks, criminal law (BiH and entities), and international treaties and conventions.

A. Gender Equality Framework

The principle of gender equality and the obligation to achieve gender equality in BiH is guaranteed by various legal actions in national laws and regulations and international legal documents signed and ratified by BiH. Public policy also applies. One of the most important is the BiH Gender Action Plan 2018–2022 (Agency for Gender Equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.). The obligation to adopt a Gender Action Plan is enshrined in the Gender Equality Law (Law on Protection from Domestic Violence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.). This law addresses the main problems of men and women in the country, intending to achieve absolute gender equality. It regulates, promotes, and protects gender equality, guarantees equal

opportunities and treatment for all people regardless of gender in public and private spheres of society, and protects against discrimination based on gender. In particular, the law prohibits discrimination based on gender, direct and indirect gender-based discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and victimization.

The law prohibition of discrimination (Amendments to the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, 2016); establish a framework for exercising equal rights and opportunities for all in BiH. Moreover, provide a system of protection against discrimination. *Discrimination* is defined as "different treatment, including exclusion, limitation or preference based on actual or alleged reasons against a person or group of people and those associated with them based on race, color, language, religion, ethnicity, disability, age, national origin or social, affiliation with national minorities, political or other beliefs, property status, membership in a trade union or other association, education, social and gender status, sexual orientation, gender identity, sexual characteristics and any other circumstances which have a purpose or consequence of preventing or jeopardizing the recognition, enjoyment or realization of any person based on equality, rights, and freedoms in all areas of life."

Sexual harassment is defined in the BiH Gender Equality Act and the Prohibition of Discrimination Act as: "any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that seeks to violate the dignity of a person or group of persons, or which achieves such an effect, especially when the behavior creates a frightening, hostile, demeaning, or abusive environment."

Public policies for specific sectors, coordinated by the Gender Equality Agency or Gender Center, include Action Plans for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women's Peace and Security (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Gender equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Strategy for Implementing the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees); gender responsive budgeting activities (Agency for Gender Equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.); (Gender Equality Act in Bosnia and Herzegovania, n.d.).

B. Framework for Violence Against Women

Violence against women is recognized by law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the law has no specific provision regarding using ICT to commit such violence. No lex specialist directly acknowledges violence (against women) that involves the use of technology. Family Law addresses violence against women in BiH, but there is still no consolidated family law at the national level. There are three laws governing family matters: the Family Law of the Federation BiH (Family Law of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.), the Family Law of Republika Srpska, and the Family Law of the Bryko (Family Law of Brčko District, n.d.). In particular, domestic violence is regulated in more detail by the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence (LPDV): LPDV Federation BiH (Law on Protection from Domestic Violence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.), LPDV Republika Srpska (Law on Protection from Domestic Violence of the Federation of Republic Srpska, n.d.), and LPDV Kabupaten Brýko (Law on Protection from Domestic Violence of the Federation of Republic Srpska, n.d.). LPDV has the function of

protecting survivors of violence, while the handling of violence is based on the Criminal Code. Domestic violence is recognized in criminal law as a crime. In addition, *domestic violence* is also defined as a form of gender-based violence.

C. Criminal Code and Framework

BiH, because it divides authority, has four KUHP and Criminal Procedure Code: KUHP BiH (Criminal Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.), KUHP Federation of BiH (Criminal Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.), KUHP Republika Srpska (Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska) and the Criminal Law of Brcko BiH (Criminal Law of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.). The criminal code in BiH criminalizes domestic violence and other offenses. It is defined in a gender-neutral manner, except for violations which, by their nature, can only make women victims. However, the law provides a basis for prosecuting perpetrators and protecting victims of gender-based violence. It creates a framework for the general prevention of violence against women, among other crimes. Significant legislative changes occurred in 2017 when the new Republika Srpska Criminal Code was adopted and harmonized with the Istanbul Convention. The Criminal Code in Republika Srpska now regulates crimes such as molestation/harassment, association to commit a criminal act of trafficking in persons and children, sexual extortion, and the crime of satisfying sexual desire in front of children (also recognized in the criminal law of the BiH Federation and Brýko BiH District). And criminal acts of harassment or intimidation in the workplace.

The Criminal Code of the BiH Federation (Article 183) and the Brýko District of BiH (Article 180), and the Criminal Code of

Republika Srpska (Article 150) recognize, among other things, the following crimes: Endangering security; Persecution/harassment (defined only by the Criminal Code Republika Srpska and the BiH and Brčko District Criminal Law Federation does not define it); Unauthorized wiretapping and audio recording; Unauthorized optical imaging, i.e., photography; Sexual harassment (defined only by the Criminal Code Republika Srpska – BiH and Brčko District Criminal Law Federation does not recognize it, implying unequal protection of victims of sexual harassment across the country); Forced sexual intercourse (Office on Women's Health, resources on sexual coercion, n.d.) (BiH and Brčko District Federation Criminal Law); Sexual extortion (KUHP Republika Srpska); Blackmail 1979; Obscene and lewd behavior.

It is justified that the relationship between the online digital world and the physical world is a continuum and cannot be separated. Because the recording and distribution of rape videos via the internet reinforces and perpetuates the trauma and violence experienced by victims/survivors, in cases of sexual coercion, the internet becomes a means to access and maintain control over the victims (Vasudevan, 2018). The law does not explicitly mention the words "online" or "internet" and does not prevent law enforcers, prosecutors, and judges from extending legal protection to victims/survivors.

D. International Treaties and Conventions

BiH is a signatory to various international conventions and legal documents that guarantee the full enjoyment of human rights, freedoms, and gender equality. 101 The most important of them, which can be used in cases of violence against women with the use of technology, are: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, 1948; European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1953; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979; European Council Convention on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), 2011; Cyber Crime Convention (Budapest Convention), 2001.

3.2. Institutional Governance of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Of all the questions posed in the NAPRI toolkit, it may be helpful to focus on the principles of responsiveness and participation and the advancement of a gender perspective at the institutional level. Implement legislative measures that define and criminalize sexist hate speech incidents and apply them to all media, including reporting procedures and appropriate sanctions. More proactive detection and reporting procedures for sexist hate speech should also be encouraged concerning all media, including the internet and new media.

A. CERT in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is a group of information security experts responsible for protecting against, detecting, and responding to an organization's cybersecurity incidents. CERT may focus on resolving incidents such as data breaches and denial of service attacks but also provides warnings and incident handling guidelines. CERT conducts ongoing public awareness campaigns and engages in research aimed at improving security systems. In 2011 the BiH Council of Ministers considered and adopted a strategy (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011) to establish a CERT in BiH by the Ministry of Security. To date, there is no

CERT at the state level. In June 2011, the BiH Republika Srpska Information Security Act established a national team for dealing with computer security incidents in the entity and placed it within the Republika Srpska Information Society Agency. In June 2015 Republika Srpska CERT started operations.

The proactive actions (Republika Srpska CERT website, n.d.) of CERT Republika Srpska include dealing with online threats. The incident reporting form (Republika Srpska CERT incident reporting form, n.d.) includes the sending of SPAM messages, distribution, and sharing of copyrighted content, distribution of content prohibited by law, and incidents not covered by the existing classification. It is important to note that this CERT only covers incidents in the cyberspace of the Republika Srpska entity. BiH has not adopted a cybersecurity strategy and cybercrime. However, the issue of cybercrime and cyber terrorism is discussed in the strategy to combat organized crime at BiH (2014-2016) (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.) and the strategy for preventing and combating terrorism (2015-2020) (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.) both with national security in mind.

Integrate a gender equality perspective into all policies, programs, and research related to artificial intelligence to avoid the potential risks of technology perpetuating sexism and gender stereotypes and examine how artificial intelligence can help close the gender gap and eliminate sexism. That includes measures to increase women and girls' participation in information and technology as students, professionals, and decision-makers. In addition, the design of data-driven algorithms must factor into gender-based dynamics. Transparency around

this issue should be increased, and awareness about the potential for gender bias in big data; solutions to increase accountability should be offered.

B. Gender Participation at the Institutional Level

They create practical and legitimate security and judicial services that meet international and national standards. Recommendation 16 (b) CEDAW/C/BIH/CO/4-5 (2018), is mainly implemented through the promotion of gender institutional mechanisms, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Awareness-raising campaigns and reducing tolerance for violence continue. Activism campaigns against gender-based violence and other media and civic campaigns raise awareness of violence about human rights violations and promote protection mechanisms. There is significant cooperation and assistance provided by the media. At the same time, the Press Code and Radio and TV Broadcasting Code contain provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sex and promoting gender equality.

In 2016, in response to Recommendation 16(c) CEDAW/C/BIH/CO/4-5 adopted the Law on Providing Free Legal Aid, which regulates the forms of free legal aid, service providers, and users, their terms and method of implementation, financing, and control, as well as monitoring its implementation. In addition, the law on free legal aid has also been adopted in hospitals and eight (out of ten) cantons in F BiH. In BD BiH, the Office of Free Legal Aid law is applied within the Court of Appeals jurisdiction (CEDAW/C/BIH/6, 2018).

There has been visible progress in a systematic approach to introducing gender equality principles into the work of relevant defense and security sector institutions. Gender equality training is included in the regular training program. The network of designated gender focal points across all defense and security agencies is expanded. The sex-disaggregated database has been further improved and updated regularly. The introduction of affirmative action increased women's interest in the military and police professions, even increasing the number of women sent to peacekeeping missions (CEDAW/C/BIH/6, 2018). Law enforcement agencies and competent authorities also provide gender-sensitive training for law enforcement officers (Criminal Law). That is to support efforts to create a gender-responsive justice system and transparent procedures to be followed by the police and throughout the justice system to enforce the law in the case of ICT-based violence (against women).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, women's participation in the legislative and executive bodies at all levels is about 20%. The election law adopted in 1998 introduced gender quotas for candidates in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following several amendments to the Election Law, the current election quota is regulated in Article 4.19. Quotas are mandatory, set a relatively high percentage of 40%, and have mandatory ranking-sequence rules. The Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the authority to reject any list that is not made following this rule (Susmel, 2019).

As a result of the 2018 general elections, women's representation in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is

currently 23.8%. Of the three members (chairman, one female representative, and one male representative), the first representative of the People's Representative Council is a woman. That is an example of the PARTICIPANT of actions regulated in the DPR's Rules of Procedure. In entity parliaments, women's participation on average was 19.7% (21.4% in the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 18% in the National Assembly of Republika Srpska). In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of women increased by more than 4%. Furthermore, there was a decrease in the number of women elected to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska. At the Cantonese level, the average female is 31% (Susmel, 2019).

Progress is seen in the implementation of Recommendation 28 (paragraph ce) of "Closing observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (CEDAW/C/BIH/CO/4-5), with the establishment of a club of women parliamentarians of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – the first inter-party club in the country. In cooperation with other clubs and working parties, the club works on creating and adopting measures and oversight of legislation in all areas of interest to women. An action plan of activities is developed, and priority topics are determined in collaboration with institutional gender mechanisms for lobbying cooperation through thematic sessions, roundtables, and meetings with non-governmental organizations. Currently, two women ministers are on the Committee of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a significant increase (25% female ministers) in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Susmel, 2019).

IV. Conclusion

The analysis findings show that gender-based cyber violence has become an exponential security threat in the last decade. Cybersecurity governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina impacts everyone, women, men, girls, boys, and anyone with diverse gender identities and expressions. Therefore, actors responsible for developing new strategies should apply a gender lens when identifying problems and include their recommendations in national strategies and other documents. Lack of representation and equal participation of people of different sexes in policy-making and decision-making processes can lead to security needs being ignored and not addressed due to a lack of perspective. Analysis with the NAPRI tool in observing the policy framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina in combating cyber-gender-based violence is still weak. The online gender-based violence law has not explicitly been regulated in drafting. The legal instruments of Bosnia and Herzegovina still need to expand the strategy to regulate the flow mechanism of reporting mechanisms, protection, and effective sentencing according to a gender lens.

