Aim and Scope

WIMAYA is an international scholarly journal devoted to international affairs. Published twice a year by the International Relations Department, Pembangunan Nasional Veteran East Java, the journal aims to promote the importance of interdisciplinary approach to analyze various international issues. The journal welcomes empirical and theoretical research articles that seek to cut across disciplines in order to capture the complexity of a phenomenon. The editors also welcome discursive book reviews that contribute to the literature.

Editorial Team

Numtip Smerchuar, Ph.D. (Cand)
School of Political & Social Science, University of Phayao, THAILAND

Sarah Anabarja, Ph.D. (Cand)
International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS), National Chengchi University (NCCU), TAIWAN

Thaingi Khin Htwe, MA in International Relations
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University, JAPAN

Mona Sihombing, Master of Global Media Communication
The University of Melbourne, AUSTRALIA

Alia Azmi, MSi
Civic Education Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Negeri Padang

Layout Editors
Paskalis Dimas
Faculty of Social and Political Science
Pembangunan Nasional Veteran East Java

Submission information

WIMAYA

Interdisciplinary Journal of International Affairs
Volume 03, Number 01 (January-June 2022)

Contents

Research Article

Resource Extraction Developmentalism and the Coal Industry Across the Indonesian Archipelago: to the Benefits of Whom?

Jasmine A. Savitri[1]
University of Cincinnati
jnsavitri@gmail.com

Abstract
Over the years, the government of Indonesia has relied on different natural resources as its income generator. Although oil is still a main contributor, coal has increased significance that the business is growing rapidly. The government of Indonesia even promoted the industry's expansion through legal means, The 2020 Amendment of Coal and Mineral Mining Law, which lays the foundation of its down streaming. Despite domestic and international outcry for a more aggressive response towards climate crisis, Indonesia's coal industry is ever flourishing and yet to face its end. Nonetheless, local and marginalized communities have to bear its various negative consequences and the environment is facing even further degradation, while a few elites live off of the benefits.
Keywords: coal industry, Developmentalism, indonesian archipelago, resource extraction

I. Introduction

The Indonesian government's aggressive infrastructure development strategy, including coal power plants, is lauded for the broader distribution of electricity access across the archipelago and its impacts on the nation's development. Also celebrated for its contribution to the largest share of Indonesia's annual export and economic development is the mining industry. Communities affected by coal concessions or infrastructure development were given compensation for their loss of land, plans were made to ameliorate the environmental ramifications, and the 2020 Amendment of Coal and Mineral Mining Law (New Mining Law) is deemed to grow the economy further and create more jobs. Nevertheless, the detrimental consequences of this industry keep lurking in the everyday lives of local communities. Simultaneously, the New Mining Law mostly amended articles related to mining permits and only slightly addressed the environment and human rights (Harsono 2020).

With this paper, I argue that although the extractive mining industry is promised to grow Indonesia's economy and create more jobs, it will continue to disproportionately affect the environment, and most importantly, marginalized communities. My examination of what is referred to as "resource nationalism" (Gellert 2019) of the mining industry shows that this garners more significant benefit for certain dominant classes, i.e., coal mining giants and elite politicians. Further, I argue that these dominant classes, as part of a larger "extraction regime" (Gellert 2019), use their political affiliation and power to facilitate the formation and expansion of legal certainty (i.e., the adoption of the new law), thus assisting their capital accumulation agenda. This political power and affiliation will not only assist their capital accumulation agenda but also hinder the shift towards a more sustainable energy generation and prevent them from being held accountable for the negative consequences of their industry operation.

Specifically, this paper will answer the following questions: What are the social, economic, and environmental costs of Indonesia's coal mining industry, and who bears the larger burden to cover these costs?

---

[1] The author received her Master degree of Community Planning at University of Cincinnati

Why does the government of Indonesia continue to extract coal and massively build coal-based plants all over the country, despite the adverse impacts on the lives of the surrounding residents and the environment? Which classes and actors benefit from this industry, and through what measures?

II. Theoretical Framework

This inquiry refers to Paul K. Gellert's (2019) conceptualization of "altered state developmentalism" to explain Indonesia's neoliberal strategies and policies, not only in the extractive industry but also in power plant construction. State developmentalism is where the state becomes an active agent of development, which has control over capital while working in harmony with capitalists (Pirie 2017). However, the core strategies to pursue growth through developmental state projects have shifted, as Pirie (2017) has argued for the Taiwan and South Korean cases. Gellert (2019) conceptualized this shift with the concept of 'altered state developmentalism,' where the developmentalism approach retains industrial transformation and GDP growth as central goals yet shifts the means to achieve it. States no longer attain revenues from direct ownership or control but through their roles in the allocation of permits as well as joint alliance over mine ownership and operation (Gellert 2019). Gellert (2019) further reiterates that top-down and nationalist strategies and policies indeed expand the conditions for deep marketization, yet the state still holds major control. The paper provides findings on which dominant actors benefit from altered state developmentalism, actors which form part of what Gellert (2019, p. 18) refers to as an "extractive regime" consisting of "foreign and domestic dominant classes."

That an extractive regime satisfies the interests of certain dominant classes is confirmed by the inquiry of Eleanor Andrews and James McCarthy (2014). The writers combine political ecology and legal geographies to understand how formal legal measures such as laws, regulations, and policies facilitate extractive industry operation, providing resources "that can be harnessed in the service of multiple parties and goals" (Andrews and McCarthy 2014, 9). These legal and regulatory structures are "changed, reinforced, deployed and invoked" to establish the social and legal spaces for extractive industries to operate (Andrews and McCarthy 2014, 7).

Political ecology analyzes and explicates the political economy of environmental issues and conflicts. It offers the context in which environmental policies can be situated by conforming to the roles of informal, extra-legal, and implicit aspects of the relationships between people and their environment. However, the complexity and ambiguity of formal law and policy can be used to the benefit of certain parties and interests, which political ecology could not explain due to the reliance on field-based research methodologies (Andrews and McCarthy 2014). Here, legal geographies offer a way to understand the legal and political dynamics of an issue through examining court documents, bills, statutes, and even media coverage, in contrast to the grassroots knowledge on certain conflicts obtained from the political ecology approach (Andrews and McCarthy 2014). Strategic interventions are deployed to influence the legal realm, including centralization of authority, tax incentives, subsidies, government and industry affiliation, and surveillance over environmental activists by the government (Andrews and McCarthy 2014).

III. Methodological Approach

I will perform my analysis based on data collected from academic literature, reports from NGOs working in response to the coal industry, press releases, statements from government officials, and other secondary materials such as media reports within Indonesia to answer my research questions. Using Paul K. Gellert's conceptualization of altered state developmentalism, I will further emphasize the state's role in advancing the extractive industry as one of the important sectors supporting Indonesia's development goals of industrial advancement and GDP growth. I will continue Gellert's inquiry by delineating further evidence on the government's aggressive actions to promote deep marketization in the mining sector and what does that say about the future of Indonesia. The biggest transition since the time Gellert's research was published in 2019 is the issuance of the new 2020 Mining Law, a recent update to the 2009 version.

With reference to Eleanor Andrews and James McCarthy's combination of political ecology and legal geography, I will look at how the New Mining Law as a legal measure facilitates extractive industry despite its negative consequences, especially to the low-income and marginalized groups. Through a political ecology lens, I will analyze reports from different NGOs advocating for environmental preservation and environmental justice in the mining sector to understand the dynamic relationships between communities and their environments and how these relationships have been challenged due to power imbalance in the political economy of the mining sector. I will complicate this logic by shedding light on the legal dimension of Indonesian mining sectors, which contest both claims on the environment and resistance to them and extend beneficial resources to certain parties and goals.

Eventually, I will verify that the dominant classes and actors who benefitted from the altered developmentalism approach are the same individuals served by New Mining Law as a formal legal measure to assist their capital accumulation agenda.

IV. Discussions

a. The rise of coal exporting and resource nationalism in Indonesia

The coal industry was not the prodigy in Indonesia's exports until the late 1980s or early 1990s. Its development was influenced by certain domestic and international factors and experienced a shift in the ownership structures. These two sections explicate the phenomena.

<u>Coal industry development</u>

From unknown to being the second-largest coal exporters in the world, and the largest steam coal exporter, Indonesia has experienced exponential growth in coal commodity production. Between 2000 to 2010, over 10,000 coal mining permits (IUP) were granted, which account for the biggest share of total mining permits (40 percent) (JATAM 2018). The country did not suddenly plunge into the resource extraction industry; it rather experiences a change in resources portfolio to gas, coal, and palm oil (Gellert 2019). Especially for coal, the industry experienced at least three periods of formative, take-off, and localization. Coal was initiated as one of Indonesia's commodified resources between 1967 to 1988, experienced a production boom in the period of 1989 to 1999, and was domesticated from 2000 to 2009 (Lucarelli 2019).

Domestic and international factors determine the increased rate of coal production in Indonesia from the beginning to the current industry expansion. Domestically,

fiscal and policy support, political decentralization agenda, as well as the interdependent nature between coal mining and Indonesian politics have stimulated production to grow. In the late 60s, President Suharto and his neoliberal-friendly governance introduced Law No.11/1967 on Mining which laid the ground for foreign investment and profit repatriation (Lucarelli 2010). Furthermore, the decentralization in the regulatory regime and the political affiliation of mining companies and government officials or political representatives have incentivized local governments to aggressively issue new permits, resulting in the rapid growth of mining companies (Atteridge et al. 2018). Policies were then framed to stimulate domestic coal demand using the jargon of energy security across the archipelago and the nation's development (Atteridge et al. 2018). Coal, soon developed as the main source of power generation, accounted for 63 percent of the total electricity production in 2019 (Market Forces 2017).

In a broad sense, international influences encouraged the interest for resource extraction from the beginning of the neoliberal free-market rules, and structural adjustment requirements are taken into account. The first Mining Law No.11/1967 was indeed part of Suharto's embracing the neoliberal prescriptions for development. When global oil prices experienced a dramatic increase, the coal industry received rising demand from Indonesia's Asian neighborhood (Lucarelli 2010). This moment initiated the period where the coal industry was thriving, or what Lucarelli (2010) refers to as the take-off period.

Later, the global climate change agenda, along with Indonesia's low rank in ease of business, eventually halted foreign investment in the mining sector. However, the industry does not show a dramatic slow-down.

The major players in Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) further expand the industry by investing in new coal power plants in Indonesia, seeking to grow demand for new plans in the region (Market Forces 2017). Low-cost loans from China, particularly, have encouraged this expansion as well (Atteridge et al. 2018).

In summary, Indonesian coal production was stimulated by international political economy influences and demand. Experienced several declines over time, and expected to experience another decline in the global demand mainly due to global climate change concerns, prompted government's shifted focus to further increase domestic consumptions.

Resource nationalism

"Resource nationalism" has been defined as "state intervention in natural resources industries in order to exert more control over the terms of private investment" (Warbuton 2017, 288). For more than a decade, Indonesia has been described as one of the countries where resource nationalism is on the rise after a long economic liberalization during the Suharto era. This economic liberalization, not so surprisingly, has benefited the United States and its allies more than it did Indonesia (Kaup and Gellert 2017). As a result, before economic liberalization was fully embraced, resource nationalism started to take root through a mix of policy prescriptions, especially in the mining sector. There is a unique aspect of Indonesia's resource nationalism in the mining sectors, as it is more widespread compared to some other sectors. Warburton (2017, 286) argued that the structure of ownership in the sector also determined the nationalist stance, in addition to the influence of price mechanism or state-level institutions.

Greater state control over resource extraction and reduced foreign investment

were enacted by requiring foreign companies to divest ownership, increasing taxes and royalties, and restricting the export of unprocessed raw commodities (Warburton 2017). Marked by the enactment of the 2009 Mining Law, Indonesia started to see an increase of nationalist policies in the mining sector. After pressures from legislatures and parliamentarians, the government included in Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining a requirement for 20 percent divestment of foreign companies to Indonesian participants after five years of operation (Kaup and Gellert 2017), with priorities given to the government and state-owned enterprises, then to private domestic companies (Warburton 2017). In addition, the 2009 Mining Law also marked the decentralization of the mining authority system to regional government bodies (Junita 2015).

Despite initial oppositions from mining associations, other ministries, and leading figures, along with criticism from business analysts for fear of decreasing FDI inflow (Warburton 2017), the resource nationalist approach was aggressively intensified when the law was updated in 2012. Foreign companies are required to divest at least 51 percent of their ownership to Indonesian participants after ten years of operation (Kaup and Gellert 2017). This does not mean that foreign involvement in the mining sector was dismissed altogether. Owing to the 2009 Mining Law, foreign investors are now allowed to own mining licenses through Indonesian foreign mining companies, a practice strictly banned by the Mining Law of 1967 (Law 11/1967) or the Old Mining Law (Junita 2015). In addition, foreign companies still retain a considerable amount of control over the mining sectors, only with new domestic players entering the game.

Wealthy tycoons and prominent politico-business elites had begun pursuing control over the mining sectors by buying foreign projects or pursuing shares of foreign companies (Warburton 2017, 299). After all, given the costly nature of these businesses, only those with substantial capital resources were able to do so. Therefore, the popularity of resource nationalism has carved the ways for these certain powerful elites to gain control in the extractive industry for their capital accumulation agenda. Argued as being driven by political opportunism disguised as nationalist pretense (Warburton 2015), resource nationalism signals an approach that less likely benefits a larger portion of the Indonesian community. The coal mining sector did see a shift from 75% foreign-owned in 2013 to 95% domestically owned in 2012 (Warburton 2017, 298). Nonetheless, the imbalanced power structure in the political economy of coal mining has put local communities at the forefront of bearing the highest social, economic, and environmental costs.

b. Environmental and socio-economic costs of coal mining

Resource nationalism that allows for resource extraction has been argued to benefit certain elites and leave social, economic, and environmental burdens to local communities (Warburton 2017). Underneath the widespread energy access across the archipelago and increase of GDP, the extractive industry is prompting environmental degradation, increasing emission, and threatening local communities' livelihoods and rights.

All stages of the coal industry, from the exploration, extraction, and transportation to the electricity generation from coal-fired plants, have impacted the environment both directly and indirectly. It immediately puts fundamental pressures on the environment through forest clearing, sometimes involving the use of fire, contributing to greenhouse gas

emissions at the least. Land clearing for coal mining and coal-fired electricity plants has disrupted soil and waterway systems which eventually led to disasters such as flood and erosion, not to mention the resulted loss, fragmentation, and degradation of native vegetation. Furthermore, local communities have to bear the consequences of the disruption of their living spaces, from finding better quality agricultural land, cleaner water resources to obtaining additional money resources to cover the daily needs of their disrupted lives.