Most of the parliaments of Bosnia and Herzegovina are exclusively gender-neutral. Lawmakers and public policymakers should collaborate with relevant stakeholders to develop sound governance principles for legislation on violence against women and coordinate the implementation of gender-sensitive legislation. Therefore, the existing cooperation of institutional mechanisms for gender equality lays the groundwork for the development and adoption of a gender action plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a strategic political document which, at the state level,

establishes the basis for action for the introduction of gender equality and the implementation of obligations. Law in all relevant areas of society. FBiH, territorial ministries and institutions that the government must be competent, cooperate with institutional mechanisms for gender equality and organizations civil society, must improve the referral system for survivors of gender-based online violence, especially for vulnerable groups, such as women and girls, as well as strengthen and standardize protocols at the local level. It is also important to ensure that disadvantaged groups, including women with disabilities and from minority communities, can access available services.

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Research Article

Sporting Event as Strategy of Soft Diplomacy: Case Study 20th National Games (PON XX) Papua, Indonesia

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Abstract

Indonesia National Sports Games (PON XX) has been successfully held far away from the capital city Jakarta. Located in Papua, PON 20th became the first national sports event hosted in the far east of Indonesia's province. The agenda is more than just a quadrennial sporting event for the Indonesian Government. The event has become an instrument strategy of soft diplomacy that aimed to deal with domestic and international issues in Papua. This research aimed to discuss the relations between The National Sports Week (PON) XX in Papua and the sports diplomacy for the Indonesian Government to understand development agendas in eastern Indonesia better. The author uses a qualitative study case method to discover how far the sports event can contribute positively towards domestic and international issues of the country. The data source will be gathered from secondary resources, including journals, articles, news, and documents for analysis purposes. The author argues that the National Sports Event (PON) Papua 20th has positively impacted the

Indonesian national effort to develop eastern Indonesia.

Keywords: national image, sports event, soft diplomacy, development, Papua

I. Introduction

In 1948, the first Indonesian national games were held in Surakarta under President Soekarno's regime. After the independence declarations, Indonesia's sovereignty was still in doubt. Consequently, the Indonesian sports team could not attend the London Olympics in 1948. The other reason why the Indonesian sports team was rejected is that the national sports association (PORI), which was formed in 1946, has not been yet become a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Hadi, 2021). Even though the first Indonesia national games (PON) was held amid the upheaval of the independence struggle, the event has been successfully held with more than forty thousand spectators from the Surakarta regency.

Under President Soekarno, the Indonesian National Games was more than just a sports event. The Indonesian government realized that organizing the national games brings international and domestic awareness, which can be managed as public diplomacy. Nygard (2013) explained that hosting a sports event can be used as a policy instrument for either domestic or foreign policy. It can be exclusively used as a foreign policy instrument; it may also address domestic issues. Indeed, sports politics need to be conciliatory as the fundamental values of sports are fair play, anti-racism, and respect. Sports diplomacy has been used as a form of soft diplomacy. The

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concept of soft diplomacy was initially contained in Nye's book, *Bound to lead* (Nye Jr. (1990), pp. 25–48, 188–202) to enlighten US policy-makers to understand the role and limitation of post-cold war hegemony. The concept of soft diplomacy can be defined as a power of persuasion in a non-coercive manner to convince another actor.

Last year, The Indonesian government successfully held the 20th National Games (PON XX) 2021 in Papua. This four-year national sports event was delayed a year before due to the Covid-19 pandemic. President Joko Widodo opened the event in Lucas Enembe Stadium to welcome athletes from 34 provinces in Indonesia. As reported, 7039 athletes participated, separated into 37 sports categories, and competed for 681 gold medals, 681 silver medals, and 871 bronze medals (Setpres, 2021). The 20th PON was then followed by the national Paralympic games on November 2-15, held in Papua. For the next National Games (2024), Aceh and North Sumatera will take up the baton as host and co-host.

In this article, we purpose that through organizing national sports events (PON XX), especially in Papua, the government of Indonesia has been employed sport as the instrument of soft diplomacy. Sports diplomacy addresses international and domestic issues as follows. The international issue, the government of Indonesia frequently being accused by the international actors which poorly pay attention to the development of eastern Indonesia. Moreover, Papua as a domestic issue revolves around human rights violations, under-development, discrimination, racism, and separatism movement (Perkasa, 2021; Singh, 2019). In this article, we develop the concept of soft power beyond policy instruments employed by the government to address international

perception towards development in Papua. Furthermore, the article expands the role of sports politics to encourage domestic peacebuilding and nation-building.

II. Method

This research employed the qualitative method as it utilized a theoretical framework to gather and analyze data. Bryman (2004) explained that the qualitative descriptive analysis focuses on the quality of the analysis regarding theory or concept as the starting guide. Moreover, the study also uses case study analysis to obtain a specific picture of the field's complexity (De Vaus & de Vaus, 2001).

The data collection technique of this study is based on two steps; first, academic publications focusing on the utilization of sport as soft diplomacy were screened. Second, any relevant online media archives, both international and domestic, were collected and analyzed. The limitation of this research is the short supply of relevant academic literature discussed in the latest PON XX. Therefore, the paper represents an attempt to understand the strategy of the Indonesian government to employ sport as an instrument for soft diplomacy to address international and domestic issues.

To improve internal validity, Bryman (2004) explained employing triangulation during the process of data collection. The triangulation allowed the author to validate the data from various sources. Furthermore, the triangulation results were analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis to explore the strategy of the Indonesian government employing sports diplomacy as an instrument to address the international and domestic issues in Papua.

III. Theoretical Framework

a. Soft Power Diplomacy

International politics are centered upon the concept of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Nye (2004) explained that in international politics, Power is the capacity to influence people, to generate outcomes, and it involves connections. He explained that power can be distinguished into hard power and soft power. Hard and soft power are interchangeable since they both refer to the capacity to influence the conduct of others to accomplish one's goals. They differ in degree, both in terms of the character of their conduct and the tangibility of its resources. The capacity to influence what others do might be based on force or persuasion.




Fig. 1. Hard Power and Soft Power

Source: Nye (2004)

Nye (2004) believes that soft power is founded on a set of universal principles. He explained that soft power is the ability to influence people to desire the same results as we want, which includes knowing how others perceive our message and fine-tuning them appropriately. Persuasion is a tool of power that significantly alters view. Nye (2011) identified three fundamental factors greatly influence a nation's soft power: its culture, its political ideals (when it upholds them both at domestic and international), and its foreign policy (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority). He believes that the target's perspective is crucial when employing

soft power, furthermore the targets as vital as the agents. The art of persuasion and attraction are the instruments to conduct social constructs. Soft power is a dance which requires partners (Nye, 2011)

The capacity to influence others by constructive methods such as defining the agenda, persuading, and inspiring positive attraction in order to achieve desired objectives is known as soft power (Nye, 2011). Co-optive power the capacity can be based on the attractiveness of one's culture and beliefs or on the ability to manage the agenda of political choices in such a way that others refrain from expressing certain desires due to their perceived unrealistic nature (Nye, 2004). Nye (2004) defined hard power in international relations as military and economic capabilities, as they are the primary weapons capable of posing threats or providing incentives. He recommends that, rather than relying solely on military force or economic penalties to draw players and affect agendas, other types of power should be used in international politics to attract players and influence agendas (Nye, 2004).

In diplomacy, and indeed politics in general, evokes images of logical negotiating with a give-and-take procedure. Diplomacy and the ability to attract and persuade others are gaining importance, yet public diplomacy is undergoing significant transformations (Nye, 2019). The method utilized is essentially strategic in the sense that any actions one performs considers the actions of others. Eventually, the decisions are oriented toward outcomes decided by the parties involved in the collaborations. However, certain parts of diplomacy and politics do not require an ongoing process of strategic give-and-take. They are influenced by societal standards or opinions of what is positive or negative. Persuasion processes are described by a

mechanism such as image-building, creating a platform for discourse and trust-building, reconciliation, and integration (Nygård & Gates, 2013).

b. Sport Diplomacy

For such a long time, Sport, society, and politics have a long-standing and fascinating relationship (Murray, 2013). However, the theoretical underpinnings of the interaction between sports and diplomacy have not been adequately studied and explicated. It is found in the present research that in order to elucidate the link between the two ideas, they are seen as case-specific studies (Murray & Pigman, 2014). Sports diplomacy, as a subfield of diplomacy, falls under the umbrella of public diplomacy. Sports diplomacy is one of a country's most respectable, fair, and powerful diplomatic weapons (Kurt, 2014 cited in ÖZSARI, 2018). Sports diplomacy serves four fundamental purposes. These include promoting peace, gathering nations together, offering a platform for interaction, fostering understanding and confidence, and developing it via the use of a number of sports diplomacy methods (Nygård & Gates, 2013). Furthermore Trunkos (2017) also explained that sports in diplomacy could provide an unofficial meeting place as well as a reason for world leaders to get together and start talking to one another. Bridging the cultural and linguistic gaps between nations while also the benefits of diplomacy through sports.

Sports diplomacy, as a subset of public diplomacy activities, is both a representation of soft power and a tool for international engagement. Organizations on a global scale, national brands, media, and technology (ÖZSARI, 2018). In recent days, hosting a sport event is more than just a sport agenda. This should cover the perception of sporting

achievement in as much depth as is necessary, but they should also handle other conceivable dimensions of international prestige such as political, economic, or cultural issues (Haut et al., 2017).

V.Cha (Cha, 2009) explained that sport generates not just physical but also political change within a nation. This shift could be evaluated in terms of domestic or international policy. States that host major sporting events such as the Olympics undergo a tremendous renovation in which entire towns are completely rebuilt and retrofitted with new infrastructure to satisfy the current and user-friendly criteria of the globalized traveler. As FIFA World Cup successfully held in South Africa, it's an important foreign policy tools and have greatly benefited South Africa and encourage rising source of soft power the African Continent in the International System (E Castro, 2013). In 2022, the government of Indonesia successfully hosted world class Moto GP and Formula E in Lombok and Jakarta.

According to the government, hosting two major sporting events will improve Indonesia's economy and prestige. These two cities will benefit from economic stimulation and multiplier effects, as well as a positive global reputation for country branding. The government believes that by utilizing sport diplomacy, it can increase tourism and attract new investors to Indonesia (Hantoro, 2021). Papua in preparation for National Sport Games 20th (PON XX) Construction of state-of-the-art airport terminals, as well as a national campaign to renovate restroom facilities and a stadium venue, all underwent rapid physical modifications. When Papua hosts a national sporting event, the region undergoes a dramatic and rapid physical shift.

c. Human Security

Human security is a multidimensional concept that emphasizes the protection and well-being of individuals by focusing on their safety, freedom, and dignity. It goes beyond traditional notions of state security and recognizes that threats to human security can arise from various sources, including poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and political instability. This theoretical framework aims to analyze the key dimensions of human security and the factors that contribute to its attainment.

One crucial dimension of human security is economic security. Poverty and economic inequality can undermine individuals' well-being and expose them to various risks, including food insecurity, lack of access to healthcare, and limited educational opportunities. Economic policies that promote inclusive growth, income redistribution, and social safety nets are essential for enhancing economic security (Sen, 1999). Additionally, addressing structural factors that perpetuate poverty, such as unequal distribution of resources and limited job opportunities, is crucial for ensuring long-term economic security (Stewart, 2010). Through the national sports agenda, there is a direct and indirect impact on improving the economy of the people in Papua. The infrastructure built also has an economic impact even after the event agenda is over. This is expected to be a driving force for the economy of the community, especially the Papuan people.

Political and social security is also a key dimension of human security. Individuals' safety and freedom are directly influenced by the quality of governance, respect for human rights, and the presence of effective institutions that uphold the rule of law. Promoting democratic governance, ensuring

civic participation, and protecting human rights are crucial for enhancing political security (Paris, 2001). Additionally, addressing conflicts, reducing violence, and promoting peaceful resolution mechanisms are essential for fostering a secure political environment (United Nations, 2004). Politically, the Indonesian government tries to show that with the national sports agenda, it shows good political stability in the Papua region. The Central and local governments work hand in hand in encouraging the realization of infrastructure, social and economic development that can be directly felt by the Papuan people. pride as a host is also a positive impact of the XX PON which then creates a sense of confidence for the community that they are not left behind from other provinces.

Through this national sports event, the government of Indonesia shows the effort to assure that the national development is not centralized only in the western part but also in the eastern part of Indonesia. The government assure through this event, is not only about sports event per se, but it is more about national binding and integration. People to people approach is deployed to conduct more constructive voices from the people in Papua. In summary, human security encompasses economic, political, and social dimensions that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Achieving human security requires addressing structural factors, promoting inclusive policies, and ensuring the provision of basic needs and rights. By adopting a comprehensive approach that addresses the multidimensional nature of human security, societies can strive towards creating a safer, more equitable, and sustainable world for all individuals.

IV. Discussion

The author focuses on mechanisms through which the Indonesian government-

employed sports diplomacy by hosting national games PON XX in Papua constitutes an instrument of soft power. The first mechanism is International Image-building by constructing infrastructure in Papua would brush off the allegation that the government has left Papua behind in development. Second, sports diplomacy can be a platform for dialogue between the government and the local people. Third, hosting PON XX in Papua would build trust among stakeholders involved in this event, such as central government, local government, local communities, and individuals. Fourth, from the economic perspective, PON XX has positively contributed to boost economic sectors in Papua like construction, transportation, and hospitality. The national sports event provides a fast-track economic development towards local government and people in Papua. The finally, as sport used as an instrument of soft diplomacy, the government hopes that it can be a catalyst for achieving reconciliation and integration to the separatist group in Papua to rejoin with NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia).

issues have concerned the Indonesian government in international forums. As the issue of separatism emerged in Papua, some of the Pacific Ocean countries are always vocal supporting the Papua separatism movement (Sabir, 2018). The Indonesian government has been realized the action of the Pacific Ocean countries will threaten the sovereignty and integration of the nation, thus they undertake some actions as public diplomacy to dampen the international pressure. Some of the aid approaches by utilizing instruments of economic cooperation, technology, training, scholarships, development, agriculture, and livestock still have not shifted their stance to support Indonesian sovereignty in international forums (Sabir, 2018). Thus, conducting national sport events in Papua is one of the soft diplomacies to create image building in international arenas.

This image building owned by the country is one of the effective tools in delivering a clear message to the target audience through sports diplomacy. Sport provides a potent prism through which national identity is refracted. It influences a nation's self-perception and the image it wishes to project to the rest of the world. The desire to host and do well in large events is inextricably linked to a nation's sense of self-image and the pride of its citizens. Participation and performance in global sport are also tied to a nation's international prestige and the message the government want to convey to the world about the nation (Cha, 2009). Gok (2018) said that the reputation and the image of the national brands owned by the country also affect the reputation and the image of the country. In short, the national image contributes to the country's international recognition, reputation, and brands. The Indonesian government has shown that by conducting national sports games in Papua, the development of



Fig. 2. Sporting Event as the strategy of soft diplomacy

Source: Modeled by authors

a. Image building

The government of Indonesia has always been stereotyped of being a negligent actor in the development in the eastern region and the allegations of human rights violations in Papua (Perkasa, 2021; Singh, 2019). These

infrastructure and human capital become a national priority. The Indonesian government, led by President Joko Widodo, has targeted the region with a 'prosperity-based strategy' to infrastructure and development. Jokowi has also made a determined diplomatic effort throughout his administration, visiting Papua at least 13 times. Joko Widodo has attempted to demonstrate his broader commitment to encouraging development and the welfare of people in rural regions, where most of Indonesia's population still resides, through the development of Papua (Ruhyanto, 2021).

Conducting national sports games in Papua echoes signals to the world that the government of Indonesia put full attention on the development of Papua. The government uses sports events as the moment to encourage developing infrastructure and human capital in Papua in a very short period. As the international exposure instantly puts their highlight on the event in Papua, they can see how the government has been preparing Papua to host national sports games (PON XX). It is a quintessential example of the use of soft power diplomacy. Indonesian Coordinating Minister of Human Development and Culture, Muhajir Effendy said as PON XX is organized by the international standard, the event not only received appreciation from the president but also the international community. In further, he emphasized that it shows the unity of Indonesia in the eyes of the international society (Febrianto, 2021).

b. Trust building

Moving even more specifically, employing sports as an instrument of soft diplomacy will encourage trust-building amidst central and local government, and the local people in Papua. For more than 50 years, Papua has been in perpetual conflict, particularly since the area was incorporated

into Indonesia in 1969 (Singh, 2019). Various issues about the existence of separatist movements in Papua are closely related to the lack of trust between local communities and the central government. The local communities feel that the central government has exploited the natural resources that exist in Papua without contributing back to infrastructure and human development in the region (Anderson, 2015; Singh, 2019).

The events provide a platform between government and the people to meet and discuss social issues. Ostrom (1998) explained that Face-to-face communication promotes cooperation in social situations and demonstrates how structural elements facilitate or impede effective collective action. Exchanging mutual commitment, enhancing trust, establishing, and reinforcing standards, and forging a collective identity appear to be the most crucial processes that contribute to effective communication. PON XX Papua is the form of central government efforts to build local community trust in the government.

In international arenas, Indonesia has shown that the government never let any region within the sovereignty left behind. Sporting events have been deployed by the government as the soft diplomacy to gain trust in international arenas like United Nations. The government of Indonesia keep maintaining the development of Papua region not only through material aspect like infrastructure but also the immaterial aspect such as human development. From the political side, the PON event is certainly expected to restore the trust and faith of the Papuan people in the national government.

Furthermore, the implementation of PON XX could also strengthen the sense of nationalism among the Papuans (Adityawarman, 2021). PON also provides the

opportunity for individuals from outside Papua — athletes, officials, and fans — to explore Papua and its unique traditions. Additionally, the event allowed visitors to connect with indigenous Papuans, have a better understanding of their personalities, and thereby dispel the grim narrative and pictures about Papua.

In this sense, the central government employed a “People to people” approach to constructing trust with the local Papuan people. The P-to-P approach is connected to several social mechanisms and systems employed to foster trust between people. Trust-building will encourage people to the next stage, which is known as nationalism. The purpose of the P-to-P method is to avoid propaganda from the separatist movement. The government of Indonesia’s approach is to conduct mutual trust and faith between the government and the local people (Setiawan, 2021).

c. The Economic Development

The economic impact as PON XX has been held in Papua contribute to positive value. PON benefited the local economy economically (Perkasa, 2021). The holding of PON on October 2-15, 2021, involves more than 20 thousand people consisting of athletes, committees, and security officers. This will certainly move the economic wheels of the community around the area where the event is held, especially in four districts, namely mimika district, merauke district, jayapura district and jayapura city. The government claims that the PON agenda brought an increase in Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) increasing by 0.7-1.10% or by 1,222.84 million rupiah. the sector that experienced an increase in production was the construction sector with a total increase of up to 851.88 billion rupiah or around 5%. Moreover, the sector like

hospitality was upsurge from IDR 3,68 to 12,78 million. This graph shows how significantly the national sports event PON XX impacted the economic aspect of Papua province (BPS, 2023). The government believe that the impact of economic booster as PON XX held in Papua would not only endure during this agenda but will also continue to increase even after this agenda is over because the infrastructure built will be used for athlete quality improvement programs and other events.




Fig. 3. Papua Gross Domestic Regional Bruto (GDRP) in 2020-2022
Source: BPS RI (2023)

d. Building Platform to Dialogue

In General, Sporting events, from the World Cup and Olympic Games to a simple friendly match, help to establish links between nations and people and provide a forum for peaceful cultural exchange, which can serve as a springboard for further normalization of political relations (Nygård & Gates, 2013). 'Sports' eliminates distinctions, expands avenues of communication, and brings diverse groups of people together (Murray & Pigman, 2014). This approach is referred to as "creating a discussion platform." At this juncture, it's worth noting that organizing a sporting event might entail two distinct (but connected) methods. The core concept underlying the use of sport as a communication platform is separate from image-building. On the one hand, image building is the effort of the

country to show the world the identity of the nation, while the other hand, features the effort to bridge the communication between the government and the local people.

Today's public diplomacy is increasingly oriented on listening to 'the other,' on dialogue rather than monologue, and on long-term relationship-building as well as short-term policy aims (Melissen, 2011). The Indonesian government recognized that hosting the national games (PON XX) in Papua requires more than merely quadrennial sporting competitions. The event's ultimate goals are to accelerate infrastructural development, economic growth, and to provide wealth to the local people. Additionally, the event might serve as an excellent opportunity to foster communication between the central government, local governments, and the local people. As the Indonesian government revolved around the issue of human rights violation (Singh, 2019), Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) researcher Rozy Brilian said that the national games did not automatically dismiss "systematic problems" in Papua and West Papua. However, it might be a starting point to change its development approach by opening the room for dialogues with the Papuan communities using a human rights-centered approach (Lai, 2021).

It is widely understood that sports may be utilized to open doors of opportunity and encourage any type of discussion in the public diplomacy (Sombosombo, 2012). Gok (2018) explained that sports diplomacy is used to bridge language and culture divides and to bring people together via the common passion of sports. It is generally accepted that sports can be used to unlock the doors of opportunity in public diplomacy and promote any dialogue (Sombosombo, 2012). Sports diplomacy is used to overcome linguistic and sociocultural

differences with the universal passion of sports and to bring people together (Gök, 2018). There are many sensitive issues related to Papua as a part of Indonesia's sovereign territory. However, the effort of the Indonesian government to bring development and platform to dialogue to the Papuan land through sports events should be appreciated.

Head of Indonesian Christian Student Movement (GMKI) Jefri Gultom (2021) said, in the momentum of PON XX, the message of dialogue must take precedence as a civilized nation. The essence of human values must go along with the steps of sportsmen through sportsmanship. Diversity in dialogue must be a binder in unity. Through sports, cooperation and collaboration between elders, educators, local and central governments, and public support strengthening the commitment to create a civilized socio-cultural institution. He mentioned that from this point, sports besides as the symbol of pride is also a symbol of the identity of the diverse nations.

e. Reconciliation and Integration

The fourth instrument employed of sports diplomacy is reconciliation, integration, and anti-racism. The turmoil in Papua has been taking place for decades. The government's approach towards the issues should adopt a different strategy and instruments. The missing puzzle between the government and the Papuans people should be completed by conducting the reconciliation between two actors. The Indonesian government has been shown its commitment and trust towards Papua to become national sports games host which makes Papua is no more left behind. As the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) established the blueprints for Papua in 2008, recommends four actions that government might consider as a policy road map: first, recognition of Papuans as the traditional

owners of the land. Second, a new perspective of development focuses on human development in Papua. Third, cross dialogue between involved actors regarding the history of the Papuans to reach an agreement. fourth is the key to rebuilding the sense of trust through reconciliation of the victims of the past violations (Anderson, 2015).

Sports diplomacy which manifested into PON XX in Papua is the right moment to reforge the relationship between Papuan's people the government of Indonesia. Utilizing sports to transcend the cultural and language gaps between cultures. There is an additional unique characteristic of sporting activities. Due to the fact that the majority of spectators already understand the regulations, sporting events bridge cultural and linguistic gaps between the host nation and the spectators (Trunkos & Heere, 2017). Despite many critics who been said that PON XX does not necessarily take the problems out of Papua, PON XX in Papua succeeded in creating a melting pot for integration and interaction of diverse people, including between indigenous Papuans and the migrant population in Papua.