Health and environmental costs

It is difficult to discuss the environmental impacts of the coal industry without mentioning the health implications imposed on residents. Therefore, this section will discuss both problems simultaneously, divided into several environmental issues and the associated health problems related to coal mining, including the loss of forest cover, creation of abandoned pit lakes, water, and air pollution, along with aggravated natural disasters.

For three decades since early 1990s, there has been massive destruction of forest lands and community lands for mining exploration and exploitation, waste basins, and transportation infrastructure. As of now, Indonesia has lost 1.74 million ha of forest land due to active coal mining and 8.6 million more (9% of the country's remaining total forest cover) from future permits (Bebbington et al. 2018). The loss has cost Indonesia its carbon sink and increased greenhouse gas emission. Moreover, the areas surrounding experience general ecological alteration, especially due to the massive loss of water resource much needed for the industry to operate. Forest clearing has also caused habitat loss for forest animals (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018).

More often than not, coal mining left behind huge basins, which were then filled with rainwater and turned into deep lakes, usually refers to as pit lakes. Although pit lakes are not unique to coal mining practice in the extractive world, Indonesia is seeing more abandoned pit lakes, of which companies have not fulfilled their reclamation responsibilities (Apriando 2021) (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018), and the local government shows lax enforcement of environmental regulations (Syahni 2021). Pit lakes have proven to cause flooding, land erosion, and water contamination to local water resources (Apriando 2021). while in some cases have been used by mining companies as waste dumping sites without a proper filtration process (Bersihkan Indonesia 2018). In 2015, JATAM (an advocacy network working on issues related to the mining, oil, and gas industries) released a report showing a high acidity level of Nangka River in East Kalimantan, which is believed to be connected to the mining activity of a mining company called Kutai Energi who allegedly disposed unfiltered water from their pit lakes into the river (Apriando 2021). Consequently, local communities who rely heavily on the river for their daily water needs are now unable to even feed their livestock (Apriando 2021).

Water contamination is not only found in pit lakes. In fact, there are more environmental problems related to water pollution in rivers. Coal-slurry spills were considered as common incidents where coal mining is a major industry (Syahni 2021), and in other places, river water turned whitish (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018, 15). Water contamination has cost local communities the ecological services provided by the rivers. They have lost their main water resources for farming and drinking, a place of leisure activities such as bathing, swimming, and fishing. Furthermore, coal exploitation has

caused ocean pollution as coal may spill from barges bringing supplies to coal power plants, destroying coral reefs, and polluting the marine ecosystem (Wicaksono 2019).

Coal dust is a common residue in coal industry areas. Communities living nearby both coal production sites and coal-based electricity plants experienced environmental and health problems linked to the industry. Housing units within close proximity to the sites are now used to black dust covering all parts of their house, including kitchen appliances (Wicaksono 2019; Suprapto 2020). Dust from coal-hauling activities could even interfere with residents' vision (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). Moreover, health problems surge in number, including asthma and persistent cough cases, especially in children, other respiratory health issues, and even increased cancer cases [2] (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018; Suprapto 2020; Wicaksono 2019). In Long Loreh village, North Kalimantan, residents suffer from Upper Respiratory Tract Infection, due to a massive amount of dust resulted from coal-hauling process (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). Long Loreh farmers also saw more crop failures as a result of coal dust filling in their grains (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018).

On top of these casualties, local communities have to bear a higher vulnerability to natural disasters due to environmental degradation. East Kalimantan, the heartland of Indonesia's coal industry, experienced at least 218 floods between 2010 and 2012 in the capital city, and now called the "Flood City" (Syahni 2019). Only recently, in January 2021, a deadly flood as high as 10 feet inundated a large portion of the South Kalimantan area (Jong 2021), one of Indonesia's coal mining havens. In addition to

flooding, erosion and sedimentations are new problems emerging from coal exploitation (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018).

Socio-economic costs

Although environmental and health impacts eventually affect local communities, the casualties are entrenched and have altered their lives completely. This section will discuss both the social and economic costs of the extractive coal industry as both have overlapping impacts on communities' livelihoods. The cases presented below serve as snippets to the extensive lists of cases that are actually happening in the sites.

The economic impacts discussed here are closely related to the environmental degradation of coal exploitation, particularly waterways pollution and scarcity. Consequently, a lot of the resistance to the coal industry comes from farmers, who in Indonesia typically belong to the low-income and marginalized groups. Some of them were settlers participating in the government's induced transmigration program (Wicaksono 2019), one very similar to the U.S. westward expansion through Land Act and Homestead Act. Farmers who were once promised better lives in new lands now have lost their irrigation source used to water their rice fields or fish ponds. Even when water might still be available from the river, the contamination eventually caused crop failures (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). In the worst case, the industry could even take over active croplands and deny any access to residents who were relying on the land as their primary source of income, as experienced by the farmers in Teluk Dalam village, Kutai Kertanegara, East Kalimantan (Bersihkan Indonesia 2018, 42; (Wicaksono 2019). Furthermore, resistance

---

[2] Although there is no specific research conducted that can link cancer to coal mining in Indonesia, local residents have seen a dramatic increase in

nasopharyngeal cancer cases after the development of the coal-fired plant in Panau, Central Sulawesi.

also comes from fishers whose yields are adversely impacted by the ocean pollution from coal barges travelling through Karimun Java archipelago (Wicaksono 2019). The archipelago is known for Karimunjawa National Park, a marine conservation area with mangrove forests, beaches and coral reefs.

For the general public, polluted rivers mean loss of water sources and transportation access (Syahni 2021). As farmers struggle to keep their corps and fish alive, other community members have to find other water resources by building wells or installing public water services since water springs dropped dramatically or completely damaged (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). In Long Loreh village, as their river turned from clear to whitish, residents had to seek for paid water services which rarely reliable. They are left with no choice but to still consume the contaminated water for clothes and dish washing, and forced to travel further away for clean drinking water (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). Again, local communities bear the overlooked and uncounted costs of coal mining industries. Communities have to shoulder the extra financial burden and seek an additional source of income given the failures in their previous modes of production. These are the burdens that came along as coal mining companies expand and slowly seize community spaces.

As some aspects of local communities' lives have been altered, their characters and the social relations are heavily influenced and transformed. There are fewer and fewer land successions happening from older generation farmers to their children, given the low quality of life brought by the occupations of lands by coal mining (Wicaksono 2019). Being farmers becomes more challenging and less economically beneficial, younger generations are more attracted to other kinds of occupations. In their report, Shahbanu and Maimunah (2018) noticed an increase in the local consumptive behavior where communities no longer rely their daily needs upon nature and increasingly does so on the market. Moreover, there is a loss of community space and connection to the rivers. Now, local communities can no longer utilize the rivers for communal activities such as bathing, swimming, and fishing, as the water is badly polluted (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). Lastly, communities are weighted with tragedies happening in the wake of coal exploitation. For instance, there have been many death cases due to drowning in abandoned pit lakes, given their close proximity to residential units (Apriando 2021). Unfortunately, companies and government officials often see these accidents as parents' lack of responsibilities or parts of the children's destiny (Gokkon 2019), leaving life-long trauma to the lives of parents who lost their children.

Long Loreh village residents, Teluk Dalam village farmers, Panau residents and Karimun Java fishermen are the local communities paying the uncounted and overlooked costs of coal industry. Oftentimes, they are marginalized, having fewer access to basic necessities compared to their Indonesian counterparts due to lower economic development in their rural villages, their indigenous status, gender or race. Despite the plans to ameliorate the negative environmental ramifications and the compensations given to local communities, the detrimental consequences are still lurking in their everyday lives. The government clearly sees these costs as less important, if not unimportant, and will continue to rely on the extractive regime, particularly the coal mining industry, to advance the state's development agenda. The following section will unpack the state's rationales in sustaining the coal industry by discussing Indonesia's neoliberal

strategies and policies using the altered state developmentalism conceptualization.

c. Coal mining and infrastructure development as resource extraction developmentalism

Gellert, in his inquiry, narrates Indonesia's resource extraction as a state developmentalism approach, made possible due to the considerable reliance on state action for the deep marketization of resources under neoliberalism (Gellert 2019). However, the 21st-century Indonesian extractive regime is built on 'altered' state developmentalism, where neoliberal development goals of "industrial transformation and GDP growth" remain, but achieved more through "market-based strategies" than "state or dirigiste strategies" (Gellert 2019, 3). As a result, the resource extraction involves "a mix of neoliberal market strategies and policies and top-down statist, even nationalist, ones" (Gellert 2019, 3). this section will first examine how altered state developmentalism is realized under the coal exploitation agenda. Next, it brings the concept into the current global context with the decline of global market demand for coal. Finally, it offers an understanding of where Indonesia's state is directing its coal industry.

According to Gellert, states like Indonesia operate both in support and resistance to the core and periphery global system. The altered developmental state enables a shift to the semi-periphery in advancing domestic capital but retains a capitalist orientation to expand territories and exploit nature and people. This inconsistency of support and resistance to the global core and periphery system brought the 'altered' character of the state, where changes occur in modalities of rules and key relations among actors (state, domestic and international capital, labor, and other societal groups). Still, the state politicizes opportunities to make up for the declining revenues from resources.

In his analysis, Gellert (2019, 15) argued that the state had taken a more resource nationalist attitude than altered state developmentalist, by using downstream processing and divestment requirement strategies. However, despite being dominated by both public and private domestic ownerships, the state's control over the mining sector, especially coal, through legislation remains (Coca 2021). The state harnesses benefit from coal demands, especially from India and China, having the sector contribute to the highest share of national export revenue (Bersihkan Indonesia 2018; Atteridge et al. 2018). After all, there are existing global demands for an energy-efficient and cheap source for electricity which Indonesia's coal production is skewed towards (Mordor Intellegence 2021).

Furthermore, to understand the coal extractive regime in Indonesia, attention should equally be given to the coal power plant business. Utilizing Asia's giants' (Japan, China, and Korea) agenda to expand new plants demand across the region (Market Forces 2017), the state has incentivized a massive development of coal power plants, masked by rhetorical aspirations for development, power distribution, and the nation's prosperity. The coal industry supporters believe that coal as a domestic resource would benefit the economy and promote energy independence (Coca 2021). However, this inward-looking approach represents Indonesia's state interest and intervention in maintaining the sustainability of coal exploitation in response to the declining global coal demand.

The Indonesian state is yet to show any sign of its loosening the exploitation of nature and people. In fact, it is trying to expand the coal industry through increased control over mining permits and down streaming the use of coal (Coca, 2021). Indonesia further incentivizes the coal industry through the

ambitious goal of expanding electricity generation capacity and doubling domestic demand (Atteridge et al. 2018, 13) by aggressively planning and developing coal power plants. The country now has the third biggest coal-power capacity after India and China, with coal power construction accounts for 75 percent of the total plans across South and Southeast Asia (Coca 2021).

So far, we have discussed how Indonesia's state has a considerable role in sustaining the coal industry, claimed as one of the means to support the neoliberal goals of the country's development and growing national economic revenues. Nonetheless, there is a missing piece that has yet to be addressed and examined, of which Gellert (2017, 18) put as an open question: to the benefit of which actors this extractive regime of coal serves? As stated in the introduction, this argues that the mining industry garners more significant benefit specifically to mining giants and elite politicians as the dominant classes in the industry. To realize their capital accumulation agenda, these dominant classes take advantage of the legal measures to facilitate the extractive industry operation, which will be the topic of the next section.

d. Legal measures facilitating extractive industry operation

Before diving into the domestic aspects of the extractive regime in the coal industry, this section will discuss how the extractive industry can operate through social and legal spaces established by both legal and regulatory structures. More importantly, this section will make the case on how the process of formal legal measures that facilitate the extractive industry operation are being harnessed to favor certain parties and goals. The section does so by reviewing the formal legal measures of Indonesia's coal industry within two periods. First is the period when the coal industry was mainly shaped by the global

demand for coal and foreign investment in its initiation and development for over three decades. Second is the latest period when the government shifted focus to strengthen the domestic coal market.

In their analysis, Andrews and McCarthy (2013) suggest that to fully examine the political ecology of extractive industry; there is a value in paying greater attention to the legal measures and other state interventions allowing it to operate. Political ecology helps understand the flow of power within the extractive coal industry and explicate its impacts on humans and the environment. Then, legal geographies shed light on the process in which law becomes a key instrument in mediating how resources are extracted, and the industry is expanded.

The initial foundation of coal's regulatory framework is the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, which gives the state the power to control natural resources used for the benefit of the people (Lucarelli 2010). The coal industry's development was then encouraged by the Foreign Investment Law and the Mining Law signed in 1967 (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018; Lucarelli 2010), which also marked the state's embracing neoliberal approach to development. Still, coal was not the prodigy in Indonesia's export at the time, as the country heavily relied on its revenue first from oil and then from plywood in response to the changing global demands. When the wood industry declined, coal expansion began to extend and accelerate (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018), mediated by a set of rules and policies from both the legislative and executive powers (Junita 2015).

In 2009, Indonesia updated its Mining Law by issuing the Law on Mineral on Coal Mining No.4/2009, replacing the 1967 version. It brought a significant change on the regulatory regime of coal, from a contractual to licensing system (PwC 2011). The 2009

Mining Law and the 2004 Regional Autonomy Law retain a big role in the expansion of the coal industry. The law that gives regional governments on the district level authority to issue mining permits has spurred mining companies' formation (Atteridge et al. 2018) (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). With the amendment on the law regulating revenue distribution set out in Law No. 33/2004 and Government Regulation No.55/2005), the regional government on the district and provincial level were entitled to 80 percent of the revenue from land rents and royalties (Atteridge et al. 2018). Given the authority and local incentives, the previous laws have driven regional governments to expand coal mining industries for revenue accumulation.

Indonesia's state went to a greater length with legal measures to facilitate the coal industry. Even when environmental issues are on the question, it prefers to weigh on the economic significance of coal. Using the Presidential Decree No. 41 of 2004, the state facilitated 13 mining companies to operate in protected forest areas (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018). Furthermore, although the 2009 Mining Law is usually attributed to Indonesia's resource nationalism in the extractive industry, it is also responsible for furthering the commodification of coal. Using the law, the state is allowed to criminalize opposing parties threatening the sustainability of mining operations (Shahbanu and Maimunah 2018).

The recent trend of legal and regulatory measures applied by the state shows a gradual shift to increase domestic demand for coal in order to keep the business running. Due to global climate change concerns, coupled with geopolitics influence for uncertain energy supply (Atteridge et al. 2018, 14), the government is devising strategies to expand the domestic use of coal. President Joko Widodo introduced a national

plan to grow generating capacity in 2014, which was set to double domestic coal demand by 2019 (Atteridge et al. 2018; Toumbourou et al. 2020). The plan puts coal plants on the frontier in achieving energy independence by supplying more than 50 percent of the total energy (Sirait 2020; Toumbourou et al. 2020).