Sporting events could be used to eradicate the divisions, stigmatization, and injustices with the aim of fostering unity and promoting national consciousness about Indonesia and a commitment to developing the country. It is time for us to recognize and trust Papua's capacity. For the indigenous Papuans, it is a moment to achieve self-confidence, self-esteem, and a belief in their ability to progress (Perkasa, 2021). There are found in the range to utilize the linking effect of sporting events, and they can also be employed for diplomatic goals on a much smaller scale. As well as individual athletes, sports teams can be utilized to educate people about countries and develop cross-cultural understanding (Trunkos & Heere, 2017). All

this falls within the framework of reconciliation and integration between the people and the government.

VI. Conclusion

In this article, we discussed that the Indonesian government held National Sports Games (PON XX) in Papua as a strategy of soft diplomacy through sports events to deal with domestic and international issues. Discussion The author focuses on four mechanisms through which the Indonesian government-employed sports diplomacy by hosting national games PON XX in Papua constitutes an instrument of soft power. As the international exposure instantly puts their highlight on the event in Papua, they can see how the government has been preparing Papua to host national sports games (PON XX). Domestically, the government used national sports games as a platform for dialogue between central and local governments with the local people in Papua. PON XX Papua is a central government initiative aimed at fostering local community trust in the government. In this regard, the central government took a "people-to-people" strategy to establish trust with the indigenous Papuans.

The government's approach to these concerns should be distinct in terms of strategy and tools. The missing piece of the puzzle between the government and the Papuans should be finished by reconciling the two players. Sports diplomacy, as expressed in PON XX in Papua, is the ideal time to restructure the connection between the Papuan people and the Indonesian government. Sporting events might be utilized to erase divides, stigma, and injustices with the goal of creating togetherness and instilling a sense of national pride and devotion to the country's development. For indigenous Papuans, this is an opportunity to build self-esteem, self-

confidence, and a belief in their abilities to advance (Perkasa, 2021). For a lengthy period, the administration has utilized a variety of diplomatic strategies to deal with foreign and local pressure on Papua. Via sports diplomacy, the policy is carried out smoothly and successfully, achieving the diplomatic objective of encouraging Papua not just through physical development, but also through human capital development.

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Research Article

Analysis of the Role of the *Union Generale Tunisienne Du Travail (UGTT)* in the Democratization Transition In Tunisia

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the position of the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) which is a combination of trade unions and labor unions in Tunisia in influencing the country's political stability during the time of the Arab revolution or what is known as the Arab Spring. This research analysis uses the concept of civil society to see the role of trade unions in Tunisia in building their political power. This research uses a qualitative method with library research which is classified and grouped based on several collections of written materials from various sources of books, scientific articles, and the internet. The results of the study show that the UGTT has two roles in achieving the goals of Tunisia's democratization, firstly as a power intermediary, where the UGTT functions in uniting the population and the government by chairing dialogue and guiding decision making during an unstable period. Second, the UGTT also plays a role as a key mediator in the democratization transition process by participating in the policy-making process, namely working with members of parliament in drafting a new constitution.

Keywords: Arab Spring, civil society, Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT

I. Introduction

The wave of revolutions in the Middle East that started and marked this period in 2010 was important for the opposition groups present in the region to fight for a broader and more open political system and government. On the contrary, what happened during the unprecedented wave of democratization was a good positive response from all governments towards the democratization efforts. What happened in the Middle East region, there is almost no regime that avoids making democracy its country's political system. In addition to acceptance or positive reactions to this democratic political system, several opposition groups have made democratization changes through various means such as coups against authoritarian leaders. In connection with the expression of the ideals of the struggle for a democratic government system, political turmoil occurred in the Middle East region which is also known as the "Arab Revolution" or often referred to in the Western media as the Arab Spring (Kartini, 2016).

The Arab Spring is a popular political strategy in international politics, especially in Arab countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia since the end of December 2010. According to some scientists who define the Arab Spring as a form of mass protest (revolution) whose purpose is to overthrow, degrade, overthrow and coup state leaders who act dictatorial, authoritarian, corrupt and eliminate their people in their government (Rahmanda, 2022). In the history of Tunisia, since the founding of the state until the Arab Spring, NGOs and civil society have played a very significant position in the country. At a time when Tunisia was situated on the basis of

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a French protectorate, the emergence of civil society also stimulated mass mobilization, culminating in the 1956 revolution that succeeded in gaining Tunisia's independence from France.

The social order in Tunisian society is that most of them are ethnic Arabs as much as 98% of the population in Tunisia, Berbers and Turks. While ethnic Arabs are Muslim, most of the Muslims in Tunisia are Sunni Maliki schools of thought, but there are a small number of Ibadi (Khawarij) in whom there are still Berber followers on Jerba Island. At the end of the 70-80s, the Bourguiba government came under the onslaught of sharp criticism from 4 elements of public power. Inside there are groups of believers or ethnic Arabs who believe in Islam as an anti-Bourguiba regime action. At first the rumors raised by this group of believers were a criticism of policies that were viewed as anti-Islam, but in 1978, this group's criticism continued to grow stronger by linking socio-political and religious reasons in rallying the masses to attack rulers who were suspected of being tyrants, followers foreign authorities and exploiters of the people. Then, in the end, some of Bourguiba's inner circle, who had been sidelined, also voiced antithesis and founded the party. One of them is the MUP of the Communist party and the Democratic Socialist Party (MDS) (Sukandi, 2016). Then the socialist movement that wanted a modern and independent Tunisia was born, namely the Destour party which was founded around 1920 and in 1934, a branch known as the Neo-Destour Party was born which became dominant under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba (1903-2000). In line with this political movement, the UGTT trade union and labor movement was born which later worked together to bring Tunisia to its independence and was declared in 1957 with Bourguiba as the first president. The independent government carried out many social reforms

regarding education, the status of women and the economic structure. Throughout the 1960s, the government pursued socialist policies, then returned to liberalism by fortifying the country's violent associations.

In 1987 Bourguiba was in a coup d'etat for health reasons, then replaced by President Ben Ali with no changes to the authoritarian and dictatorial system. National identity at that time there was social inequality and some groups assimilated, while others eventually withdrew. It is known that none of the invasions that have taken place and the displacement of populations have left any traces in the ethnic structure of Tunisia (To-Z, n.d.).

One of the largest civil society organizations that is most influential and plays an important role in society is the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). Founded by Farhat Hached, UGTT was well received by Tunisians and the partnership quickly gained public support, which then mobilized to pressure France to demand more social and political rights for Tunisians as well. Strengthening the position of co-workers as an important part of the national liberation action. UGTT is a workers-based civil society in Tunisia. This movement focuses its struggle on the rights of laborers and workers. Not only that, UGTT always participates in every resistance it goes through, against the French who colonized Tunisia, as well as against the dictatorships in Tunisia. Since Tunisia's independence, the labor movement has served as a bridge between legal disputes and the UGTT being the main confederation with political power. In addition, as the most influential partnership in Tunisia, UGTT also reflects Tunisia's national interests and goals, such as:

“Building a socialist and nationalist economy, independent and free from all forms of dependency; calling for fair distribution of national wealth in a way which guarantees the aspirations of all workers and lower sections of society; defending individual and liberties, and reinforcing democracy and human rights; supporting all people struggling to reclaim their sovereignty and determine their destiny and standing in solidarity with national liberation movements across the world.” (Aduani & Ben Sedrine, 2018).

This aim was interpreted in Hached's May 16, 1947 speech to the unions in the agreement to transfer the country to the French protectorate:

“The workers struggle to improve their material and moral conditions is then tightly linked to the higher interests of the country, because such improvement requires a social change which cannot be obtained as long as the nation is subjected to the colonial system” (Omri, 2016).

Hached's ability to create a positive image for UGTT from its early presence as a reliable workers' organization and UGTT's correlation with the needs of the population made it a workers' organization that has done both during its history and its presence in Tunisia until today. The emergence of the Arab Spring in Tunisia began with the event of self-immolation by the Tunisian fruit seller Mohammed Bouzizi at the Regional Council Court. The self-immolation incident then set in motion the biggest wave of democracy in the Middle East that has ever existed. For months, protesters have been demanding an end to the old government, which they see as corrupt. Continuing grievances in various countries then challenged the West's way of looking at the Middle East. The social action that took

part in the revolution was intimately connected with the arrival of religious values. Islamic groups in the Middle East combine religious values, rituals and applications while carrying out revolutions in one social action. There are contrasting opinions about the ties between religion and politics in the Arab Spring. On the other hand, the Arab Spring emerged as an event driven by secular liberties who needed democracy, not a theocracy. Elsewhere, groups of protesters gathered at the center of the celebrations to push for the overthrow of the authoritative government, using religious edicts as encouragement and houses of worship as gathering places for protesters before taking to the streets. (Elnanda, 2015).

News of the suicide spread throughout the country. Finally, after the death of Mohammed Bouazizi, the people organized a social protest. The social grievances were led by the UGTT group, which later escalated into demonstrations demanding the suspension of state leader Ben Ali who was then sovereign for 24 years (Musada, 2013). The existence of corruption and nepotism is seen as a denigration of the value of the community's resistance rate for a more positive life, as happened in society, namely increasing unemployment, then also the high cost of living sacrificed by the Tunisian people who emerged from the recession. The wave of protests by the Tunisian people against the accusations of impeachment of the country's leader ultimately ended on January 14, 2011, Ben Ali officially resigned as president. After the Tunisian people succeeded in overthrowing Ben Ali, when the Arab Spring event saw a very important role in the presence of civil society, where civil society is one of the most important elements in preserving democracy, it shows that civil society exists. Community participation or involvement in social clubs. The existence of

the labor movement in Tunisia is a strength of civil society and the basis for building a revolutionary system towards a successful democracy (Arieff, 2011).

UGTT conducted a national dialogue to discuss holding general elections which fell in October 2011, where this process is an illustration of one of the desired stages of the democratization process (Jatmika, 2011). Tunisia thus became the first country to successfully go through the democratization process in the Middle East. Thanks to the presence of the UGTT, the process of democratization of Tunisia is also going strong. So from the discussion that has been described above, the authors are interested in examining how the role of UGTT as the largest and most influential civil society in Tunisia in assisting the democratization transition process in Tunisia.

II. Method

This research uses a qualitative method with library research which is classified and grouped based on several collections of written materials from various sources of books, journals, news and the internet. Then in this article the researcher also uses the concept of civil society which will be used in looking at the role of the social movement groups or the UGTT labor movement in the process of democratization in Tunisia (Sri Agustin Sutrisnowati, 2013). This type of research refers to qualitative research procedures that describe, analyze and define. Qualitative procedures describe procedures that focus on in-depth review. Therefore, the use of qualitative methods in research can make analysis based on a more extensive event. Qualitative research that looks at humanism or individual people and individual attitudes describes a response to the understanding if all

the effects of individual action are carried over to the corners of personal households. Inner views are similar to beliefs, political views, and the social context of the related person. There are also qualitative procedures that place more emphasis on reviewing events and observing the substance of the meaning of the incident. The analysis and intensity of qualitative research are heavily influenced by speech capacity and the words used.

For the purposes of research, observers used the method of collecting information by means of literature review which was categorized and combined from various sources of literature from novels, newsletters, posts and the internet. The combined information consists of main and subordinate information. The main information covers archives and novels, magazines and other origins that are directly tied to the position of the general population and democracy in Tunisia. Subordinate information shares supporting data to enrich this research analysis (Musaddad, 2014).

III. Concept of Civil Society

Civil society concept was first born in Ancient Greece. The roots of its development stem from Cicero (106-43 BC) then Aristotle (384-322 BC). Regarding the meaning of the word civil society, Cicero was the first scientist to use this term in his political ideology, which means that civil society is similar to the word state or a community that dominates another community. Meanwhile, Aristotle did not use the term civil society, but *Koininie Politike* is a political community where citizens of the country can participate directly in making decisions. However, in the mid-18th century, this term underwent a change in meaning. After that, the state and civil society were known as two entities that were in conflict with

the process of social creation and changes in political forms in Europe as a result of the era of enlightenment and renewal which was very useful in overthrowing absolute regimes. Then the meaning of the term civil society was born from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke where for Hobbes civil society is obliged to have absolute authority so that it can reduce conflict within society and be able to fully control the pattern of interaction of the people of the country. On the other hand, for John Locke, the arrival of civil society was aimed at being able to maintain independence and the property rights of the people of the country. Then, along with the development of the times, the term civil society emerged according to Adam Ferguson (1967) for Hobbes, civil society must have absolute authority so that it can reduce conflict within society and be able to fully control the pattern of interaction of the people of the country. On the other hand, for John Locke, the arrival of civil society was aimed at being able to maintain independence and the property rights of the people of the country. Then from the development of the term carried out by Adam Ferguson, Ernest Gellner also developed the term civil society which was quoted from the work of Adi Surya Culla, saying that in tracing the source of this opinion to the past period through the history of western (European and American) civilization which became his concern namely when this draft was disseminated by a Scottish thinker, Adam Ferguson in his classic creation "An Essay of Civil Society", it has an important meaning for a democratic country because the position of civil society in creating a democratic structure in the country is a commitment to the contribution of citizens in the method of voting for provisions. country. The concept of civil society basically contains various difficulties in its implementation, this interpretation and understanding can change from time to time, where the changes are not only in the perspective of the times, but the

interpretation interpreted by the term is different from various contemporary experts in the past (Sutrisnowati, 2013).

The presence of the UGTT which supports the democracy movement in many countries also refers to a group of people who are members of a non-profit organization which is the controlling arm of the government. Therefore the author uses the concept of civil society according to Ernest Gellner because in its application to the analysis carried out by researchers it is more dominant than the term civil society according to other experts. As Ernest Gellner (Gellner, 1995) has said, western writers say that civil society is a society consisting of various non-governmental institutions that are autonomous and strong enough to counterbalance the power of the state. In addition, civil society is also seen as a "tool" that can be used by the public to convey their wishes to the state. In the structure of the Arab world, where the traditional social order prevails, civil society can refer to a human community whose life takes place in communal bonds. Where they usually have difficulty meeting public needs, they do not play a real role in the country's development in the democratic arena. Forming civil society in Middle Eastern countries, in fact because of the end of Western colonialism, people have not succeeded in forming civil society, countries in the Middle East region have their countries ruled by private elites where those in power use their power only for themselves and their families, what's worse is corruption, the conspiracy of the rulers and with the development of nepotism, conversely the people do not have enough power to balance the country or control the country (Umam, 2017).

IV. Democratization in Tunisia

Tunisia was declared independent from 20 March 1956 (French Protectorate Independence Day) to 25 July 1957 (Republic Day). Habib Bourguiba was elected as the first President of Tunisia who later became a central figure in the Tunisian independence movement through the Neo-Destour movement, but at that time the Tunisian people were still worried because President Bourguiba led Tunisia with radical politics that could lead to authoritarian leadership. Based on the fact that he made a policy from socialism to liberalism which disappointed the Tunisian workers because it was clear that it would only benefit the owners of capital. The workers are very concerned about this policy, which will have a negative impact on the workers, and trade unions affiliated with the UGTT (Tunisian General Labor Union) have spoken out to fight for the interests of the workers. and against authoritarian politics (Rosdiawan, 2010).

When Habib Bourguiba was finally in a peaceful coup for health reasons on November 7, 1987, Ben Ali continued his leadership message as the second president of Tunisia. Instead of getting a president who could bring about better changes, Ben Ali's regime was exactly the same as its predecessor and became a president who led in an authoritarian and dictatorial manner. The President acts as the head of state and head of government who is responsible for all state administration both at the central and regional levels, such as decision-making power over the Council of Ministers and civil positions such as governor and mayor. Additionally, presidential powers can only be impeached by death, resignation or health. Following Habib Bourguiba's leadership style, the Tunisian era under President Ben Ali also continued its commitment to Western liberal values.

However, the UGTT labor movement is known as a movement that strongly opposes authoritarian regimes. After all, the relationship between the UGTT and the ruling government was not always good. The worst period between the two was recorded between 1978 and 1985, when Tunisia was on the verge of increasing economic pressure, as the UGTT openly opposed the government's economic policies, particularly wage inflation and floor prices, and engaged in several series of hostilities. UGTT carried out several series of demonstrations and mass strikes throughout the country, where demonstrations faced very repressive state actions with the arrest and imprisonment of the Secretary General of the UGTT at that time (Musada, 2013).

V. UGTT as Civil Society

UGTT is a social movement originating from a combination of trade unions and laborers in Tunisia. This movement focuses its struggle on the rights of workers and laborers in Tunisia. Not only focusing on welfare for trade unions, UGTT also took part in every resistance that began when Tunisia was colonized by France and always appealed the authoritarian regime that ruled Tunisia. Not only meritorious in delivering freedom, UGTT as a controlling authority that plays an efficient role as the antithesis of rulers from outside the system (Sukandi, 2016). UGTT was historically founded by Fahred Hached in 1946 who was a former member of the Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT) for 15 years (Arieff, 2011), at which time Tunisia was still under the French protectorate, UGTT became a social movement which was also active in implementing action against France in demanding Tunisia to be given better social and political rights, then followed by Tunisian independence which was agreed in 1956.

Starting from Tunisia's independence, UGTT as a social movement has become a bridge for people in channeling opinions and UGTT has also become the first trade union to exert much influence in political power in Tunisia.

The membership of the UGTT has spread widely from village to city which reaches 5% of the total population in Tunisia and makes it the most influential and largest social movement in Tunisia (Chayes, 2014). During the two terms of the authoritarian President's leadership, the government has taken various ways to bring down the UGTT to continue to fight by demonstrating the people's voice against the state's repressive attitude. At its peak, the UGTT as a trade union organization succeeded in overthrowing the authoritarian regime led by Ben Ali.

VI. The Role of UGTT in the Process of Democratic Transition

In its history, the UGTT succeeded in realizing the resistance of the Tunisian people to the coup against state leader Ben Ali, making the UGTT a national actor and the main Tunisian key who had experienced the Arab Spring in Tunisia. Not only that, the role of the UGTT in achieving the goals of the revolution did not end there, the UGTT as a social movement continued to act as a power intermediary and the main intermediary in the revolutionary process of the democratic transition in Tunisia. UGTT as the most influential trade union movement and the largest social movement in Tunisia has a dual role in supporting the transition towards democratization, namely:

1) As a power mediator, UGTT's position in uniting the population and the authorities is also carried out through debate, guiding

decision making in times of uncertainty. At the same time, UGTT has used its influence to secure historic wins for its members and workers in general, including the agreement of permanent contracts for 140,000 temporary workers and salary increases for several fields, including teachers. (Rosdiawan, 2010).

The appeal of the Tunisian people since the beginning of the change was to always be open to community cooperation. This matter can also be seen in the application submitted to the Constituent Assembly to examine the demands of the community and public participation in the formation of the new constitution is also valuable for the victory of change. Where this happened through a series of UGTT positions and also through several informal meetings held throughout Tunisia. After the fall of Ben Ali's government in Tunisia, the UGTT, as the most influential group of people in Tunisia, assumed responsibility for planning to achieve the goals of the revolution, in particular, to change the population. Other groups of citizens and political institutions also played a valuable role in this way. The increasing involvement and encouragement of public citizens in conclusion has a very important effect on the outcome of such a causal transition of public citizens in Tunisia (Arieff, 2011). Meanwhile, the role of the Constituent Assembly is to become a legislative body tasked with changing the structure of the only Tunisian party that will later take part in elections and draft a new constitution.

The leadership at the start of the transitional period following Ben Ali's fall from Tunisia was seen by the militants who were largely exiled by Ben Ali's regime. By that time, the leadership had drifted away from the desired direction of the revolution, and in the end indicated that it would retain the institutions of the previous regime. Where this

was also experienced by UGTT during the 60th anniversary of the assassination of the founder of the UGTT alliance, Farhat Hached, where he was attacked by the League of Guards Revolution (Umam, 2017), where this tournament also emerged from a resident organization in the city of Tunisia which intends to maintain discipline and security after the fall of the Ben Ali regime which was later disbanded and dominated by Muslim groups. Through this incident it shows that the government has allowed this to happen and created a feeling that for a while it is trying to suppress civil society with the aim of restraining community action so that it does not carry out protests after a series of revolutionary events. In this regard, a caretaker government was also formed following the signing of an agreement between the Constituent Assembly and the UGTT, the aim of which was to empower Fouad Mebazaa, who is the president of the Tunisian National Assembly, to lead the caretaker government as president on February 8, 2011. Mebazaa won the trust of the Constituent Assembly and the UGTT to lead a provisional government that would later form the Tunisian People's Democratic Party after the fall of Ben Ali's Tunisian People's Democratic Party, especially the general elections (Musada, 2013).

Meanwhile, the position of Prime Minister of Tunisia is still held by Mohammed Ghannouchi. However, the character of Mohammed Ghannouchi faced opposition from the UGTT coalition, where the UGTT considered Ghannouchi to be a Ben Ali loyalist and while in power he would continue to turn Tunisia into the era of Ben Ali's dictatorship. Furthermore, under Ghannouchi, there were still nineteen ministers loyal to Ben Ali. There is a negative impact because the government is not representative to fulfill the aspirations of the majority of the population. Ultimately, however, under popular pressure, Ghannouchi

resigned and was replaced by Béji Caïd el Sebsi on 27 February 2011. Fearing that the elite would overthrow these revolutionary intentions, Tunisian civil society groups and even the UGTT took to the streets to push for far-reaching political reforms, and this is achieved. The pressure they exerted eventually led to the dissolution of political institutions, changes in the composition of the government, and a completely new draft of the constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly (Arief, 2011).

At the initiative of the UGTT, a committee was formed to organize the transition to the 23 October elections and the interim government at that time as the holder of the transfer right also authorized it on behalf of the High Commission for Political Reform in general also known as "The Ben Achour Commission" which chaired by Yadh Ben Achour. Where the committee will then hold the first elections to elect members of the Constituent Assembly after the fall of Ben Ali and the main task of the Achour committee is to develop a constitution as the basis for an electoral system that will be used later and will form a provisional government. The presence of the Achour Committee helped prepare the first post-revolutionary elections successfully. Where the desire of the people to avoid the return of dictatorship power has also been concretized by the Achour committee by prohibiting the leadership of the RCD from becoming the main candidate in this election. To ensure that all competing parties have confidence in the fairness of the election results, the Achour Commission decided to establish the first independent election commission in Tunisia (Kartini, 2016).

The October 2011 general election brought together four political parties and made An-Nahdah the winner with 41% of the vote or 89 out of 217 seats in the Constituent

Assembly while second place went to the Congress for the Republic (CPR) with 29 parliamentary seats. In an effort to strengthen the government and position in the Constituent Assembly, An-Nahdah formed an alliance called the Troika with the CPR and Ettakol (Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties) parties. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly elected Hamadi Jebali, general secretary of the An-Nahdah party as Prime Minister, Moncef Marzouki, chairman of the CPR party, as president and Mustapha Ben Jafar as chairman of the Constituent Assembly (Elnanda, 2015). During the three years of transition, UGTT has become an organization to provide public aspirations and balance the power of political elites. The UGTT uses two ways to influence policy making in this transitional period, namely working directly with members of parliament to draft and determine the words in the constitution and negotiating with political parties when the process is deadlocked.

2) The presence of UGTT also acts as a mediator. The arrival of the UGTT as a national actor in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali was also demonstrated through its position as a bridge between various political parties, through a series of country talks on the basis of the UGTT initiative to help mitigate emergency political disputes in Tunisia during the era of change. This political crisis also occurred when the development momentum around the new constitution that was to be used did not develop. This is also reflected in the slowness of the Constituent Assembly in announcing and approving the draft of the new constitution. The dynamics of the process of drafting a new constitution goes through various stages to reach consensus among all groups. In this case it is mainly related to sharia which is the basis of the constitution and state law, considering that the constitution has stated that the majority religion in Tunisia is Islam. Backed by

radical Salafi and Islamic groups, the two groups also lobbied An-Nahdah to include Sharia law in the new constitution.