Despite public outcry, in 2020, the government passed a revision of the 2009 Mining Law (New Mining Law) which would intensify mining businesses and incentivize companies to increase domestic coal demand. The New Mining Law aimed to develop the downstream mining industry and increase economic growth (Harsono 2020). Argued to cast aside environmental and socio-economic impacts, this law will aid the coal industry by smoothing the permit extension for mining corporations whose licenses are about to expire and expanding the area allowed for mining operation (Nicholas 2019; Coca 2021). The law will also grant a longer license period and control over the mining area to companies integrating their operations with processing and refining facilities or with coal power plants (Nicholas 2019). To avoid conflicts with local communities, the law includes articles that could criminalize individuals who defend their land rights against mining companies (Nicholas 2019).

To add to the exhaustive list is the Omnibus Law enacted in 2020, which further reiterates the state's attempt to sustain the coal industry by securing the market at home. First, the Omnibus Law on job creation allows for mining area expansions by eliminating the 30 percent minimum requirement of forest area (Jong 2020). Second, it significantly limits public participation and rights to challenge mining operations or coal power plant construction (Jong 2020). Lastly, the law incentivizes coal companies that develop downstream facilities, such as coal power

plants and coal gasification, with an exemption to pay royalties (Jong 2020).

Finally, the state also shows attempts to advertise coal as cleaner energy to attract public support and comply with the global climate change response, such as the Paris Agreement. Under government regulations, biomass is integrated into coal power generation to presumably make the system "greener" (Coca 2021). Moreover, the government also tries to advocate coal as a cleaner option by arguing that newer power plant technologies can significantly reduce carbon emissions (Umah 2020).

NGOs and experts have expressed concerns that the recent Laws are in conjunction with business interest while setting aside the environmental and socio-economic ramifications (Harsono 2020). In an interview with the Jakarta Post (Jakarta-based English newspaper), Faisal Basri, a senior economist, argued that the New Mining Law was not the country's immediate need, except for it to secure six mining corporations their control over 70 percent of the nation's coal production (Harsono 2020). Indeed, as Andrews and McCarthy (2013, 13) have claimed, the formal legal realm allows for resources to be "harnessed in the service of multiple parties and goals." The following section discusses the matter further.

e. Benefitting parties and their political affiliations within the domestic extractive regime?

Previous studies on extractive coal industries have discussed and revealed the link between coal mining and Indonesian politics (Warbuton 2017; Atteridge et al. 2018; AlFadhat 2019; Toumbourou et al. 2020). These groups' control over Indonesia's development direction through the coal mining industry continues to this day, if not more apparent and powerful. Building off of

the analysis from Andrews and McCarthy (2014), this section seeks to exclusively unpack the web of power and influences within the coal industry.

In his book, Faris AlFadhat (2019) illustrates how Indonesian conglomerates and political bureaucrats exercise control over the extractive industry. One evident was the alliance between Salim Group (one of the largest business groups in Southeast Asia) and Nusantara Group (a firm owned by one of Indonesia's most influential elite politic, Prabowo Subianto). In 2018, Nusantara Group, where Anthony Salim is a major shareholder, competed with Churchill Group from the U.S. for a 35,000-hectare coal exploration concession of locations Churchill has already worked on in East Kutai, East Kalimantan province (Al-Fadhat 2019).

The situation eventually favored Nusantara when Isran Noor won the election as the district chief of East Kutai. Isran Noor used the power given to him as district government leader to issue and revoke licenses. With the New Mining Law of 2009 as a formal legal measure, Isran Noor released a letter claiming that no mining license has ever once been issued to Churchill Group by his administration. While at the same time granting the license extension of Nusantara (Al-Fadhat, 2019). Indeed, the above event exemplifies how the authority given by the 2009 Mining Law and the 2004 Regional Autonomy Law to regional government allows for leaders to abuse power for their own political and financial gain. The analysis from (Warbuton 2017) (Atteridge et al. 2018) (AlFadhat 2019) (Toumbourou et al. 2020) has provided numerous evidence for such practice.

This section, however, seeks to focus on the current web of power and influences benefitting from the formal legal measures made possible by the state, which becomes more apparent during the latest presidential

election in 2019 and until recently. It especially delves on the benefitting parties from Indonesia's increasing domestic market through the diversification agenda.

Just a few days before the presidential election in 2019, an 86-minute-long documentary film called 'Sexy Killers' was published online linking coal mining corporations to elite politicians within the presidential election, including both candidates, Joko Widodo (now President of Indonesia) and Prabowo Subianto (now Defense Minister of Indonesia) (Wicaksono 2019).

Earlier in the previous section, it is argued that the New Mining Law serves the vested interests of Indonesia's big coal mining corporations, including PT. Adaro Energy, the largest coal mining company in Indonesia, whose license expires in 2022 (Harsono 2019). The CEO of PT. Adaro Energy is Garibaldi Thohir (Forbes 2021), who founded the company along with Sandiaga Uno (Wicaksono 2019), the running mate to presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and now Indonesia's Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy. Garibaldi Thohir is also the brother of Erick Thohir, the spokesman for President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) campaign and now the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises. Moreover, the subsidiary company of PT. Adaro Energy, PT. Adaro Power currently owns a coal power plant in Central Java.

Furthermore, the documentary film also linked PT. Adaro Energy with PT. Toba Sejahtra (Wicaksono 2019), which business sectors include coal, oil, gas, agriculture, property, infrastructure development, and power plants (Sukirno 2013). The company has a subsidiary called PT. Toba Bara Sejahtra, known to operate several coal power plants in Java (Wicaksono 2019), the most populated island in Indonesia. The owner of this company is Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, a retired four-star

Army general, Indonesia's current Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Sukirno 2013). PT. Toba Sejahtra now has 16 subsidiaries proliferating for the past two decades (Bersihkan Indonesia 2018). In 2014, PT. Toba Sejahtera joined venture with PT. Rakabu, President Jokowi's company, and formed PT. Rakabu Sejahtera (Widhiarto and Ayuningtyas 2014). The company is presently run by Kaesang Pangarep, the first son of President Jokowi and recently elected Mayor of Solo. The company operates in construction, land acquisition, timber processing, as well as timber and palm oil products manufacturing (Wicaksono 2019).

To top everything, most of these companies are granted as sharia-compliance equities on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, certified by the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), chaired by Ma'ruf Amin, who is now the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia (Wicaksono 2019).

That coal mining giants play a significant role in the previous presidential election, and the country's current politics is also confirmed by the report from Tommy Apriando (2021) and Bersihkan Indonesia (2018). The older report from Bersihkan Indonesia (2018), a coalition of NGOs working to fight pollution and corruption, ties coal mining companies with central government politicians, finance ministry officials, supreme court justices, army generals, former ministers, and former president. At the same time, the recent report from Apriando (2021) depicts the link between regional mining corporates in South Kalimantan Province with regional governments and the current political powers in the central government. Andi Syamsudin Arsyad, a prominent businessman in the province, owns PT Jhonlin Grup, which production amounts to 400 thousand tonnes of coal with Rp. Forty billion (USD 2.7 billion) revenue in a month. In the 2019 presidential

campaign, he served as the vice treasury of the Jokowi-Ma'aruf campaign team (Apriando 2021).

As illustrated, there are deep and powerful connection between those holding the decision-making power and business/individuals operating in the coal mining industry.

V. Conclusion

In this article, I analyzed how the coal industry is being sustained to the benefit of a few while leaving environmental and socio-economic ramifications poorly addressed. As the industry flourish, local communities and marginalized groups are displaced, deprived of their means of livelihood, suffering from deaths and illnesses, as well losing their community spaces and characters. On the other hand, a group of dominant classes, including mining giants and elite politicians, are racking up profits from these unsustainable practices. The last section depicts the powerful web of relations between business owners, elites, reigning politicians, and their families. They have guaranteed their continuous capital accumulation agenda using their political power and access to legal means.

In advancing the industry, Indonesia's state shows an altered developmentalism stance by further influencing and incentivizing through legal means with the rhetoric goal of economic development based on GDP growth. Although concerns about the climate crisis force countries to shift to renewable energy hence reducing global coal demand, the state managed to devise a plan to sustain and prolong the life of the coal industry by marketing coal and coal derivatives as clean energy.

The state's roles in the coal industry were manifested in the form of formal legal measures facilitating the extractive operation. A set of laws and regulations have laid the grounds for the extractive industry to operate, expand and sustain itself. These legal measures have reduced obstacles for companies to obtain mining permits, expand their operation even to environmentally vulnerable areas, and be responsible for environmental, economic, and social damages. Also, they have hindered public participation within the decision-making process or opposition to the industry. The current national plan and recently enacted New Mining Law and Omnibus Law of 2020 serve the intensification of the coal industry through energy independence and coal diversification agenda.

It is difficult to imagine that Indonesia will shift to renewable energies soon. As a matter of fact, the state strives to frame coal as clean energy to secure the market as long as possible. With the backing of the state and legal measures, the coal industry will continue to benefit certain domestic classes. At the same time, local communities and the environment will keep paying for the uncounted and neglected costs.

Works Cited

"Adaro Energy." 2021. *Forbes*. Forbes Magazine. https://www.forbes.com/companies/adaro-energy/?sh=770c32122204.

Al-Fadhat, Faris. 2019. *The Rise of Internationalized Capital: ASEAN Economic Governance and Indonesian Conglomerates*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Andrews, Eleanor, and James McCarthy. 2013. "Scale, Shale, and the State: Political Ecologies and Legal Geographies of Shale Gas Development in Pennsylvania." *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences* 4 (1): 7–16. doi:10.1007/s13412-013-0146-8.

Apriando, Tommy. 2021. Rep. *Emas Hitam Dalam Cengkeraman Para Haji: Dari*

Pesta Pora, Kuasa Modal Hingga Ancaman Meratus. Bogor, Jawa Barat: Sajogyo Institute. https://sajogyo-institute.org/emas-hitam-dalam-cengkeraman-para-haji-dari-pesta-pora-kuasa-modal-hingga-ancaman-meratus/.

Atteridge, Aaron, May Thazin Aung, and Agus Nugroho. 2018. Working paper. *Contemporary Coal Dynamics in Indonesia*. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm Environment Institute. https://cdn.sei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/contemporary-coal-dynamics-in-indonesia.pdf.

Bebbington, Anthony J., Denise Humphreys Bebbington, Laura Aileen Sauls, John Rogan, Sumali Agrawal, César Gamboa, Aviva Imhof, et al. 2018. "Resource Extraction and Infrastructure Threaten Forest Cover and Community Rights." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115 (52): 13164–73. doi:10.1073/pnas.1812505115.

Bebbington, Anthony, Denise Humphreys Bebbington, and Laura Sauls. 2018. Rep. *Impacts of Extractive Industry and Infrastructure on Forests: Global and Synthesis Report*. Climate and Land Use Alliance. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330425315_Impacts_of_Extractive_Industry_and_Infrastructure_on_Forests_Global_and_Synthesis_Report.

Bersihkan Indonesia. 2018. Rep. *Coalruption: Elite Politik Dalam Pusaran Bisnis Batu Bara*. Bersihkan Indonesia. https://www.jatam.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/COALRUPTION.pdf.

Coca, Nithin. 2020. "As World Sours on Coal, Top Producer Indonesia Tries to Sweeten It at Home." *Mongabay Environmental News*. December 28. https://news.mongabay.com/2020/12/as-world-sours-on-coal-top-producer-indonesia-tries-to-sweeten-it-at-home/.

Coca, Nithin. 2021. "King Coal: How Indonesia Became the Fossil Fuel's Final Frontier." *Mongabay Environmental News*. March 17.

https://news.mongabay.com/2021/03/king-coal-how-indonesia-became-the-fossil-fuels-final-frontier/.

Gellert, Paul K. 2019. "Neoliberalism and Altered State Developmentalism in the Twenty-First Century Extractive Regime of Indonesia." *Globalizations* 16 (6): 894–918. doi:10.1080/14747731.2018.1560189.

Gokkon, Basten. 2019. "Drowning Deaths at Disused Mines in Indonesia Renew Calls for Action." *Mongabay Environmental News*. July 15. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/drowning-deaths-at-disused-mines-in-indonesia-renew-calls-for-action/.

Greenpeace, Auriga, JATAM, ICW. 2018. Rep. *Coalruption: Pengaruh Elite Politik Dalam Pusaran Bisnis Batu Bara*. http://pasopatiproject.id/coalruption-pengaruh-elite-politik-dalam-pusaran-bisnis-batu-bara/.

Harsono, Norman. 2020. "Explainer: New Rules in Revised Mining Law." *The Jakarta Post*. May 14. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/14/explainer-new-rules-in-revised-mining-law.html.

Jong, Hans Nicholas, and Arumingtyas Lusia. 2019. "War on Graft in Mining, Palm Oil Hit by New Law Weakening Indonesian Enforcer." *Mongabay Environmental News*. October 13. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/kpk-mining-coal-palm-oil-corruption-indonesia/.

Jong, Hans Nicholas. 2020. "Indonesia's Omnibus Law a 'Major Problem' for Environmental Protection." *Mongabay Environmental News*. November 4. https://news.mongabay.com/2020/11/indonesia-omnibus-law-global-investor-letter/.

Jong, Hans Nicholas. 2021. "Palm Oil Plantations, Coal Mines Linked to Deadly Indonesia Flood." *Mongabay Environmental News*. January 20. https://news.mongabay.com/2021/01/palm-oil-plantations-coal-mines-deforestation-indonesia-south-kalimantan-flood/.

Junita, Fifi. 2015. "The Foreign Mining Investment Regime in Indonesia: Regulatory Risk under Resource Nationalism Policy and How International Investment Treaties Provide Protection." *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law* 33 (3): 241–65. doi:10.1080/02646811.2015.1057028.

Kaup, Brent Z, and Paul K Gellert. 2017. "Cycles of Resource Nationalism: Hegemonic Struggle and the Incorporation of Bolivia and Indonesia." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 58 (4): 275–303. doi:10.1177/0020715217714298.

Mordor Intellegence. 2021. *Indonesia Coal Market - Growth, Trends, COVID-19 Impact, and Forecasts (2021 - 2026).* https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/indonesia-coal-market.

Nicholas, Hans. 2019. "Indonesia Rushes to Pass Bill Seen as Pandering to Mining Companies." *Mongabay Environmental News.* October 11. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/indonesia-mining-coal-bill-law-controversial/.

"Oligarki Ekstraktif Dan Penurunan Kualitas Hidup Rakyat." 2018. *JATAM*. December 18. https://www.jatam.org/oligarki-ekstraktif-dan-penurunan-kualitas-hidup-rakyat/.

Pirie, Iain. 2017. "Korea and Taiwan: The Crisis of Investment-Led Growth and the End of the Developmental State." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48 (1): 133–58. doi:10.1080/00472336.2017.1375136.

PwC. 2011. Rep. *Mining in Indonesia: Investment and Taxation Guide*. PwC. pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/mining-investment-and-taxation-guide-2011.pdf.