However, An-Nahdah has decided not to regard Sharia as the source of all state law. In this case it was decided that An-Nahdah was an Islamic party, but there was no program to include Sharia in the new constitution and focused more on social issues such as economic equality, freedom of speech and expression of women's rights (Kartini, 2016). In the end, the current conflict has led to ups and downs in the process of collecting provisions regarding the current constitution which could not be completed within one year since the formation of the government and the new Constituent Assembly. During this conflict, the UGTT was at the forefront of decision-making held through national consultations, the Tunisian Association of Human Rights, the National Orders of Lawyers and the Tunisian Union of Trade and Industry, where this dialogue is to create a space for compromise with the Constituent Assembly.

In this dialogue, the UGTT presents a "roadmap" which explains certain steps to overcome the political impasse that has hit the country. These steps included agreeing on constitutional discussions, a technocratic caretaker government, and the establishment of an independent election commission. Civil society efforts in the UGTT labor movement played an important role in holding democratic elections after the fall of the dictatorship and upholding democratic principles in forming a transitional government with the arrival of the An-Nahdah party as its chairman. winner in the election. Not only that, the UGTT also put pressure on other public citizen bodies to participate in the development of the latest constitution as a democratic foundation in Tunisia (Ibad & Muta'ali, 2021).

VII. Conclusion

The Arab Spring incident that attacked Tunisia brought the structure of people's life to the latest round. The democracy that existed in Tunisia prior to the Arab Spring was limited to popular tactics, that is, democracy was only used as an instrument of justification for long-term government, while the wishes of the people were ignored. However, this situation was exacerbated by emerging economic disparities, which further fueled people's desire to change the country. Since independence, Tunisia has been ruled by an authoritarian ruler who was able to be overthrown by the power of civil society, especially the activities of the workers who were able to become the main force of the population in overthrowing the Ben Ali government.

UGTT is present as the most influential trade union movement and has the largest membership in Tunisia as a civil society. The presence of the UGTT provides two very influential roles, namely acting as a power intermediary, where the UGTT in this case has conducted many demonstrations against the ruling authoritarian regime. Then it is shown with the fall of Ben Ali at that time. The second is acting as a mediator for other political parties by carrying out a series of national dialogues, where the UGTT also provides a "road map" idea about a number of steps to be able to find solutions to the political problems that hit Tunisia. The presence of UGTT as a civil society in Tunisia gave a very satisfying impact and influence on the development of democratic life, especially because Tunisia was also in a transitional period of democratization at that time. Where the UGTT is also a force that can balance the country outside the regime when a tyrannical government reigns.

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Research Article

Maintaining Monarchy in Amidst Disruptive Era: Case Study Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta, Indonesia

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Abstract

Monarchy is an interesting political system to study because it is the earliest political system in world history and still exists today with various variations. This article focuses on the Yogyakarta Sultanate which was founded in 1755 as the only monarchy that still exists administratively in the political system of the Republic of Indonesia. This qualitative study finds that Yogyakarta's political system fulfil holistic, adaptive elements and combines old and new elements so that Yogyakarta gets asymmetric decentralization status from the republican central government of Indonesia. However, Yogyakarta has problems in the succession system because it does not yet have written and open rules like the British, Dutch, and Spanish monarchies. This study recommends the importance of a special study of the monarchy with all its survival capabilities in a modern democratic system.

Keywords: uniqueness, semi-monarchy, asymmetric decentralization, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

I. Introduction

National integration, especially with regard to the relationship between local political actors and the central government, is one of the central issues in the study of International Relations. This, among others, is

reflected in various peaceful cases, political tensions and open conflicts. Open conflict, occurred in the case of Rakhine state with Myanmar (Kipgen, 2013); Trigray with Ethiopia (Gavin, 2021). Political tensions combined between negotiations and open conflict; happening in Pattani with the Thai Central Government (Ockey, 2021), Papua with the Government of Indonesia (Viartasiwi, 2018). Tensions in regional relations with the center, occurred in Hong Kong and China (Novelin, 2020); Catalonia with Spanish (Mukti et al., 2019). Conflict resolution after peace talks, the Northern Irish Catholic group took place with the British Central Government in London (Guelke, 2014); Aceh with the central government of the Republic of Indonesia through the 2006 Helsinki agreement; on Bangsamoro with the Philippine Government; on Bangsamoro with the Philippine Government (Jatmika et al., 2022).

This study focuses on the case of the Uniqueness of Yogyakarta Special Province in the form of a semi-monarchy in the practice of Asymmetric Decentralization in The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. This is important to study because the actual process of enacting privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the Privileges of Yogyakarta occurred after going through various tensions. For example, the formation of the Ijab Qobul Brigade; referendum discourse; preparation of ID cards and even passports if one day Yogyakarta breaks away from Indonesia. In 2022, privileges law number 13/2012 have entered 10 years and are marked by the stipulation of Sri Sultan HB X and Pakualaman IX as Governor and Deputy Governor of Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*, DIY).

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The emergence of the privilege of Yogyakarta is a gift from a very long struggle process. The Sultanate of Yogyakarta is part of the Mataram Kingdom which is divided into two parts, namely the Sultanate of Yogyakarta and the Kasunanan of Surakarta. The entry of the Dutch into the Sultanate of Yogyakarta made Sri Sultan have no power in the government because it was managed by Papatih Dalem. After the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, Yogyakarta joined the Republic of Indonesia and from here Sri Sultan played a very important role in national politics. Because the leaders of Yogyakarta issued mandates and edicts, the government issued Law no. 22 of 1948 which stipulates Yogyakarta as a level II region and is updated with Law No. 3 of 1950 which stipulates the Establishment of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Then came Law no. 1 of 1957 and Law no. 6 of 1959 which contains about regional government, and the last is the issuance of Law no. 18 of 1965 which recognizes that Yogyakarta is one of the special regions and at the same level as the province. The specialty of Yogyakarta is seen from the city of struggle in the field of education, the capital of struggle, harmony between leaders, and being a source of wisdom for its people. In addition, Yogyakarta is an area that has a noble culture and is a cultural heritage from ancient times that still exists today (Felinda, 2011). After Indonesia's independence, Yogyakarta was given a Status Charter by President Soekarno, which is a concrete (de facto) recognition of the Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat Sultanate and is de jure fully recognized for its existence based on the constitution and laws and regulations within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a special region at the provincial and regional levels. emphasized its through privileges law number 13/2012. The implication of the Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat Sultanate for the privileges of DIY is the granting of several

special powers, namely filling the position of Governor, Regional Institutions, Culture, Land and Spatial Planning. Specifically in the form of DIY Asymmetric *Pilihan Kepala Daerah* (PILKADA), and DIY Regional Governance. The concept of the Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat Sultanate in the constitutional structure of the Republic of Indonesia, first, the leadership that encourages the privilege of DIY through strengthening the *paugeran* values of the Sultanate which can support the mixed government concept of monarchy, democracy and transcendence within the scope of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the creation of a balanced central-regional relationship, on the one hand the Government of Indonesia has accommodated the wishes of the DIY community through privileges law number 13/2012, on the other hand the Sultanate is required to make improvements and adjustments to regulations as ordered by privileges law number 13/2012 (Triwahyuningsih et al., 2020).

In recent years, Yogyakarta has faced a problematic situation, which is probably caused by the development of various modern trading facilities and star-rated hotels throughout the city. On the one hand, these activities have stimulated the economy, on the other hand they are considered activities that reduce the comfort of people's lives. The comfortable atmosphere as a product of traditional urban layout that characterizes the city seems to be disappearing. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the implementation of privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the Distinction of the Special Region of Yogyakarta in the Field of City Spatial Planning has become questionable. One of the reasons is because the substance of the regulation is weak, due to the limited understanding of the peculiarities of Yogyakarta City Spatial Planning. To limit these problems, the

prominent urban spatial planning as mentioned above is placed in a historical and cultural frame, in line with the main considerations of privileges law number 13/2012. The extraordinary value of the city of Yogyakarta includes three components, namely signs (components of urban spatial planning); signage (configuration of space utilization and structure) and the concept of signage (embedded meaning). The extraordinary value of Yogyakarta City Spatial Planning is characterized by two main concepts, namely the philosophical ax of Tugu-Kraton-Panggung Krapyak and the Mandala structure of the Pathok Negoro Mosque. Overall, the extraordinary value of Yogyakarta City Spatial Planning is Prince Mangkubumi's masterpiece in the field of urban spatial development (Suryanto, Achmad Djunaedi, Sudaryono, 2015).

As a country whose economic system is still dependent on public sector financing, the hope that the decentralization policy in Indonesia can significantly improve the people's welfare has not been fulfilled. This is like what happened in the Special Region of Yogyakarta which has special authority in regulating its government affairs. Privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the Privileges of DIY covers 5 matters (Mutiarin & Sakir, 2015; Purnawan, 2016), namely (1) How to Fill in the Position, Position, Duties and Authorities of the Governor and Deputy Governor; (2) Institutional Affairs; (3) Cultural Affairs; (4) Land Affairs; and (5) Spatial Affairs (Mutiarin & Sakir, 2015; Suryanto & Ahmad Djunaedi, 2015). With the existence of the Act, it is hoped that the DIY Government can provide the rights of its people to live in prosperity. However, these expectations still cannot be fulfilled properly (Mutiarin & Sakir, 2015). As reinforced by an article written by Iqbal (2020) that in spatial management it is stated in Local

Regulation (*Peraturan Daerah*, Perda) No. 2 of 2010 which was later enacted and enacted the Law, is expected to provide welfare for the rights of the community and the fact is that it is still not going well. Various factors that make this happen include the existence of urban development that does not comply with applicable laws, including the irregular construction of malls and hotels. Like Sleman City Hall, the construction was carried out before the regulation took effect (Iqbal et al., 2020). Thontowi (2019) also added that although the existence of privileges law number 13/2012 received a positive response from the DIY community, and it has also been implemented in a number of special Jogjakarta Regional Regulations (*Peraturan Daerah Istimewa, Perdais*) such as the appointment of positions, Institutional Perdais and Cultural Perdais, but at the implementation level have not been able to improve the welfare of the people of DIY due to the use of the power factor among the DPRD DIY considering that there has been a conflict of interest between members of the Keraton family (Thontowi, 2019).

The issuance of the privileges law number 13/2012 is an affirmation of the special status of DIY. To carry out these privileges, the DIY Regional Government received a Privileges Fund budget from IDR 231 billion in 2013 to IDR 800 billion in 2017. The Privileges Fund budgeting process uses a mixed approach between traditional budgeting and performance-based budgeting, with top-down and bottom-up methods up. There is an inconsistency between the programs and activities planned and those implemented by the Regional Government of DIY, due to external and internal factors, so that it can have an impact on the success of the goals, objectives and vision and mission to be achieved. Community Participation in Cultural

Development and Preservation, as well as target indicators of the Suitability of Spatial Utilization to the Provincial Spatial Plans (*Rencana Tata Ruang /Wilayah*, RTRW). Nine of the 17 main performance indicators of the 2012-2017 Regional Medium Term Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah*, RPJMD) that received additional budget allocation contributions from the Privileges Fund, managed to achieve the target. Meanwhile, the additional allocation of Privileges Fund for performance target indicators of the suitability of space utilization to the Provincial RTRW, has not yet succeeded in achieving the target. The four main performance indicators of the 2012-2017 RPJMD, which failed to reach the target, did not receive additional budget allocation contributions from the Privileges Fund. One of the reasons why the Privileges Fund is not allocated for performance indicators that do not reach the target is, among others, due to the limitations of the laws and regulations. The allocation of the Privileges Fund for socio-cultural priority targets related to economic activities, in general, has a positive effect on decreasing the income inequality index, although it is only temporary. The ineffectiveness of the performance target indicators for the suitability of space utilization against the Provincial RTRW is partly due to the fact that most of the activities carried out are only in the form of planning with output in the form of documents, and land acquisition, while physical development is only carried out for activities in a limited area. The obstacles faced by the DIY Government in the Privilege Fund budgeting process are: (1) The high element of uncertainty in the Privilege Fund budget allocation from the Central Government, (2) the DIY Regional Government does not yet have indicators to measure program/activity outcomes, (3) There is no unequal understanding of each Regional Apparatus Work Unit (*Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah*,

SKPD) on Privileges Funds, (4) Privileges Funds cannot be used to finance programs and activities other than privileges (Nazam & Hadna, 2018).