Shahbanu, Alwiya, and Siti Maimunah. 2018. *Extractive Oligarchy and the Declining Quality of People's Life* (version English). *JATAM*. DKI Jakarta: Jaringan Advokasi Tambang. jatam.org/oligarki-ekstraktif-dan-penurunan-kualitas-hidup-rakyat/.

Sirait, Ferry Edwin. 2020. "Pembangunan Ratusan PLTU, Menuai Krisis Di Indonesia." *Selamatkan Bumi*. April 8. https://selamatkanbumi.com/id/pemba ngunan-ratusan-pltu-menuai-krisis-di-indonesia/.

Sukirno. 2013. "Inilah 16 Perusahaan Milik Luhut Pandjaitan: Ekonomi." *Bisnis.com*. November 3. https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/2013 1103/44/184423/inilah-16-perusahaan-milik-luhut-pandjaitan.

Suprapto, Yitno. 2020. "Coal Piles Threaten Public Health, Ancient Temple, in Indonesian Village." *Eco-Business*. Eco-Business. November 25. https://www.eco-business.com/news/coal-piles-threaten-public-health-ancient-temple-in-indonesian-village/.

Syahni, Della. 2019. "In 'Sexy Killers,' Journos Probe Indonesian Candidates' Ties to Big Coal." *Mongabay Environmental News*. April 30. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/04/in-sexy-killers-journos-probe-indonesian-candidates-ties-to-big-coal/.

Syahni, Della. 2021. "Calls for Accountability after Coal-Slurry Spill in Indonesian River." *Mongabay Environmental News*. February 19. https://news.mongabay.com/2021/02/calls-for-accountability-after-coal-slurry-spill-in-indonesian-river/.

Toumbourou, Tessa, Muhamad Muhdar, Tim Werner, and Anthony Bebbington. 2020. "Political Ecologies of the Post-Mining Landscape: Activism, Resistance, and Legal Struggles over Kalimantan's Coal Mines." *Energy Research & Social Science* 65: 101476. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2020.101476.

Umah, Anisatul. 2020. "Ini Strategi Besar RI Agar Batu Bara Tetap Laku 30 Tahun Lagi." *News*. November 13. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20201113193027-4-201783/ini-strategi-besar-ri-agar-batu-bara-tetap-laku-30-tahun-lagi.

Warburton, Eve. 2015. "In Whose Interest? Debating Resource Nationalism in Indonesia: Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia." *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia | Promoting Exchange among the Intellectual Communities of Southeast*

Asia, We Bring News of Publications, Debates and Ideas, through Lively and Accessible Writing. October 21. https://kyotoreview.org/yav/in-whose-interest-debating-resource-nationalism-in-indonesia/.

Warburton, Eve. 2017. "RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND SECTORAL VARIATION IN MINING AND PALM OIL." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 17 (3): 285–312. doi:10.1017/jea.2017.13.

Wicaksono, Didit Haryo, dir. 2019. *SEXY KILLERS*. Believe Music. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlB7vg4I-To&t=1s.

Widhiarto, Hasyim, and Kusumari Ayuningtyas. 2014. "Furniture Business Propels Jokowi's Path to Prominence." *The Jakarta Post*. June 30. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/30/furniture-business-propels-jokowi-s-path-prominence.html.

Research Article

Chinese students in Thai Higher Education Institutions and the Transformation of Graduate Migrants:
Characteristics, Practices, and Transitional Migration

Sivarin Lertpusit[1]
Thammasat University
tusivarin@gmail.com

Abstract

This research article entitled "Chinese students in Thai higher education institutions and the transformation of graduate migrant: Characteristics, practices, and transitional migration" aims to clarify two objectives. Firstly, to analyze the determinants that motivate Chinese students to enroll in Thai higher education institutions and, secondly, to examine the particular characteristics and patterns of status involved in transitioning from student to graduate labor. Mixed research methods from in-depth interviews and questionnaires are employed in gathering and analyzing the finding. Criticizing Human capital theory, Chinese students in Thailand intend to invest in the Thai language to escalate their socioeconomic status. However, the popularity of the Thai language over the Vietnamese and Myanmese languages, which share a higher trading volume with Yunnan and Guangxi, represents the significance of Thai soft power through social media and healthier cultural linkage. Lastly, the length of stay among transforming Chinese workers depends on individual contentment. Applying social field theory, their economic capital mainly motivates short-term migrants. However, the pursuit of social and cultural contentment is the principal motivating factor attracting graduate migrants to reside long-term in Thailand.

Keywords: Chinese student mobility, international students in Thailand, transforming migrant, competitiveness in China, Thai's public policy on skill-worker.

---

[1] Assistant Professor of College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University.

I. Introduction

Globally, outbound Chinese students had climbed up from 38,989 in 2000 to 544,500 students in 2016 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2017) because of the over-demand for university seats in China and the preferences over foreign degrees. It is expectable that students predominantly go to developed and English-speaking countries, specifically, the U.S, U.K, Australia and Canada. However, some Chinese students enroll in Thai higher education institutions, and the amount has been increasing apparently. Referring to the Chinese embassy in Bangkok, enrollments by students from PRC have increased, from 11,545 to 22,076 and 30,526 in the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. The growing ratio at 33% in only one year is certainly remarkable and the benefits for Thailand from the influx of these students are clearly positive for Thai universities.

Thai institutions of higher education have been facing a continuous decline in the number of indigenous Thai learners from the demographic changes and the reformation of the country's university system. The emergence of Chinese students contributes a large amount of revenue to universities because they constitute the dominant body of foreign students in Thai institutions. As such, this research paper concentrates on illustrating the attractive and determinant factors of Chinese students in enrolling in Thai universities, which might provide essential information in formulating strategies to attract more qualified Chinese students.

The second argument involves the negative perception of new Chinese among local Thai people through social media, particularly issues with Chinese working in the wholesale and retail trading sectors, with

Chinese tour leaders in the tourism industry, and with Chinese employees who were accused of job seizing. Unfortunately, the lack of information concerning new Chinese migrants in Thailand has provoked negative social discrimination because local Thai implies that most new Chinese are unlawful migrants. Empirically, the current population of Chinese nationals in Thailand can be classified according to four categories: entrepreneurs, employees, students, and workers. Chinese students who have attended Thai universities often seem to continue their stay by working or investing in Thailand after graduating. Such migration is associated with the high demand for Thai-Chinese speaking staff, thus boosting Sino–Thai economic interdependency. The emergence of Chinese students and graduates who have continued to work in Thailand has proved to be a turning point in the story of Chinese migration, with these new Chinese immigrants being well-educated and pursuing legal forms of residency. A second focal point in this research is to understand the transition from student to a migrant. This involves an examination of what motivates Chinese graduates to stay in Thailand and includes a deeper analysis of the individual characters of migrant graduates to determine or predict their length of stay.

This research aims to clarify two objectives concerning Chinese students and graduates: (a) to analyze the determinants that motivate Chinese students to enroll in Thai institutions of higher education, and (b) to examine the particular characteristics and patterns of status involved in transitioning from student to graduate-labor.

The qualitative research method has been employed to collect and analyze data pertaining to these issues. A research framework has been designed, based upon existing literature, to be inclusive of two concepts: human capital and forms of capital.

Briefly, human capital is mainly addressed by economists as an accumulated resource that develops people's efficiency. Education and migration are currently referred to as high-impact domains, particularly education which is criticized as a class-blockage agenda. Moreover, in this globalized knowledge economy, international experience is considered a valuable skill for job attaining and class escalating. Meanwhile, the capital's forms explain the ability to convert economic, social, and cultural capital, which identifies people's class. Being apart from the field where their positions are dominated by the reproduction of social class, thus, encourages them to perform their capabilities and accelerate their status. These concepts will be applied to analyze the transition to the workforce among Chinese students in Thailand.

This study triangulates data from documents, interviews, and fieldwork observations. In total, 91 people were interviewed for this study; this sample includes 32 current Chinese students in Thai higher education, 21 Chinese graduates who were resident in Thailand at the time of data collection, 34 key informants affiliated with relevant organizations or directly related to Chinese graduates, and four returned Chinese workers. Participant selection generally involved snowball sampling. Data was also collected by way of 426 questionnaires distributed among Chinese students at 15 universities in Bangkok, Nakorn Pratom, Samutprakarn, Chonburi, Lampang, Chiang Mai, and Chiang Rai, with the choice of sampling locations determined in accordance with data on the distribution of Chinese students in Thai institutions of higher education. An additional 26 copies of the questionnaire were distributed among returned Chinese graduates, identified through online graduate networks, and to

Thai-language employees who had graduated from Yunnan and Guangxi.

II. Motivation involving Chinese student migration in Thailand and the specific characters

Chinese student is not only the largest group of international students in Thai universities, but the wave of student flow is significantly increasing from 11,545 in 2013 to 30,526 in 2015. According to official data from the Office of Higher Education Commission, 71% of Chinese students enrolled in private universities, with English and Chinese being the languages of instruction. The most selected discipline is Business and administration (55%), followed by Thai language courses (13%). Typically, private university students take business and administration programs, while Thai language students are mainly in Rajabhat universities.

In terms of student backgrounds, the majority are female, Han ethnicity from agriculturalist and entrepreneurial families; and originate from middle to high-middle income areas, such as Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, and Guangdong. Nearly 45% attend collaborative programs (3+1 and 2+2 programs), another 40% pursue a national degree, and the remaining take exchange and internship programs, as shown in table 1.

Fig. 1. Chinese students: universities and degrees (person)
Source: (Lertpusit, 2019)

While Thailand is not the most popular education destination among Chinese, a number of students have nonetheless chosen to attend educational programs in Thai universities. The reasons for this decision are varied. A number of scholars, Peter (Bodycott, 2009), Wang (Ross, 2010), Teixeira (Teixeira, 2017), Shen (Shen, 2005), Findlay (Findlay, 2010), Bodycott and Lai (Bodycott, 2017), Welch and Zhang (Welch, 2008), Biao (Biao, 2003) and Zweig (Zweig, 2004) indicate the motivation factors among Chinese students abroad as family and personal issues, the over-demand for university placements in China, a complicated local system of university entrance examinations, household responsibilities system, attractive overseas immigration prospects, social facilities, the lower cost of education, and greater privileges for returnees.

Considering the concept concerning globalization and internationalization in higher education (Foskett, 2012) and Human capital (Schultz, 1979), Chinese students in Thai institutions intend to invest in human capital. In the case of students majoring in Thai, most are from agricultural backgrounds. Meanwhile, 46% of their fathers earn approximately ¥3,000–6,000 per month. Another 30% receive less than ¥3,000. Based on a study of China's nationwide disposable income, which in 2016 was ¥23,821 per year (China Statistical Yearbook, 2017), many of these families are considered lower-middle class with fewer opportunities in the Chinese social structure and possess limited resources.

Referring to the survey on Chinese students in Thai HEIs, 2016, 52.8% reveal the Thai language as a "very important" influential factor. As many as 52.8% of Chinese students point out that they invest in language skills in order to increase their job opportunities. The reputation of the university is another significant factor as the potential discipline in

famous universities in Yunnan and Guangxi, which are the hometowns of Chinese students in Thailand, is ASEAN language programs, as shown in table 1. Enrolling in well-known programs in high-ranking *universities is a* critical strategy used among ordinary students in China.

SPECIALTY	NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY/COLLEGE WHICH OPEN ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONAL	GRADUATES (ANNUAL)
THAI	40 (Yunnan 19; Guangxi 11)	1500–1700
VIETNAMESE	25 (Yunnan 10; Guangxi 8)	750–800
INDONESIAN	13 (Yunnan 0; Guangxi 3)	100–150
CAMBODIA	8 (Yunnan 3; Guangxi 2)	50–100
LAO	8 (Yunnan 4; Guangxi 2)	250–300
BURMESE	16 (Yunnan 10; Guangxi 2)	150–200
MALAY	7 (Yunnan 1; Guangxi 1)	50–100

Tab. 1. Circumstance of ASEAN Minority language in Chinese universities, 2017
Source: Sunshine college entrance examination information platform (http://gaokao.chsi.com.cn/)

Referring to tab. 1. the popularity of the Thai language over Vietnamese and Myanmese language represents the significance of Thai soft power. Even Vietnam and Myanmar stand as the most important trading partners with Guangxi and Yunnan among ASEAN nations, the expansion of these languages turns out lower than the Thai language. Implying from this educational demand, cultural linkage and cultural transfer do actively impact students' decision-making as they absorb Thai pop culture through social media and entertainment channels. According to the concept of soft power (Nye, 2004), Chinese students partially integrate with Thai culture through cultural products such as Thai dramas and movies that ultimately persuade them to attend programs in Thailand where they feel comfortable to live.

Other remarkable factors include the emergence of formal academic cooperation in the forms of MOUs, collaborative programs, personal exchange projects, and so on, which effectively encourage transboundary education mobility. Agreement on academic collaboration between Thailand and China was intensified through the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) by enhancing academic exchange and training programs (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Numerous dual degree and joint degree programs have been developed pursuant to the expansion of the collaboration, such as the Bachelor of Arts in Thai Language and Culture offered through the Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Rai Rajabhat University in collaboration with Yuxi Normal University (Office of the Higher Education Commission, 2013). The most effective activity between Thai and Chinese institutions is the personnel exchange project, for instance, exchange students and staff between these two countries accounted for approximately 55% of all exchanging personnel in Thailand (Office of the Higher Education Commission, 2013). Lastly, the affordable cost of studying and living in Thailand, as compared to other education destinations, attracts Chinese students from lower-middle to middle-income families. For example, studying in a general public university in Malaysia might cost approximately $2,701–3,008 per year, while enrolling in a private university generally charge $10,000. Meanwhile, the tuition fee for a private university in Thailand is approximately $3,500.

III. The migration experience and the transition from student to labor migrant

While these factors might serve as initial attractors for Chinese students to enroll in Thai higher education, they eventually become motivators for students to decide to continue their stay in Thailand by applying for

jobs and establishing businesses after they graduate. Corresponding to the tightening of economic ties between Thailand and China, the demand for Chinese-Thai speaking personnel has increased significantly. A report by the World Bank criticizes the slowdown in economic competitiveness and the middle-income trap as consequences of ineffective education. In other words, Thai personals perform below the basic proficiency in science, reading, and mathematics. Furthermore, the inadequate Chinese-skilled workforce from the coming aging society affects the growing demand in the labor market as well.

While the quality and quantity of Chinese-language graduates have not satisfied the over-demand for such workers in the Thai labor market, the high availability of jobs for Chinese graduates who are conversant in the Thai language and are integrated into Thai society is a significant factor. Approximately 50% of Chinese students express their intention to continue residing in Thailand, particularly those who have taken Thai language courses. However, under the Work of Alien Act B.E.2551, Chinese people can only apply for a Thai work permit under Section 9 and Section 12, general workers and investment promotion laws, under a quota system (4 local workers per 1 foreign employee), and their monthly salary must be over ฿35,000 (Ministry of Labor, 2017). These regulations limit the free flow of skilled legal labor while the high demand motivates Chinese people to apply for other channels, such as student visas, tourist visas, and so on.

Individually, the main determinants of students wanting to reside in Thailand include balancing the costs of staying versus returning. The cost comprises embedded skills, experiences, and connections, all of which are more beneficial for potential graduates if working or running businesses in Thailand. Compensation for such activities can come in various forms. Graduates can earn a higher financial return in Thailand when compared to their anticipated wage and expenditure in China, particularly if they plan on residing in Guangxi or Yunnan. As the average monthly wage for Thai language graduates in China is ¥4,846 (or ฿22,776), while the initial salary for Chinese freshmen who are fluent in the Thai language is ฿20,000-35,000 (Table 1).

Other advantages of residing in Thailand include a less competitive workplace culture and less complicated social culture, issues that often prove to be an intense source of stress for Chinese youth. The criticized issues on working conditions in China among the new generation are the "996" –working from nine in the morning to nine in the evening, six days a week, and the seniority system embedded in Chinese working culture (Hruby, 2018). Chinese graduates who work in Thailand point out that work conditions in China affect their decision to migrate. Most are concerned about managing their time and trying to strike a work-life balance. Another key concern among Chinese students abroad is the guanxi-based structure of workplaces in China (Cheung, 2014). Graduates concerned about career achievement rely on their social connections rather than their potential work output, which causes tension in deciding whether to return to the Chinese labor market or not.

Several push factors, including a highly competitive job application process, inherently stressful workplaces that demand extra-working hours, seniority, power, and harassment, drive many Chinese workers to migrate out of the country. Thailand, on the other hand, possesses a number of pull factors for these Chinese workers, with a high demand for Chinese-speaking staff, a significantly less stressful working culture, more reasonable working hours, and significantly less competitiveness resulting in more

opportunities for workers to advance through their chosen career paths.

IV. The characteristics and perceptions of Chinese graduates

Human capital theory can explain the determining factors behind Chinese graduates; however, the theory cannot completely explain the character of short-term, long-term, or return migrants. Therefore, Bourdieu's sociocultural theory of capital has been used to better understand this phenomenon (Anheier, 1995). Social field theory describes three dimensions of capital—cultural capital, social capital, and economic capital—sources of power responsible for social stratification and the reproduction of social class. Cultural capital emerges in the embodied state, objectified state, and institutionalized state, which introduce skill and education as an effective form of capital that can be converted into economic capital (Bourdieu, 2007). These social factors have formed circular relations with each other leading to the strengthening and sustainment of migration (Chaichanavichakit, 2022).

Applying this theory to Chinese graduates in Thailand, their language skills, transcultural adaptation, and cultural integration are determined as their cultural capital. Meanwhile, social capital mainly depends on the effectiveness of one network-building activity. Connections, therefore, must be continuously reproduced as networks of relationships between people in a wide range of places. For Chinese graduates, social capital can be constituted in schools, universities, workplaces, Chinese communities, families, and so on. The implication of these social networks is the conversion from one form of capital to another. As a consequence, the reproduction of social class is reproduced from these three dimensions of capital and inheritance from parents to their descendants.

Chinese students in Thailand, on the other hand, are typically from lower or middle-class families. As such, being in Thailand carries with it the possibility of upward social mobility and gaining privileges. Persistent migrants accumulate capital through advantages when living or working in Thailand. Thai language skills, and experience integrating into either Thai or Chinese culture, are considered advanced capabilities in the Thai labor market according to the cultural capital definition. Besides social class accelerating, self-esteem is recognized as another crucial motivation among Chinese graduates.

a. Short-term mobile workers

A large proportion of Chinese graduates returned to China after having worked in Thailand for a period by issuing economic returns as the most attractive factor. Most had worked in Thailand for approximately 3 years after graduation, classifying them as short-term migrants. Major obstacles for returned and short-stay graduates include Thai language proficiency, career advancement, family, marriage and social costs, goal accomplishment, and social integration. Those who fail to develop language skills often struggle to find a proper job, which can hamper their career path. Meanwhile, most of the well-paid jobs are sales and service providers, which mainly serve Chinese customers such as translators in King power group, real estate agencies, and the health service sector. Generally, these jobs offer a high salary for freshmen but do not have secure career advancement. Some graduates, in addition, aspire to reside in Thailand from the get-go, often for educational purposes, to gain international experience, or to amass financial wealth. After a period, however, they are still expected to return to

China for their parents' benefit and for marriage purposes.

b. Long-term mobile workers

Simultaneously, some graduates choose to stay in Thailand for more than 3 years or as long-term graduate migrants. These migrants typically work in educational institutions and Thai–Chinese business enterprises and run their own businesses, which generate high returns. However, almost 40% of long-term graduates earn less than moderate income, which indicates the significance of other factors apart from the financial returns. Another motivating factor that influences long-term migrants is the uncertainty of the Chinese social security system, such as the social restrictions on the possession of private vehicles, health care accessibility, and land-use rights under the Property Right Law (2007) (Zhang, 2015). A remarkable case is Q.X., who decided to give birth to his child in Thailand because "accessing to an effective health service in private hospitals in Thailand requires only money. On the contrary, no matter how much money you have, the service you get from a public hospital is very poor unless you have a reliable connection." Other regulations are, for instance, vehicle control regulations and, lately, the social credit system—used to rate people based on their trustworthiness and behavior. The system also allows for penalties to be issued by banning people from public service and transportation, such as airplane and bullet train rides. Such restrictions persuade long-term migrants to reside in Thailand.

In addition, Chinese graduates who decide to stay longer adapt themselves to Thai culture in terms of their lifestyle and living conditions. Over time, they also form their own families and communities to support their mental health while away from their homeland. Finally, achieving career or business success abroad is often pivotal in their self-esteem development, allowing them to develop confidence that they can be successful individuals without relying on their parents' social relations. In short, Chinese-graduate migrants are capable of converting human capital into social and economic capital, and in reverse. Moreover, the pursuit of social and cultural contentment is the principal motivating factor attracting graduate migrants to reside long-term in Thailand.

IV. Characters of graduate Chinese and the domination among new Chinese migrants

Regarding the divergence of old and new waves of Chinese migrants, the new wave of Chinese is characteristically dissimilar from traditional migrant groups. Previously, Chinese migrants were low-skilled laborers from certain areas, such as Guangdong and Fujian, who flooded into Siam in response to the rapidly increasing demand for labor. Latter migrants have generally been better educated and come from numerous hometowns, such as Guangxi, Yunnan, Fujian, and other areas. The gender of these sojourners has also been more mixed. The uniqueness of Chinese graduates is their educational background and occupation. According to data collected, more than 50% of Thai language student intends to continue their stay in Thailand. They engage in numerous industries as interpreters, coordinators, and teachers. Therefore, their workplaces are possibly in academic institutions – from elementary schools to graduate schools – industrial estates like factories in Rayong province, and also companies in Bangkok. The distribution of educated Chinese in a variety of economic segments has raised a number of issues in relation to local people. As a colleague, A.T. respects the diligence and activeness of Chinese employees, describing Chinese employees as relatively more effective than

Thai staff. In addition, being educated and well-integrated into Thai culture, Chinese staff is perceived positively by surrounding communities in terms of socializing.

Most Chinese graduates living in Thailand do so legally, while illegal migrants tend to keep their stay short. Short-term workers apply for student visas from language schools in the hope of being issued a long-stay visa and working in Thailand. Consequently, a number of negative attitudes have emerged in relation to new Chinese who enter, work, and run businesses illegally. The growing number of Chinese graduates, however, is changing community attitudes among Thai people, with Chinese graduates exhibiting social responsibility and participating in Thailand's social security system by paying taxes. Individualism is another specific characteristic of Chinese graduates, many of whom live separately and are disconnected from larger associations, such as business networks. Lastly, Chinese graduates are typically middle-class, metropolitan freshmen. They usually settle in large cities, like Bangkok, Chiang Mai, or Rayong, places that are centers of modernity, jobs, and facilities.

Works Cited

Anheier, H. K., 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieus Social Topography. *American Journal of Sociology,* 100(4), pp. 859-903.

Biao, X., 2003. Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective. *International Migration,* pp. 21-48.

Bodycott, P., 2009. Choosing a Higher Education Study Abroad Destination. *Journal of Research in International Education,* pp. 349-373.

Bodycott, P. a. A. L., 2017. China: The Role of Chinese Parents in Decisions about Overseas Study. *Understanding Higher Education Internationalization.*

Insights from Key Global Publications, pp. 197-201.

Bourdieu, P., 2007. *the Forms of Capital.* [Online]
Available at: www.marxists.org

Chaichanavichakit, A., 2022. Redrawing the Canvas of Migration Decisions: A Case Study of Cambodian Workers in Thailand. *The International Journal of Organizational Diversity,* 22(1), pp. 23-42.

Cheung, A. C. K. a. L. X., 2014. To Return or Not to Return: Examining the Return Intentions of Mainland Chinese Students Studying at Elite Universities in the United States. *Studies in Higher Education,* 40(9), pp. 1605-1624.

China Statistical Yearbook, 2017. *National Statistic Report: Beijing,* s.l.: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Findlay, A. M., 2010. An Assessment of Supply and Demand-Side Theorizations of International Student Mobility. *International Migration,* 49(2), pp. 162-190.

Foskett, N. a. F. M., 2012. *Globalization and Internationalization in Higher Education: Theoretical, Strategic and Management Perspectives.* s.l.:Bloolsburry Publishing.

Hruby, 2018. *Capital - Young Chinese Are Sick of Working Long Hours.* [Online]
Available at: www.bbc.com/capital/story/20180508-young-chinese-are-sick-of-working-overtime
[Accessed May 2019].

Nye, J. S. J., 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. *Public Affairs.*

Office of the Higher Education Commission, 2013. *Academic Collaboration between Thai and Foreign Institutions 2009-2010,* s.l.: Bureau of International Cooperation Strategy.

Ross, H. a. Y. W., 2010. The College Entrance Examination in China: An Overview of Its Social-Cultural Foundations, Existing Problems, and Consequences. *Chinese Education & Society,* pp. 3-10.

Schultz, T. W., 1979. Investment in Human Capital. In: *In Power and Ideology in Education.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-324.

Shen, W., 2005. A Study on Chinese Student Migration in the United Kingdom. *Asia Europe Journal,* pp. 429-436.

Teixeira, L., 2017. China's Middle Class Anger at Its Education System Is Growing. *Foreign Policy.*

The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015. *Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative.* [Online] Available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/
[Accessed March 2017].

Welch, A. R. a. Z. Z., 2008. Higher Education and Global Talent Flows: Brain Drain, Overseas Chinese Intellectuals, and Diasporic Knowledge Networks. *Higher Education Policy,* pp. 519-537.

Zhang, a. L., 2015. *China: Real Property Law.* [Online] Available at: www.loc.gov/law/help/real-property-law/china.php
[Accessed March 2018].

Zweig, D., 2004. Globalization and Transnational Human Capital: Overseas and Returnee Scholars to China. *the China Quarterly,* pp. 735-757.

Research Article

State's Repression toward INGO: The Dismissal of Médecins Sans Frontieres from Ethiopia

Kholifatus Saadah[1]
International Relations Department, Jenderal Soedirman University
kholifatus.saadah@unsoed.ac.id

Aqbil Faza Dyarsa[2]
International Relations Department, Jenderal Soedirman University
aqbil.dyarsa@mhs.unsoed.ac.id

Abstract
The primary purpose of humanitarian-based INGOs is to provide and distribute assistance to those who could not get it. One of the INGOs engaged in this field and is quite successful in the international constellation is Medecins Sans Frontieres, often called Doctors without Borders. Humanitarian INGOs generally have a noble mission and have no mission to engage in the host country's political dynamics. However, the noble mission became a boomerang when MSF became one of the INGOs who worked to save the famine in Ethiopia. MSF has a noble mission, but the Ethiopian government has another mission that aggravates the condition of hunger in Ethiopia. As INGOs sought to be neutral, MSF decided to remain silent and take no steps relating to the political constellation of one of the world's poorest countries. Things got worse when MSF realized that one of their programs was being misused by the government to blackmail the guerrilla groups in the north. MSF could no longer remain silent and objected to any Ethiopian government policy related to them, resulting in the dismissal of all MSF members from Ethiopia at the end of 1986. This paper will explain the weak position of NGOs toward state, the main reason of the dismissal. The authors will be using the qualitative method by explaining the history about MSF and NGOs in the perspective of state which resulted the justification of the weak position of NGOs itself.

Keywords: humanitarian INGO, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Ethiopia, INGOs expelled, INGOs dilemma

I. Introduction

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) or often referred to as Doctors without Borders, is one of the INGOs with a humanitarian basis in their activities. This INGO was formed in 1971 with the noble aim of helping people in unreached areas who need help as soon as possible (MSF, n.d). It was a revolution in its time, after the Red Cross, as a movement with such a similar goal. Initially, MSF was a collection of international doctors on duty in two locations, Nigeria and Eastern Pakistan, and was frustrated by the difficulties in carrying out their duties. This condition has made MSF one of the successful humanitarian-based INGOs, and it has successfully sent nearly 2,500 volunteers to 80 countries since 1977. However, the journey taken by MSF is not as easy as imagined. Rejection, dismissal, and even direct problems with the bureaucracy of a country are some of the problems that MSF, and several other INGOs, often encounter when carrying out their missions. One of the most challenging problems MSF faced was in Ethiopia during the 1983-1985 famine. At that time, MSF faced the dilemma of not being directly involved in the political constellation and several illegal actions carried out by Ethiopia. However, this attitude put INGOs in a dilemma, to remain silent and carry out their mission or participate in protesting some issues that should be justified.

This paper will explain how MSF as INGOs experienced a dilemma regarding the conditions that occurred in Ethiopia and ended

[1] Junior Lecture at International Relations Department, Jenderal Soedirman University

[2] Undergraduate student at International Relations Department, Jenderal Soedirman University

in the dismissal of the INGOs. This paper wil seek the justification about how weak the NGOs toward state in the international world. In this paper, the readers can get to know about the MSF's stance which is different from Red Cross, the same humanitarian NGOs and the weak position of NGOs toward state. Although this case has been going on for quite some time, the author sees that this case is still relevant to be discussed today. This is because the conditions that occur in Ethiopia and MSF can occur anywhere, especially considering the increasingly rapid development of INGOs at this time. The dilemma experienced by the state will continue if the state is not able to accommodate the vision of INGOs which come to their country. Surely, this could lead to a collision of objectives between the state and the INGO which could lead to the dismissal of the INGO itself. The latter could be happened continuously because of the weak position of the NGO toward state which is undeniable.