Privileges funds are funds originating from the budget section of the State General Treasurer which are allocated to fund special authorities and are transfer expenditures for other transfer sections. The institutions that have the right to supervise the management of the Privileges Fund are: the Inspectorate, Development Planning Agency at Sub-National Level (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*, BAPPEDA) and Regional People's Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD), all of which have different monitoring systems. The accountability of the Privileges Fund is carried out in 2 stages, namely: The first stage, the stage of making the Final Report on the Performance of the Privileges Fund and the Distribution of the Privileges Fund which is prepared by the Head of each Regional Government Work Unit who has used the Privilege Fund to the Governor or an authorized official. In the second stage, the Governor or authorized official submits the final stage of Privilege Funds Absorption Realization Report in the annual Accountability Performance Report or End of Office Accountability Performance Report to the DIY Regional House of Representatives (Ali, 2020).

Based on the background of the problem above, a question arises, "Why does the Sultanate of Yogyakarta which was established in 1755 still exist as a political administrative reality in the national political system of the Republic of Indonesia?"



Pict. 1. Map of Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Source: Wikipedia (2023)



Pict. 2. Passport
Source: Facebook (2023)



Pict. 3. National Identification Card
Source: (2023)



Pict. 4. Referendum Demo
Source: Detik (2010)



Pict 5. Referendum Volunteer
Source: Kompasiana (2010)

II. Method

This study uses qualitative methods using primary and secondary data. On the one hand, primary data were collected through observation or field studies and conducted observations in Yogyakarta, Indonesia from 2012 to 2022. In addition, interviews with several related sources. As for secondary data, it is done by collecting references through literature studies, previous literature, official data and documents from the Indonesian central government as well as documents from the official website of the Yogyakarta government. References collected in the form of print media and electronic media. After all the data is collected, then the data is processed and put together in this article.

III. Findings

a. Socio-historical of Speciality of Yogyakarta

The Special Region of Yogyakarta is a provincial-level autonomous region of Indonesia in southern Java (PemerintahDIY, 2016). It has also been known as the Special Territory of Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta, 1974, 1982).

Co-ruled by the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Duchy of Pakualaman, the region is the only officially recognized diarchy within the government of Indonesia. The Yogyakarta Sultanate was established in 1755 and provided unwavering support for Indonesia's independence during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–1949). As a first-level division in Indonesia, Yogyakarta is governed by Sultan Hamengkubuwono X as the governor and Prince Paku Alam as the vice governor. In Javanese, it is Yogyakarta, and named after the city of Ayodhya in Javanese-Hindu mythology (Hannigan, 2012). The Dutch name of the Special Region is Djokjakarta.

The Sultanate has existed in various forms through prehistory and survived through the rule of the Dutch and the 1942 invasion of the Dutch East Indies by the Japanese Empire. In August 1945 Indonesia's first president, Sukarno proclaimed the independence of the Indonesian Republic, and by September of that year, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and duke Sri Paku Alam VIII had sent letters to Sukarno expressing their support for the newly born nation of Indonesia, in which they acknowledged the Yogyakarta Sultanate as part of the Indonesian Republic.

Yogyakarta's overwhelming support and the Sultan's patriotism were essential in the Indonesian struggle for independence during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–1949). The city of Yogyakarta became the capital of the Indonesian Republic from January 1946 to December 1948 after the fall of Jakarta to the Dutch. Later, the Dutch also invaded Yogyakarta causing the Indonesian Republic's capital to be transferred again to Bukittinggi in West Sumatra on 19 December 1948. In return for Yogyakarta's support, the declaration of Special Authority over

Yogyakarta was granted in full in 1950 and Yogyakarta was given the status as a Special Administrative Region, making Yogyakarta the only region headed by a monarchy in Indonesia.



Pict. 6. Sultan Hamengkubuwono X as the Governor and Pakualaman IX as the Deputy Governor with Jokowi (Inaguration)

Source: Sorot Jogja (2022)

b. The privileged position of Yogyakarta is very clear constitutionally

The privileged position of Yogyakarta is in accordance with the precepts of Pancasila, especially the third principle which reads, "Indonesian Unity". This can be interpreted that, although Yogyakarta has its own specialties by being designated as a special area, Yogyakarta is still part of the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia has always embraced Yogyakarta as part of the Republic of Indonesia, even with the special status it bears. Thus, both the people of Yogyakarta and the people of Indonesia still have a high sense of unity because they both have a high national spirit as the people of Indonesia.

The privileged position of Yogyakarta can also be seen in Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, especially in Article 18A and Article 18B, which reads:

Article 18A

(1) The relationship of authority between the central government and provincial, regency, and city regional governments, or between provinces and regencies and cities, is regulated by law with due observance of the specificity and diversity of regions.

(2) Financial relations, public services, utilization of natural resources and other resources between the central government and regional governments are regulated and implemented fairly and in harmony based on the law.

Article 18B

(1) The state recognizes and respects special or special regional government units which are regulated by law.

(2) The state recognizes and respects customary law community units and their traditional rights as long as they are still alive and in accordance with the development of society and the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which are regulated by law (DPRRI, 2016).

Yogyakarta which has a position as a Special Region is also regulated by privileges law number 13/2012 especially Article 1 paragraphs 1 to 3, which contains:

Article 1

(1) The Special Region of Yogyakarta, hereinafter referred to as DIY, is a provincial area that has privileges in administering government affairs within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

(2) Privileges are the privileges of legal standing owned by DIY based on history and original rights according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to regulate and administer special powers.

(3) Special Authority is certain additional authority owned by DIY other than the

authority as specified in the law on regional government (UUD1945, 2012).

c. Contents of the Special Law of Yogyakarta and its Practice for 10 years (2012 -2022)

In the political field, filling the positions of governor and deputy governor so as not to collide with the National Law. Privileges in the field of procedures for filling the positions, positions, duties, and authorities of the Governor and Deputy Governor, among others, special requirements for the candidate for governor of DIY are Sultan Hamengkubuwana who is on the throne, and the deputy governor is Adipati Paku Alam who is on the throne. The Governor and the Deputy Governor have the same positions, duties, and authorities as other Governors and Deputy Governors, plus the administration of privileged affairs (UUD1945, 2012). The specialty in the institutional field of the DIY Regional Government is the arrangement and establishment of institutions, with the Perda's, to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the administration of government and public services based on the principles of responsibility, accountability, transparency, and participation by taking into account the original form and structure of government (UUD1945, 2012).

According to Act No. 22 of 1948 (which is also the basis of Act No. 3 of 1950 on the formation of DIY), the Head and Vice Head of the Special Region are appointed by the [President](#) from the descendants of the ruling family in the region prior to Indonesian independence with the conditions of "skill, honesty, and loyalty, and keeping in mind the customs of the area." Thus, the Head of the Special Region, until 1988, was automatically held by the reigning Sultan of Yogyakarta, and the Vice Head of the Special Region, until 1998,

was automatically held by Prince Paku Alam who was on the throne. The nomenclature of the Governor and Vice Governor of the Special Region has only been used since 1999 with the issuance of Act No. 22 of 1999. Since 2012, the mechanism for filling the positions of Governor and Vice Governor of DIY is regulated by privileges law number 13/2012 on the Uniqueness of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (UUD1945, 2012).

In order not to collide with the National Law, then:

- a. Filling every 5 years as in other provinces, but those who can register are Sultan or PA holders. The difference is, Yogya was only registered for the Stakeholders of the Sultan and PA at that time; different from the national rules that every citizen has the same rights. Sultan and PA are entitled to hold office for life, in contrast to the national system which allows a person to serve as governor/wagub for a maximum of 5 years multiplied by 2 periods.
- b. In the Yogyakarta Sultanate, as part of Islamic Mataram (along with PA, Pakubuwono and Mangkunegoro Surakarta) there is a convention that the King must be male. The rules for filling in the candidates for the Governor of Yogyakarta Deputy Governor must not conflict with national regulations and human rights that every citizen regardless of gender background has the right to become Governor / Deputy Governor. An article appears, the requirement for a candidate for governor to have a wife/husband (can be filled in by a man or a woman)

d. Specialties in Culture

The specialty in the field of culture is to maintain and develop the results of creativity, taste, initiative, and work in the form of values, knowledge, norms, customs, objects, arts, and noble traditions rooted in the DIY community, which are regulated by local regulations (UUD1945, 2012). Special funds, how much per year is RP / US Dollar; allotment.

e. Land and Spatial Planning

The privilege in the land sector is that the Sultanate and the Duchy are authorized to manage and utilize the land of the Sultanate and the land of the Duchy aimed at the maximum development of culture, social interests, and the welfare of the community. The specialty in the field of spatial planning is the authority of the Sultanate and the Duchy in spatial planning on the management and utilization of the Sultanate land and the Duchy land (UUD1945, 2012). For example, the all coastal area 2 km from the coastline along the 90 km in all Jogja Coastal is the status of Sultan Ground (SG) or Paku Alaman Ground (PAG).

IV. Discussion

There are three ideal types that distinguish between "ruling monarchy", "constitutional monarchy" and what they call "democratic parliamentary monarchy". The defining characteristic of a democratic parliamentary monarchy is that only a freely elected parliament forms and ends the government. In contrast, in a constitutional monarchy, there is a strong element of dual legitimacy in the parliament and monarchies need each other's support to form or end a government. An even greater contrast, in a reigning monarchy, the monarchy can often unilaterally form or end government (Stepan et al., 2014).

Before discussing Yogyakarta, we will first discuss several countries in the world that still adhere to the monarchical leadership system to this day. The monarchical system of leadership is the oldest political system of government in the world based on a one-man government in which the supreme authority is held by the king, an individual ruler who serves as head of state and who attains his position through heredity. Most monarchies only allow male succession, such as from father to son. The monarchy system of government is divided into 3 types, namely Absolute Monarchy, Constitutional Monarchy, and Parliamentary Monarchy. Some countries that adhere to the monarchical leadership system to date are:

- The United Kingdom is one of the countries that still adheres to a constitutional monarchy system to this day. Before Queen Elizabeth II died, the British monarchy was still under her rule since 1952 where she became the longest-serving ruler in British royal history. The United Kingdom has four ruling states namely Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today is still led by King Salman bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud by adopting an absolute monarchy leadership system, where the existence of the prime minister in Saudi Arabia is only for a symbolic form, because the full power belongs to the king.
- The Kingdom of Qatar is an Emirati state in the Middle East that has a leader from the Thani family since the 19th century. Qatar was also founded by Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed al Thani. Qatar is currently ruled by King Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani. The Kingdom of Qatar adheres to a constitutional monarchy

leadership system, just like the British monarchy.

- The Kingdom of the Netherlands adheres to a constitutional monarchy parliamentary democratic government system and still has some federal elements in it. Because the Netherlands has a constitutional system, the prime minister has an important role in it. Now the Netherlands is still led by King William Alexander who replaced his mother Queen Beatrix since 2013. The Netherlands is called a country that has a bicameral parliament because the king indirectly governs the country, but the king still has the power as a president of the state council.
- The Kingdom of Kuwait implements a semi-constitutional monarchy government system with its leader named Nawaf al Sabah who has led since 29 September 2020. Previously the King of Kuwait was King Sabah al Ahmad al Jaber al Sabah who died at the age of 91 years

Collaboration between democracy and monarchy occurs in government systems in several countries. What happened in Yogyakarta was a monarchy system originating from the Islamic Mataram kingdom, which was later recognized as a political institution holding executive power in the democratic system of the Indonesian state. The King of Yogyakarta acts as the executive power holder (Governor) in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Yogyakarta was an Islamic kingdom which later joined the Indonesian state as a province with a special status. As King, the Sultan is always supervised by the regional people's representative council in the administration of regional government (Nugroho et al., 2021).