II. Method

This article uses qualitative analysis in the discussion. The authors will analyze the qualitative data obtained and become supporting data in explaining the phenomena raised in this article. The research question in this article will be: is it necessary to dismiss the INGO from the state if their progamme doesn't suit the state interest? Starting from the question, the author will explain the history of the founding of MSF itself and see the true vision of this organization. Then the author will compare the organization's vision with Ethiopia's domestic conditions to see why MSF's response to the Ethiopian government is like that. Lastly, author will try to explain the dilemma from the state when the INGO who came for help is contrary to state's interest from the weak position of NGOs toward state.

III. Result and Discussion

a. Medecins Sans Frontieres and International Red Cross

The emergence of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) is one form of "resistance" to the International Red Cross's leniency against local governments. Savelsberg (2015, 106-107) reveals that at the beginning of the 20th century, almost all humanitarian aid was managed by the International Red Cross, especially during the World War. The problem that emerged from the International Red Cross was that there were no medical units dispatched together with International Red Cross volunteers on the battlefield (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). There is a choice to ignore the condition of a country. Even when there is violence by the local regime so that it can carry out its mission without any obstacles, conditions like this are what the International Red Cross must pay dearly, witnessing many victims of violence by state officials against their people. In order to carry out its mission without encountering any difficulties, the International Red Cross decided to take a stand of silence.

Of course, there is a pretty painful price and must be paid by the International Red Cross for this silence. This condition was illustrated when in 1944, the International Red Cross paid a visit to the Nazi Concentration Camp (Davey 2011). The International Red Cross did not investigate the camp and disseminate it publicly for humanitarian purposes but preferred to remain silent and let the SS instrumentalize the International Red Cross for legitimate purposes (Savelsberg 2015, 107). This condition continues; the International Red Cross continues to assist people in need and see the government's atrocities against its people. The Civil War in Nigeria and the assignment of several doctors to the Biafra area by the French Red Cross in 1968-1970 was a turning point for the group of

doctors to see the actual conditions occurring in the field (Brauman & Tanguy 1998).

There was much upheaval after the Biafra assignment, especially with the opinions of several doctors assigned to Biafra, later founders of MSF, who voiced the opinion that it was necessary to publicize the actual conditions on the battlefield. They are forced to understand that what happens on the battlefield is under the state's authority, and other actors should not interfere in these matters. It described the nature of the International Red Cross, which emphasizes that its task is to channel aid to countries that approve their assistance so that the International Red Cross automatically must comply with the rules of the country concerned (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). Indeed, this event was quite disappointing, considering that the International Red Cross volunteers assigned to Biafra at that time felt that Nigeria's condition had constituted genocide. The 50 doctors assigned to Biafra formed an association to raise public awareness of Biafra's problems. This is stated in the presentation from MSF regarding the founding of the organization:

> "[Max] Recamier and [Bernard] Kouchner [members of the French group of physicians in Biafra] believed the world needed to know about the events they were witnessing: civilians being murdered and starved by blockading forces. They openly criticized the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit behavior. In the following three years, other doctors began to speak up. These doctors, or "Biafrans," as they were known, began to lay the foundations for a new and questioning form of humanitarianism that would ignore political or religious boundaries and prioritize the welfare of those suffering." (Savelrsberg 2015, 107).

At the same time, the representative of the group of doctors assigned to the eastern part of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) conveyed his experience through the National TV channel. They stated that the conditions in Bangladesh are already in a dire state, and there should be a follow-up from the Bangladeshi government instead of just allowing more victims (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). Then, as if to get a breath of fresh air, a group of doctors in France and 3,000 nurses and volunteers declared themselves willing to sacrifice to help those who needed help and were in very isolated conditions. Although initially, MSF experienced many difficulties, especially regarding financing, in its journey, MSF proved that they were one of the INGOs that could develop, as evidenced by the achievement of the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1977.

The beginning of the establishment was a tough time for MSF. From 1971 to 1976, MSF seemed to be a collection of doctors, nurses, and volunteers who only had enthusiasm, were independent and did not have adequate financial resources (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). This condition makes some parties doubt their capacity and even guarantees that there will be many interventions in the future. However, over time, the founders of MSF reaffirmed that symbols became very important in the early days of the establishment. Before, no INGO had done the same thing, sending doctors and other health volunteers to isolated places. The increasing conflict in the South creates more value for MSF because of the large number of refugee camps that have emerged due to these conflicts. Unlike UNHCR, which lacks doctors, MSF has a large stock of volunteer health workers ready to depart in all refugee camps in conflict areas (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). MSF is also helped by the volunteers' passion, considering that previously they were health

workers who practiced in France and its surroundings. Many are then excited because they see medical phenomena in the South for real, which have only been seen through their books and studies. This attitude has encouraged MSF to be able to retain many doctors and continue to send many volunteers on an ongoing basis. Technically, MSF has very agile and practical steps to implement in remote areas. One of them is the availability of medical kits and logistics ready to dispatch. This condition is supported by MSF's readiness to carry out its mission structure, both in transportation and communication. The use of radio and HT and collaborating with local parties on transportation issues illustrates how MSF as an INGO in humanitarian matters is technically ready to save many lives in isolated areas. Furthermore, MSF is trying its best to continue to help many people and see how the political conditions are so as not to endanger their volunteers.

b. The Humanitarian Crisis in Ethiopia: An Emerging Dilemma

Several countries in the African region are experiencing bad conditions, one of which is Ethiopia. The Civil War that lasted for almost 20 years made the country a hell where many people were starving. Some say that the famine in Ethiopia is the effect of a prolonged drought (Haylemariam 2015). However, the famine in the period 1983 to 1985 resulted from the authoritarian government of Ethiopia. One of those who said that the cause of hunger in Ethiopia was the government itself, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, revealed a close relationship between democracy and hunger (Haylemariam 2015). The famine in Ethiopia was the worst in history, where the death toll in the northern region reached 400,000 (Woldridge 2014). The term "Hell on Earth" is not an ordinary joke when you look at the condition of Ethiopia at that time. Hundreds of people die per week, and small

children dig and gather at several points considered to produce food. Mothers carry their babies, run when vehicles pass and sell whatever they have to get food.

As an INGO based on humanitarian aid, MSF openly came to Ethiopia with a noble purpose. Conditions in a country that has become a symbol of famine and disaster in Africa moved the hearts of MSF officials to send their volunteers. MSF carries out its mission in Ethiopia in line with MSF's vision and mission, which is fundamentally different from the International Red Cross (Davey 2011). They distributed aid, opened health posts for the sick, and helped transport the aid. At first, everything went according to expectations. However, over time, MSF volunteers discovered the peculiarity of the system running in Ethiopia related to the assistance provided. Quoted directly from Scott (2002 in Bell & Carens 2004, 318), one of the representatives from the Belgium branch of MSF described the views of the volunteers assigned to Ethiopia, Eric Dachy, describing the conditions on the ground when they were on duty:

"The Ethiopian famines of the early 1970s resulted from government policies of the Derg under Mengistu, which employed starvation as a means of control. Most of the NGOs working to alleviate this humanitarian crisis refrained from publicly challenging the government's human rights record, policies, cover-up of the cholera epidemic, and conduct of civil war in the northern part of the country based on the precept that they should avoid politics. Medicins sans frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) expressed opposition to the government in this case, and was expelled. Hence, it seems safe to assume that silence in the face of abuses was necessary if the starving were to be fed."

This part explains the MSF's stance, unlike the International Red Cross, which decides to remain silent when there is a discrepancy in the government system

regarding assistance to those in need. An INGO, especially a humanitarian or humanitarian-based INGO, must be neutral and impartial to anyone considering its position as an actor between states and global corporations. It is the price of neutrality that must be paid dearly. Many innocent victims must be sacrificed to protect certain parties' interests. Ethiopia under the Derg regime was proven to have committed many acts of violence, taken advantage of assistance from INGOs, and killed many innocent people.

As quoted by Dachy, humanitarian INGOs must help those in need. Not as a government agent to carry out covert missions that harm the people. Some have seen that the Ethiopian government uses assistance from foreign INGOs to attract the attention of populations affected by famine and make them displaced people in the future (Bell & Carens 2014). The Derg regime at that time seemed to use the famine in Ethiopia to attract world attention and as one of their political agendas in fighting the opposition in the north. MSF is suspicious of the Ethiopian government's agenda of moving its population from the drier north to the more fertile South. In the first relocation operations, as one of the INGOs in the field, MSF also assisted. Over time, MSF saw much violence that occurred during the resettlement process. Worse, it seems as if there is no effort to bring together family members (Brauman & Tanguy 1998). The transfer process seemed as if they were moved without showing the people's health, many of whom eventually died on the way because there was no medical treatment for those who were sick.

In early 1985, MSF became increasingly aware that there was a political element in the agenda, and even MSF, as a humanitarian INGO, was involved in it. The hunger never shows results, even though there has been quite a lot of aid distributed from both the state and INGOs has also raised questions in the minds of MSF volunteers. The West blames Ethiopia's inability to deliver aid across the country and focuses solely on resolving their civil war (BBC 2000). This is what gives MSF volunteers an idea, have they been used all this time? Starting from that question, they realized that some of the assistance from MSF that should have been distributed according to the procedure was diverted to fulfill their interests. The New York Times (1985) stated that this displacement was one of the government's strategies to weaken the north, where rebel groups were in the region. Reports noted that at least 100,000 victims died because of the error of the volunteers (New York Times, 1985).

Unable to stand what the Ethiopian government was doing to those who should have received help, MSF made a statement. They cannot afford to be in the same corridor as the Ethiopian government, which is only defending their evil deeds (Bell & Carens 2004, 318). However, when MSF stated that they were on the opposite side of the government, the Ethiopian government, through The Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, stated that it would suspend MSF's work as of December 2, 1985. Furthermore, the commission alleged that MSF committed media manipulation, conducted vicious media campaigns and misappropriated aid funds (New York Times 1985). This statement prompted Rony Brauman, President of MSF, to speak up. He said that what is happening in Ethiopia should be beyond humanity, and it is inappropriate that a government in authority would endanger its people. However, Brauman also said that it was better to remain silent so that he could continue to provide aid in Ethiopia. Otherwise, he would experience expulsion like what happened at MSF. Brauman deeply regrets the attitude of the Ethiopian government.

However, as a representative of the INGO, he also feels a responsibility to participate in disseminating information about what is happening in Ethiopia.

Brauman's statement emphasized that INGOs faced a dilemma when carrying out their missions. INGOs should, however, have to remain silent about the current situation. Humanitarian-based INGOs, such as the International Red Cross, do not touch the affairs of the state at all. Although many problems around him, the International Red Cross only focuses on helping those in need. It was this feeling that later confused MSF while in Ethiopia. How can they remain silent and do nothing when the aids they provide are supposed to help the community but are one of the causes of the loss of 100,000 lives. The problem of morality is one of the obstacles to implementing the humanitarian mission. Sometimes it is pretty complicated, especially when INGOs decide not to get involved with state affairs, such as not taking sides with any party when a conflict occurs in the host country. MSF's stance in announcing that they should be responsible for the deaths of 100,000 people is quite a bold move compared to other INGOs who have chosen to remain silent about the conditions of a country they are helping. What if the volunteer doctors become victims of the civil war? This condition continues to raise questions regarding the neutral condition in the host country. Does MSF report that by keeping silent about what is happening in Ethiopia, where is the humanity they hold dear? (May, 1986).

c. The Dismissal of INGO from the State: The Weak Position of NGOs toward State

The dilemma experienced by INGO is not something that will happen on purpose. On the contrary, INGOs emerge as actors who have a vision and mission, both of which are not owned by the state and global corporations. This can make INGOs also have a

considerable influence in shaping a state policy and international view of a state condition. The problem of the dilemma lies in ethics, where when INGOs are expected not to "overstep" the state's authority to take action. However, this condition went against the conscience of INGO volunteers. They saw injustice on the ground, even violence that was not supposed to be. As if they were in the wrong position, INGOs would try to remain neutral by not interfering in state affairs.

The neutrality carried out by INGO is that the price is relatively high. One hundred thousand lives were lost in relocating people from North to South, where MSF was involved. As if not wanting to get more "protests", the Ethiopian government decided to "expel" MSF from Ethiopia on multiple charges. Was MSF made the wrong move? So dismissal is needed? To quote McDann & Johnstone (2005 in Murdie 2014, 234) that:

"World politics has undergone a radical and often-overlooked transformation in the last 15 years, resulting neither from the collapse of the Soviet Union nor the rising tide of fundamentalism, but from the unprecedented growth of nongovernmental organizations around the globe. NGOs or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have moved from backstage to center stage in world politics and are exerting their power and influence in every aspect of international relations and policy making. NGOs have been a positive force in domestic and international affairs, working to alleviate poverty, protect human rights, preserve the environment, and provide relief worldwide."

The quote above reveals that INGOs (and Global Civil Society) have started to have great power in the international constellation. In addition, the number of INGOs in the constellation of international relations has never decreased. On the contrary, even from year to year, it has consistently increased significantly. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War encouraged the development of actors other

than the state, considering that during the Cold War, actors in international relations were only limited to the two superpowers. Of course, this should make the state pay more attention to INGOs. INGO targets that are very "humane" encourage them to gain popularity more easily among the public. The presence of INGOs, coupled with their reports, can also shape people's thoughts regarding "crimes" committed by the state. If the state takes careless steps toward the presence of INGOs, this can make the country lose its sovereignty and no longer get respect from its people. Worse, it can be seen as an evil party because it only sees its interests without considering the conditions of its community.

Nevertheless, some things should also be considered. Emerging as an "angel" in an individual security, INGOs are also part of several problems that arise, such as a form of plan that may not work correctly (Schuller 2007 in Murdie 2014, 235). The number of deaths that occurred after MSF arrived in Ethiopia was part of the "failure" of the mission from MSF itself, but at the same time, the source of the problem was not only the INGO concerned. MSF as an INGO claims that they are also responsible, showing that the actual position of INGOs is still relatively weak compared to the host country. Why then did MSF not take any action that could stop the government's activities in moving people from North to South? The author's answer is relatively short because MSF has no army or security forces that can "protect" the volunteers if they protest. MSF in Ethiopia should indeed be under the authority of the state, but again, the actions of Ethiopia itself are actions that should not be carried out. By utilizing assistance from MSF as a humanitarian-based INGO, the government's political agenda has harmed the values upheld by them. MSF sees that what the Ethiopian government is doing makes MSF appear as the

"prime suspect" because it is directly responsible for the deaths of people who were transferred from North to South. Problems do exist in the relocation process, where MSF is one of the directly involved parties. MSF also feels that what is happening on the ground is a very dilemmatic condition. They must be under pressure to continue carrying out their activities regardless of the conditions on the ground caused by inappropriate state actions.