The relationship between Yogyakarta and the central government of Jakarta is harmonious because Yogyakarta has 6 elements of rationality, namely rational choice (survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and influence). This success can be a role model for other regions in Indonesia and other countries in the world.

NO	ASPECT	YOGYAKARTA
1	Survival	privileges law number 13/2012, the third sila of Pancasila, Article 18 of the constitution
2	Security	privileges law number 13/2012, the third sila of Pancasila, Article 18 of the constitution
3	Economy/welfare	Law of Land
4	Prestige	Cultural Privileges
5	Influence	The position of Governor / Deputy governor automatically for life

Tab. 1. Yogyakarta

Source: Authors

Yogyakarta's Asymmetric Decentralization is one of the most unique because it is the only one in the world a semi-monarchical local government under the unitary republican national government. Which is somewhat similar is Monaco under the national system of the French Republic, but theoretically Monaco is an independent

country (quasi-state), but its foreign policy takes refuge in France.

V. Conclusion

The relationship between Yogyakarta local political actors and the central government in Jakarta is harmonious because Yogyakarta has 6 elements of rationality, namely rational choice (survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and influence). This success can be a role model for other regions in Indonesia and other countries in the world in establishing harmonious relations with the central government. Asymmetric Decentralization Yogyakarta is one of the most unique because it is the only one in the world a semi-monarchical local government under the unitary national government of the republic.



Pict. 7. Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and his family

Source: Kompasiana (2012)



Pict. 8. Pakualaman IX and his family

Source: Gudeg (2016)

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Book Reviews

***International Security Studies: Theory and practice.* By Peter Hough, Shanin Malik, Andrew Moran and Bruce Pilbeam. London and New York: Routledge, 2015, xiv+473 pp.**

With the advancement of Security Studies, this book may be used as a complete reference for comprehending theoretical viewpoints on a variety of significant international security concerns. This book, written in a chronological order, encourages readers to think ahead of present debates on security challenges, both military and non-military. Including empirical studies in each chapter can also help readers grasp our study of numerous security case studies from the United States, China, the Middle East, Russia, Africa, the Arctic, Europe, and Latin America.

With a background in education, Peter Hough, Shanin Malik, Andrew Moran, and Bruce Pilbeam attempted to develop a book that might be used as a textbook for students interested in Security Studies. Thirty-four chapters are arranged into five subject areas and incorporate educational aspects such as text boxes, summary points, and recommended additional reading: (1) Conceptual and Theoretical Security; (2) Military Security; (3) Non-Military Security; (4) Institutions and Security; and (5) Case studies. This textbook is required reading for all Security Studies students, as well as students of Critical Security Studies, Human Security, peace and conflict studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

Shahin Malik wrote six chapters in Section 1: Conceptual and Theoretical. The first chapter has a framework that describes the Boundaries of Security Studies. Malik wants readers to realize that in the 1980s, many traditional academics, such as Stephen Walt, defined

Security Studies as the 'study of the threat, use, and control of military force' (p.6). Malik recognized that this was simply an extension and location for Realist thought. So, in chapter two, Malik gives evidence that the development of liberalism in Security Studies is becoming deeper. The next chapter examines Critical Security Studies, an alternative approach to security that emphasizes the change from traditional military and state-centric concepts of security to security that focuses on individuals. The following two chapters sequentially discuss feminist security studies and human security.

Section 2 has seven chapters that cover everything from the existence of war to the use of nuclear weapons to the establishment of a privatized military. The first two chapters in this part outline the many types of war that constantly threaten global peace. Wars can be inter-state, intra-state, or extra-state; if there is a formal declaration of war or not; declared or undeclared wars; total or limited wars, when fought primarily with military resources and with clearly defined and limited objectives. There are several more sorts of wars, including as proxy warfare in which hegemony is endorsing the third parties (p.88). According to Andrew Moran, in the age of globalization, the forms of threats and wars are becoming increasingly diversified and are assessed depending on: the actors engaged, goals, methods, and financing. Chapter nine discusses nuclear proliferation, which emphasizes the argument that non-state actors such as warlords, terrorists, and guerrillas are also participating in warfare. From military arms trade to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), small arms, light weapons, ammunition, and explosives (SALW), contemporary terrorism, and religious engagement in international war, chapters 10 to 12 cover it all. Contains several case studies of Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 tragedy. The last two

chapters in this part focus on the presence of intelligence in security studies, beginning with the 2009 Stuxnet case in Iran; the existence of America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the United Kingdom's MI6; as well the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service (FSB).

Non-military security, Section 3 Peter Hough highlights the many forms of non-military threats, which are separated into five chapters. Environmental security, which is also a 'low politics' concern, is discussed in Chapter 15. Academics and governments have characterized climate change as a national security threat. Because of the significant mortality toll from pollution, environmental challenges are sometimes portrayed as human security issues. Chapter 16 on crime and security shows that as mobility has been simpler in the age of globalization, so has the number of cross-border crimes. Colombia's cocaine business, for example, has become a narco-terrorist concern in the United States and the United Kingdom. The importance of Food Security is discussed in Chapter 17 because it is also the root cause of other problems. The global policy on famine relief owned by the United Nation (UN)'s World Food Programme (WFP), a hybrid of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), must be monitored, and this is a basic need of every human being. Hough describes in the next chapter how social, economic, and environmental developments linked with modern globalization have increased transnational health hazards. The section's last chapter examines catastrophe and security, beginning with a case study of the 2011 Japanese tsunami. It comes out that a 2011 Humanitarian emergency response review is required, with the main tenet being that there must be resilience, leadership, and cooperative collaboration to cope with disaster-related dangers.

Section 4, Institutions and Security, is divided into three chapters. Bruce Pilbeam's Chapter 20 discusses the UN and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The United Nations has the legitimacy to continue to sustain world peace via diverse activities such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building (p.296). However, when the following human crime situations occur: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the international community must assume responsibility for assisting in their resolution. This is known as R2P, and it includes three primary responsibilities: prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. Meanwhile, Andrew Moran's Chapter 21 describes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) continuity for the Region. The part concludes with Hough's writing in Chapter 22 about regional security organizations, which also includes a map that shows a lot of overlap within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Hough's objection is highlighted in a graphic in which several nations that overlap are also members of NATO, the European Union (EU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (p.323).

Section 5 concludes with a number of case studies relating to security studies. Various examples in each Region are discussed in 11 chapters. Beginning with Chapter 23, which examines counterterrorism operations in the United States, the chapter moves on to discuss security dynamics in Russia and the Black Sea; the perceived danger to China; the failing institution-building for European security; and security in the African region. Then, in Chapter 28, Hough discusses the humanitarian problems that exist in the Arctic, from climate change to health difficulties such as the

elderly, 'lifestyle diseases' caused by poverty, and the high rate of suicides. The Arab Spring and democratization, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, security threats in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia and Brazil, and the unfinished war between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are all discussed consecutively in the following chapters. This part concludes with a study of space and security, which covers dangers from satellites to the Apollo moon programme.

It may be concluded that this book is extremely good at explaining both theoretically and empirically with highly various case studies. However, improvements are required in the most recent edition, which is slated to be able to update case studies that occur over time. This book does not go into great detail regarding one of the facets of Human Security, namely personal and communal security. Another critique is that the migration problem is not addressed, despite the fact that it may fully explain the security-threat nexus. Aside than that, this book is rather simple and may be used as a reference for those interested in the dynamics of Security Studies.

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Book Reviews

***Sensible Politics: Visualizing International Relations.* By William A. Callahan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020, xvi + 303pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-007174-5**

International politics are influenced by a lot of factors that constantly change along with the evolution of the society. In this post-literate age, media plays an important role in delivering international affairs to us. Even more with the widespread of social media usage, it is relatively easier for us to shape our view of the world through videos and images that we see. We are affected by visuals more than we ever anticipated. Thus, it is important to dig deeper on how visuals can have an important role in shaping a better understanding of the dynamic in international relations.

William A. Callahan, in his new book *Sensible Politics*, attempts to develop our understanding of international politics through visuals. This book focuses on what the visual can do in helping us to understand the complexity of social theory and world orders. Callahan argues 'visual international politics is important and different' (p.1). It is important because visuals play an important role in this digital era, and it is different as visuals can viscerally move people in terms of how it can make them feel which then resulting in "affective communities of sense" (p.2). Callahan also explains in this book that the visuals he discusses is not limited to only painting or photography, but it also includes other form of visuals such as film, video, and even walls and gardens.

There are a total of 11 chapters in this book that Callahan divides into 3 parts: a framework for analysis, visual images, and visual artifacts and sensory spaces. There are two things that

make this book intriguing and worth to read for students or researchers of IR. First is the fact that visual IR remains an under-studied field (p.6). Second is how this book explores visual images and artifacts that come from non-Western countries. In addition to that, it is worth noting that this book highlights the value of comparative approach to provide an alternative explanation of some recent international affairs such as the Islamic State's utopian Caliphate, the tension that always arises between Japan and China whenever public figures visit Yasukuni Shrine, and even about participatory surveillance on the World Wide Web.

One thing that Callahan keeps mentioning in this book is how visuality can provoke new social relations in a form of affective communities of sense. On chapter 1, Callahan mentions that this affective communities of sense 'complicate what can (and cannot) be seen, said, thought, and done' (p.44). In addition to that, he also mentions on chapter 2 that aside from the importance of thinking visually, there is also the need for us to understand the feeling visually in international politics. It is important to keep in mind that both are equally important to understand how images can create a strong positive or negative effect within a community where a certain image is being presented to.

For many IR students, IR tends to highlight classical and traditional issues of IR through the lenses of realism. However, as the world orders have gone through changes, IR approach also needs to evolve along with that. Thus, Callahan through *Sensible Politics* provides a new approach to understand modern security, order, and war through visualization. This can be seen from chapter 5 where he elaborates how the visible is essential for thinking about war and waging it in the twenty-first century and what can

visuals tell us about security, social-ordering, and world ordering (p.90). He provides the explanation by exploring the examples of the feature film *The Interview* (2014) that provoked the North Korea-US national security event and the use of images on media by the Islamic State's (p.90). Such examples open a new perspective that can be used by students of IR to explore security, social-ordering, and world ordering.

Another thing that is discussed in this book is the role Maps, Space, and Power that are always essential in IR. Many conflicts occurred among world orders often time are affected by maps, space, and power relations in the area. Chapter 7 in this book talks about the need 'to understand maps as active interventions that can shape global politics' (p.149). Intriguing arguments are presented through the examination of Chinese maps that contain a U-shaped line that digs deep into the South China Sea abutting the littoral states of maritime Southeast Asia (p.149). In this chapter, there are explanations regarding how maps play a key role in the South China Sea disputes and why Beijing is pushed to "rejuvenate China" by recovering "lost territories" (p.149).

As a Professor of International Relations that studies visual IR, Callahan invites students or scholars of IR to shift the understanding of social theory and international politics by expanding IR's comparative scope. First, the scope is broadened to incorporate not only spoken words but also visual elements and visual senses. Second, moving the focus beyond Eurocentric examinations of visual IR by considering Asia and the Middle East. Finally, emphasizing shifts from critical IR's concentration on dividing concepts such as inside/outside and self/other, to view politics in terms of innovate mechanism for organizing societies and shaping global order.

Reading this book will evoke wider questions regarding the influence of visual artifacts on world politics. *Sensible Politics* applies critical thinking to analyze what visuals can do and the result is shown by Callahan through visual examples he provides in all chapters in this book. This book also sets the groundwork for future developments in theories of world order, shaping the direction of future thinking on the subject.

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