However, should INGOs be dismissed from a country? In the author's opinion, this should not have happened. Expelling an INGO from a country that initially needs assistance will only give the international world the impression of "to cherish a viper in one's bosom" for the international community. Many of the responses related to the dismissal of MSF from Ethiopia, despite all the accusations given by the local government, were disappointed because of the harshness of the Derg regime at that time. Peter McPherson, head of the United States Agency for International Development, revealed that what happened in Ethiopia would be of particular concern due to a large number of casualties (May 1986). MSF's dismissal from Ethiopia also emphasized that the country dubbed "hell on the earth" does not have a robust democratic system. Instead, strong authoritarianism has become the foundation of the country and has increasingly "prospered" the famine outbreak.

Judging from the position of NGOs in the context of the law, NGOs have been proven to be involved in setting international standards, especially regarding human rights (Martens 2002). This position makes NGOs supposed to have power, especially in the history, NGOs also sit as drafting committees in the process. We could see from the story of Amnesty International in the process of making the Convention of the Abolition of Torture (Cook 1996 in Martens 2002). Even

though they have a large enough influence in international dynamics, NGOs do not yet have a legal international personality (Martens 2002). Surely it portrays a difficult position for NGOs; cannot go against a state that legally has the force of law. Problems can occur again if NGOs transform into INGOs that cross the national borders. Because, when an actor crosses national borders, the actors or NGOs must follow the rules in the host country. Charnovitz (in Simmons 1998) reveals that the involvement of NGOs is quite dependent on two things, the needs of government and the capabilities of NGOs. The capability of NGOs is a concept that NGOs can create themselves, by adjusting their resources and development. Meanwhile, the needs of the government are quite relative; what if the government changes and is no longer friendly to NGOs? Of course, this condition will be returned to the context that NGOs do not have the authority as strong as the state, especially in domestic conditions. The explanation above regarding the dismissal of MSF is justification for the conceptual understanding that NGOs still have limitations, especially when dealing with the state. Thus, the oppression carried out by the state by expelling it has a clear legal justification compared to the statements of NGOs which defend their vision of providing humanitarian assistance.

IV. Conclusion

From the explanation above, several conclusions can be drawn. First, an INGO almost always has a noble vision and values. These visions and values are proven by the programs carried out, according to the basis of the INGO. Medecins Sans Frontieres or Doctor Without Borders is a humanitarian-based INGO. MSF has a program to send doctors and other health workers to conflict areas, especially to refugee camps, to apply the vision and values of the founding of MSF. Second, as

an INGO that emerged as a reaction from the International Red Cross due to their inability to respond to the conditions of the country concerned, MSF faced a dilemma. This dilemma is related to ethics, where MSF must be faced with a reasonably severe condition in Ethiopia and the local government actually uses assistance from INGOs to save them from rebel groups.

Second, In this paper, it can be concluded that the weak position of NGOs in front of the state can be explained through the legal context. This is because NGOs do not have a legal national personality compared to the state. Moreover, if NGOs have to cross national borders and become INGOs, then the rules that must be agreed upon are the rules in that country. The dismissal of MSF from Ethiopia is proof that in front of the state, NGOs do not have greater authority even though they have nobler goals in the international community's perspective.

Works Cited

BBC. (2000). "Flashback 1984: Potrait of Famine" April 6 2000 [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/703958.stm [acessed at 8 July 2017]

Bell, D. A., & Carens, J. H. (2004). The ethical dilemmas of international human rights and humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a dialogue between practitioners and theorists. Human Rights Quarterly, 300-329.

Brauman, R. & Tanguy, R. (1998). "The MSF Experience" [online] http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/msf-experience [acessed at 8 July 2017]

Davey, E. (2011). Famine, aid, and ideology: The political activism of Médecins sans Frontières in the 1980s. French Historical Studies, 34(3), 529-558.

Haylemariam, D. A. (2016). "The Cause of Ethiopia's Recurrent Famine Is Not Drought, It Is Authoritarianism" The Huffington Post 21 Agustus 2016

[online]
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawi
t-ayele-haylemariam/the-cause-
ethiopias-recurrent-
famine_b_8019244.html [acessed at 9
July 2017]

Martens, K. (2002). Mission impossible?
Defining nongovernmental
organizations. Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 13(3), 271-285.

May, C. D. (1986). "Aid Unite Disputes
Ethiopia's Policy" New York Times, 28
Januari 1986 [online]
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/28
/world/aid-unit-disputes-ethiopia-s-
policy.html [acessed at 10 July 2017]

MSF. n.d. "Who are We?" [online]
https://www.msf.org/who-we-are
[accessed at April 25 2022]

Murdie, A. (2014). Help or harm: The human
security effects of international NGOs.
Stanford University Press.

New York Times. (1985). "Expelled Doctors
Accused Ethiopia" 4 Desember 1985
[online]
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/04
/world/expelled-doctors-accuse-
ethiopia.html [acessed at 7 July 2017]

Savelsberg, Joachim J. (2015). "The
Humanitarian Aid Fields and Doctors
Without Borders" (ed.) Representing
Mass Violence. California: University of
California Press.

Simmons, P. J. (1998). Learning to live with
NGOs. Foreign policy, 82-96.

Wooldridge, M. (2014). "World Still Learning
from Ethiopia Famine" BBC, November
29 2014 [online]
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-30211448 [acessed at 8 July
2017]

Research Article

Joe Biden Intervention In The Russian Invasion Effort Against Ukraine

Hardi Alunaza SD[1]
International Relations Department
Tanjungpura University
hardiasd@fisip.untan.ac.id

Desy Nur Shafitri[2]
International Relations Department
Tanjungpura University

Annisa Ernianda[3]
International Relations Department
Tanjungpura University

Anggi Putri[4]
International Relations Department
Tanjungpura University

Abstract

The protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 has reached an unpredictable peak of tension. The military invasion of Russia on February 24, 2022, overwhelmed Ukraine in the face of attack. Randomly bombed facilities caused thousands of civilians to lose their homes and lives. Initially, this conflict was caused by the seizure of the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. The conflict spread to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ending in a difficult situation to control. Primarily when the United States officially provided military assistance to Ukraine during the conflict. In explaining this article, the author will use the Infra State-War Theory, the Concept of Military Intervention, and the Rational Actor Model Theory with a qualitative approach and descriptive research methods. This study's results aim to analyze the continuation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The author will look at the evolution of the intervention of the United States in the era of Joe Biden's leadership in three phases of discussion. First, this article will elaborate on the origin of the conflict over the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. Second, it describes the interventions that have been carried out by the United States before. Third, this article will explain and analyze how the United States intervened during the leadership of Joe Biden.

Keywords: intervention, Joe Biden, invasion, Russia, Ukraine.

I. Introduction

Ukraine is still relatively young since its independence from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has gone through several revolutions that have colored changes in various areas of life. One of the conflicts that caused significant changes in Ukraine stems from the large-scale protests in 2013 against a presidential decree on economic integration with the European Union. Rather than sign an association agreement on economic integration with the European Union, the then-president chose to become an ally of Russia on the pretext that the monetary crisis in Ukraine could be overcome by negotiating with Russia. Russia provides financial assistance of USD 15 billion and pruning natural gas prices up to 30% of the original cost to Ukraine (Lamusu, 2022).

The people of Western Ukraine, pro-EU, took to the streets to protest against the government, sparking a large-scale conflict known as the Euromaidan Revolution. The protests continued to intensify the conflict until then-President Viktor Yanukovych decided to flee from Kyiv in 2014. Following President Yanukovych's escape, Ukraine was taken over by Russian forces in March 2014 over the area that has been disputed, namely the South Crimea region in Ukraine. With strong cultural ties to Russian life, the Crimean society finally held a referendum to disengage from Ukraine.

---

[1] Assistant Professor of International Relations Department, Tanjungpura University

[2][3][4] Undergradute Student of International Relations Department, Tanjungpura University

This conflict arose several other crucial conflicts that caused startling changes from 2013 to 2014 and resulted in many casualties. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has said that since mid-April 2014, the Euromaidan conflict in the conflict zone of eastern Ukraine has left 1.2 million people homeless, 15,491 people injured, and 6,116 people lost their lives (OCHA, 2022).

After the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine continues to face severe challenges in light of the Russian intervention and occupation of Ukraine's Crimean region. One of them is the Russian-led separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Then the tightening of control by Russia near the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. In response to the conflict, Ukraine is trying to develop an army capable of defending its territory, promoting economic growth, carrying out reforms, and protecting its democratic path.

After the overthrow of its pro-Russian authoritarian President (Viktor Yanukovych) during the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine has made significant strides in domestic reforms and agreed to become a normal European state. However, Ukraine has much more to do. Ukraine will need to make further reforms if it gets involved in a real low-intensity war with the Russian state because Russia illegally seized Crimea and continued a smoldering conflict in the eastern Donbas region (eastern Ukraine).

Ukraine still faces real challenges in its conflict with Russia after the Donbas War involving the separatists and the Ukrainian military. Representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and LPR & DPR conducted the settlement of the Donbas War in the city of Minsk, Belarus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2014). But the agreement did not go well. On the contrary, the deal failed and

increased the intensity of the war, which continued and caused more casualties. So that on February 12, 2015, a second agreement was concluded in the city of Minsk that resulted in a decision that both parties to the conflict, namely Ukraine and pro-Russian separatist groups, withdraw their weapons from the ceasefire area. The agreement includes taking over Ukrainian territory that borders Russia covering an area of approximately 250 miles and granting autonomy to regions controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups.

Fig. 1. Pro-Russian separatist area.
Source: BBC (2022).

Since the presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky, who was elected in 2019, Ukraine has undergone difficult economic and governmental reforms as it faces the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic amid an unfavourable situation over its conflict with Russia. Past conflicts between Ukraine and Russia prompted Zelensky to reflect on how to proceed with the conflict resolution process regarding Russia-controlled Eastern Ukraine and the situation in the Russia-annexed Crimea region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many splinter countries joined the European military alliance with the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and France (NATO). The original purpose of forming NATO was as a defence pact in the face of the threat of Russia's post-war expansion in Europe (Brown, 2022). Ukraine has a geographical area that

borders Europe, so the people of Western Ukraine have strong ties to Europe and support its association with the European Union. Ukraine has always wanted to join NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), but so far, NATO is still considering this because it would endanger the country's relations with Russia. Nevertheless, Ukraine is regarded as a priority alliance partner of NATO.

NATO activities are often carried out in Eastern European countries and are close to Ukraine, which is assumed to threaten the country's sovereignty over Russia. Until Western and international countries paid attention to the conflict in the Russian-occupied Crimea region and supported Ukraine. In response, Russia prepared about 100,000 until 190,000 military troops deployed near Ukraine's eastern border and stepped up military exercises in the area (Brown, 2022). This action sparked fears in Ukraine of an attempted invasion from Russia.

The United States supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and encourages the implementation of domestic reforms. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, and especially after the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory in 2014, the country has been a significant recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. From 2015 to 2020, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided Ukraine an average of about $418 million yearly, plus humanitarian aid totalling more than $350 million since 2014. Meanwhile, it is known that by 2021, the allocation of security assistance funds to Ukraine will be about $464 million (Welt, 2021).

Since the first fighting broke out in eastern Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2014, Russian-controlled forces have mainly engaged against the Ukrainian military through sniping and shelling along the front lines. That attack led President Biden to consider using U.S. military aid to expand U.S. army involvement amid growing fears of a Russian attack on Ukraine. Russian troop activity has recently increased, and an estimated 100,000 military troops have been deployed near the Ukrainian border (Brown, 2022). The United States, under the Biden administration, fears that this build-up of Russian military forces near Ukraine could signal a new conventional Russian military offensive in the country.

By the end of 2021, Russia will continue to expand its military training activities on the Ukrainian border through the navy and the army. The Russian military conducted large-scale exercises until January 2022. This training warned NATO that it was expanding further in the Eastern European region. Russia, which is getting hotter from the crisis in the area, has finally declared the independence of two Ukrainian separatist regions, namely Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LRP). On the pretext of defending the two regions, Russia eventually began a series of attacks on February 24, 2022, as a form of its invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the background described above shows that the policy of the United States under President Joe Biden was to help Ukraine deal with the invasion from Russia. This policy also intends to maintain the security stability of the Eastern European region, some of which are NATO alliances. For this reason, this article will discuss the policies of the United States under the leadership of Joe Biden and their significance in efforts to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

In conducting this research, the author will attempt to answer the research question, namely how and to what extent Biden's involvement in intervening in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This study further

explores the actions of global actors in resolving the crisis between the two sides. The author will look at attempts to intervene in international conflicts that have led to security and political instability in the regional and global spheres. The main argument is that as U.S. president, Biden plays a significant role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Military intervention or economic sanctions show how the United States will proceed against Russia if it attacks Ukraine again.

The writing of this article is based on the latest phenomenon of the Ukraine-Russia crisis in 2022. Since the conflict between the two countries had started in previous years, one of the peaks also occurred in 2014. This study analyzes explicitly how the interventions carried out by the United States under the leadership of Joe Biden attempt to reconcile Ukraine and Russia over the conflict. This phenomenon is also studied through the intra-state war approach, the concept of military intervention, and the rational actor model. The approach distinguishes this study from previous research emphasizing the United States as an actor. In contrast, this study will focus on Joe Biden's policies in conflict resolution.

II. Framework

a. Intra-state War

The increasing global security challenges are influenced by several factors, especially in the progress of global developments. Some of them are global economic interdependence, pressure on the availability of natural resources, efforts to form a new state, and armed conflict. The war between states in international politics is believed to be the dominant form of military conflict that fights for its national interests. However, based on empirical studies, more than 70% of the wars that have occurred since 1945 have been intra-state wars and are no longer inter-state wars (Jackson, 2007).

Then, from 2014 to 2015, armed conflicts between states began to escalate, especially in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Yemen, and Libya. Territorial disputes and civil wars often prompt this war. The conflict in Ukraine has excellent potential for war between Russia and Ukraine and their allies. Against the background of the separatist action, the people of eastern Ukraine found themselves in a bloody conflict between the military parties of the Ukrainian and Russian governments.

Rourke & John (2008, p. 253) explains in their research that this war between states occurs because a country is trying to secure its sovereignty against separatists and countries that encourage the separatist movement. Namely, even by using military force to preserve the integrity and independence of the country. Of course, the armed conflict will also have consequences and security challenges for the environment. The ongoing escalation of the war in Ukraine is a real challenge to international public order. The world's attention will also contribute to the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of world peace.

b. Military Intervention Concept

The United States Department of Defense (2005) defines military intervention as an action deliberately carried out by a nation or group of countries by drawing its military might into an ongoing controversy. Operationally, military intervention is defined as troop movement. In this case, military action (by air, sea, or shooting and other movements) will occur from one country to another for confrontations or political disputes.

Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention for humanitarian purposes and

conflict resolution has increased dramatically. Current military interventions may involve deploying troops through traditional and unconventional means, such as disaster relief, for example, when the United States sent troops to help Hondurans recover from a devastating hurricane in the 1990s (Hauss, 2003). Much more controversially, armed forces are used to end fighting in unresolved conflicts. In this military intervention, troops generally remain in peacekeeping forces will be much more active than traditional peacekeepers.

Increased military training activities abroad near the border can also increase the likelihood of military strikes, as they threaten a country's sovereignty. The increased pressure created by the situation poses a threat of military intervention that will increase the suffering of the people. In its conflict, Ukraine faces the threat of military intervention from Russia, especially in the eastern Ukraine region occupied by separatist groups.

Russia's intervention against Ukraine is allowed under international law but can be legally enforced if the Ukrainian government asks for help solving the ongoing problem. Military intervention can be carried out based on the circumstances of a country. The legitimacy of a government request in a country regarding the intervention it needs becomes legal when a situation like the civil war case is found. This action can also occur if that country's government is recognized by the international community and has a legitimate government (Mamfaluthy, 2015).

The United States will continue to play an essential role in the international system, as reflected in the expected gradual easing of the conflict. In the case of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the U.S. military plays a vital role in the international system. Trends suggest that the U.S. military will continue to play an essential role in deterring conventional

conflict and possibly responding to proxy wars by other powers. The military also has a vital indirect function that can reduce armed conflict in the future.

a. Rational Actor Model

Graham T. Allison first proposed the rational actor model as the first tool in studying foreign policy. The Rational Actor Model is also part of the Rational Choice. Graham T. Allison has distinguished three models that look at the considerations of the state in formulating policies other than the rational actor model, namely the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Political Model. The first choice model places the state as the most important actor in decision-making. More precisely, Allison explains in the rational actor model that decision-making is an essential intellectual process to determine the government's choices (Fawaati, 2017). This Rational Actor Model study focuses on national interests and goals by considering alternative policies and the level of advantages & disadvantages arising from these alternative policies.

In addition to assuming that the state is the only single actor that can influence the national policy of the state, Rational Actor Model Theory must also be able to see the possibilities that can arise from an event and decisions that will form in the future. This rational actor model uses four methods to formulate possible policies: goals, alternative steps, consequences, and benefits (Lamusu, 2022). The rational actor model sees the state as a rational and perfect individual actor who can adapt to the situation. This study of the rational actor model allows the state to maximize values and goals under all conditions. Essentially, as a rational actor, the state will judge the desired goals and evaluate each benefit to get the highest value (Mustikasari, 2013).

The explanation of the rational actor model fits with the actions of Ukraine and Russia as countries that want to achieve the highest profit. Ukraine is trying to take reasonable steps to defend the Crimean region that Russia wants to control with the help of the United States and NATO, both politically and militarily. Meanwhile, Russia continues to carry out its actions to constantly strengthen its armed forces at its borders to get to Crimea. Ultimately, both countries are still faced with choosing what they believe will bring benefits, albeit with high risks.

III. Research Method

The research method used by the author is a descriptive research method with a qualitative approach. According to Cooper and Emory, descriptive research refers to the author's ability to explore critical issues and is ideally compared to research on public exposure to facts. The descriptive writing type also does not use and propose a temporal hypothesis, although in some cases, the secular hypothesis is still used (Zellatiffany, 2018). The author describes the Russia-Ukraine conflict that started with the Crimean conflict and developed to involve the United States and NATO to secure Ukrainian territory. This paper will elaborate and analyze the Russian-Ukrainian conflicts one by one, starting from the territorial dispute in the Crimean Peninsula and the armed conflict in the Donbas. Specifically, the analysis will be conducted through data collection and analysis based on literature and reference data sources, as well as written facts, both digital (articles) and physical (books).

IV. Discussion

a. The Dynamics of the Conflict between Ukraine and Russia

Initially, Ukraine and Russia had good diplomatic relations, although Ukraine had seceded from Russia and chose to be independent. However, in late 2013, relations between the two countries began to become tense after pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych took office and ended up overthrowing his term in office as his actions were deemed inappropriate for Ukraine. The overthrow of the time gave impetus to the pro-Russian Ukrainian society that Russia openly annexed one of Ukraine's territories, namely the Crimean Peninsula, in March 2014. The conflict in Ukraine caused a sad event for the people and the government of Ukraine.

The pro-Russian separatist movement in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, Declaring their independence from Ukraine (Kiev), sparked months of fighting, and a U.N. report says more than 3,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict in eastern Ukraine (CNN World, 2022). The protracted conflict between Ukraine and Russia since 2014 has not come to peace. The conflict has flared lately and is caused by the intervention of the United States and NATO. Since World War II, this military organization has had a vision and mission for Russia. After the secession from Russia, Ukraine is known to maintain close relations with the United States and NATO. The aid Ukraine receives from both sides could spark conflict in the long run.

The seizure of territory by Russia also took place because Russia was unwilling to give up Ukraine completely. The existence of Ukraine has made a significant contribution to the country from a regional advantage. Ukraine has a strategic area and influences the Russian state's military, political and economic aspects. Previously, Ukraine was dependent on

exporting steel, coal, fuel, petroleum, and chemicals to Russia. The financial sector of the territory of Ukraine is a connecting bridge to distribute gas from Russia to Europe. Especially in the Crimea region, this region is a strategic place for the Russian navy. Ukraine is suitable for Russia as a natural fortress and diversion area for gas pipelines running through the European Union (Hanifah, 2017). The gas pipeline is outlined in the figure below.

Fig. 2. Russian gas pipeline to the European Union through the territory of Ukraine
Source: Hanifah (2017)

The gas pipeline used by Russia for transfer to the European Union predominantly passes through the territory of Ukraine, so when Russia was later able to take back the territory of Ukraine and the Russian Peninsula, it indirectly indicated that Russia wanted to make big profits. Recently, however, due to the conflict in the Crimean Peninsula, Russia wants to stop the transit of fuel gas through Ukrainian territory. Not only that, but Russia has also sent troops to aid any pro-Russian community struggle (Hanifah, 2017). In March 2014, elite Russian troops attempted to capture the Belbek base in Crimea. The dispatch of 30,000 soldiers exacerbated the intervention movement after the Crimean peninsula's claim to the Black Sea shores.

Since 2014, the Donbas forces, 877 kilometres southeast of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, have become a conflict zone between Ukrainian government forces and the pro-Russian separatist movement (CNN Indonesia, 2021). Donbas troops poised to be in the

Crimean Peninsula are adding to the tension between the two countries. Different kinds of conflicts that grow and spread to different sides are difficult to extinguish, even though many countries in the world, such as France, have supported the peaceful resolution of conflicts through diplomatic channels.

Relations between the Ukrainian government and the separatist groups calling themselves the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic have been tense for years after the uprisings in the region. In late April 2014, Ukraine's interim President Alexander Turchinov said the government had lost control of eastern Ukraine. Finally, after the separatist group's 2014 referendum to secede from Ukraine, the Ukrainian government decided to separate the secessionist areas and grant amnesty to the militants. Nevertheless, the tense fighting continued until both sides agreed to cease (Kartini, 2016).

According to Reuters, under President Zelenskiy's leadership, Ukraine has asked U.S. President Joe Biden for permission to join NATO since 2021 (Reuters, 2022). This action infuriated Russia., and it began deploying troops in areas near the Ukrainian border to conduct military activities. Russia continues to call on Ukraine not to join NATO, as well as asking NATO to withdraw all armed forces driving training activities in Eastern Europe. The crisis continues, and the situation is heating up.

NATO's involvement and Ukraine's firm desire to join NATO prompted Russia to invade Ukraine more aggressively than before. On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially recognized the independence of the Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR) regions, followed by sending troops as "guards" into the area. At his peak on February 24, 2022, Putin sent troops for "special military operations" under the

pretense of protecting civilians. Within hours of Putin's speech on military operations, Russia carried out air and missile strikes on Ukraine using precision-guided munition (PGM). Russia launched more than 100 SRBM and cruise missiles by air and sea (Bowen, 2022).

The airstrikes took place from the northern part of Ukraine, and the main target of the attack was the Belarusian capital of Kyiv, so the situation was out of control and difficult to resolve. Russian troops marched along the western flank of Kyiv and, within days, took control of the city's coast. In the morning, an attack took place to take over Antonov International Airport in Hostomel, Kyiv. The attack aims to encircle the capital and take it from the Ukrainian government. After taking control of the city of Kyiv, Russia is eager to take over major cities in Ukraine, such as Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Summy. After capturing these cities, the Russians launched bombings on the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and the city of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. This action is evidenced by Russia's success in controlling Kherson on March 2, 2022 (Bowen, 2022).

Russia's actions resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine and attracted the attention of the world community. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine caused extensive damage to public facilities such as hospitals, roads, and civilian homes and even cost thousands of lives. The military attack also violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits any country's use of force, territorial integrity, or political independence. Feeling disadvantaged by Russia's actions, Ukraine requested the provision of rights in Article 51 of the UN Charter as an instrument for self-protection in armed cases of U.N. members (Preztacznik, 2022). The action of the Russian military invasion prompted the United States to help Ukraine break out of the ferocity of military aggression. The United States became further involved in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict under Joe Biden's leadership.

b. *The Beginning of the U.S. Intervention Movement in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict*

Since officially breaking away from part of the Soviet Union (Russia) in December 1991, Ukraine has become independent. Ukraine renounced all legacy of Russia and then focused on strengthening ties with Western countries. The United States has been one of the partners that have supported Ukraine's independence since the country's founding. From Ukraine's foreign policy perspective, the United States has made an outstanding contribution to the country. In particular, the U.S. government is assisting in promoting Ukraine's development into a secure, democratic, free and prosperous nation. The United States was even involved in the country's economic reforms, such as stopping the application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Ukraine, which led to permanent normal trade relations. However, since 2014, assistance to Ukraine has focused on the territorial dispute with Russia in Crimea. Russia's sudden military invasion, involving thousands of military troops, bolstered the U.S. to launch military and non-military support to Russia (US Department of States, 2021).

Russia's recognition of the Crimean Peninsula has been criticized by the United States and the international community. The Crimean Peninsula is a sovereign territory of Ukraine that is legal under international law and order, so Russia's actions encourage the world's population to empathize with Ukraine. Especially for the United States and the European Union as the closest allies. As a first step in responding to Russia's actions, the two partners seek to impose isolation of diplomatic ties and economic testimony on Russia. The U.S. and the European Union collaborated on

diplomatic campaigns and gathered votes to condemn Russia's actions against Crimea. The West urged Russia to stop sending troops into the border area if it did not want tougher economic sanctions. This U.S. policy is supported by the G8 members, who are willing to fire Russia if conflict erupts. Even then-US President Barack Obama tried to embrace China's voice to support the United States and the European Union. However, China did not ultimately vote on Crimea's legality (Kamasa, 2016).

Diplomatic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union extended into the economic field. The U.S. has imposed economic sanctions on senior Russian executives and leaders who generally control large Russian manufacturing companies with close ties to the government. While the United States and the European Union initially tried to pressure Russia through the G8 members and their strategic sectors, in reality, economic sanctions are challenging to implement due to the interdependence of the U.S. and the European Union with Russia in the economic field. Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas resources to the European Union, making Russia one of its largest trading partners. Russia's gas exports to the European Union have reached 185 million m³/day and provide Ukraine with a small supply of gas energy of 16 million m/day. Seeing the total contribution of Russian natural gas to its territory puts the European Union in a dilemma to continue to exert economic pressure on Russia, significantly when Russia responded to U.S. actions by not allowing the U.S. to use Russian-made rocket engines (Kamasa, 2016).

The intervention movement of the United States and the European Union in the case of the conflict between Russia and Europe is entirely possible to stretch diplomatic relations between countries, as evidenced by the policies deployed. The response of the U.S.

to intervene on various issues in each of the President's policies. During Obama's tenure, he openly condemned Russia's actions, but he was different from Trump's intervention. Trump tends to improve diplomatic relations with Russia even if not approved by Congress and his folk. Although in the end, Trump still gave tough sanctions to Russia at the instigation of Congress. President Trump officially signed legislation in August 2017 to impose severe sanctions on Russia. Decree condemning Russia's actions in annexing Crimea from Ukraine and meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. The U.S. Secretary of State later reported that US-Russia relations were deteriorating. The deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Russia is evidenced by the reduction of 755 employees out of a total of 1,200 employees of embassies and consulates (CNN Indonesia, 2017).

Evident from the actions of President Obama, who did not want to provide military troops, even though Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko asked the United States for arms assistance. The initial intervention of the United States to Russia on the Ukraine issue was mainly carried out through diplomatic sanctions and seemed to avoid the military aspect of direct involvement, unlike Russia, which is ready with military forces in the country's border areas. However, the United States continues to provide unarmed aid to the Ukrainian military with $60 million (Kisihandi, 2014). The United States' non-military intervention reflects the actions of the United States as a rational actor and always considers action. In line with the rational actor model theory, this shows how the United States has continued its aid to Ukraine despite its deteriorating relationship with Russia. But of course, only diplomatic and economic sanctions seem far from military elements.

The United States has the most vital military aspect in the world, and Russia is

second. The military part of the two countries is undeniable. America has a military budget of USD 740 billion or IDR 10,577 trillion, with 1,956 fighter jets, 5,436 helicopters, 2,765 training aircraft, 6,100 battle tanks, and 40,000 armored vehicles (CNBC Indonesia, 2022). Judging by the war fleet and military budget, the United States can provide military assistance to support security on the Ukrainian-Russian border. However, the United States prefers financial support to Ukraine. The strength of the Russian army is a consideration for the U.S. to be rational in dealing with the Ukraine-Russia problem. Suppose the United States subsequently provides large-scale military assistance to the Ukraine-Russia border. In that case, this action will become excessive and will not yield benefits relative to the expenditure incurred, as the United States only provides aid to its allies.

Regional differences far from Ukraine to the United States are one of the barriers to the United States providing military aid. The military intervention of the United States has always been a decisive step in identifying the adversary so that the intervention aid provided is successful. However, let's look at the case of Ukraine, where the United States has to compete with Russia, which has a military strength almost equal to its military power. Success is quite difficult to calculate. In addition, the Russian armed forces do not have to spend much money to secure the region, as the conflict occurs within Russia's borders.

c. President Joe Biden's Policy Regarding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

The United States and Ukraine have had profound and divergent relations since the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In early 1994, former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that a strong and stable Ukraine would be an essential counterweight to Russia. In principle, this balance can prevent the rise of Russia and strengthen regional and global security (Welt, 2021). Within months of the publication of Brzezinski's article, the United States, Britain and Russia pledged through the 1994 Budapest referendum to give "political guarantees" to respect Ukraine's independence and sovereignty in exchange for becoming a non-nuclear state.

In response to Russian aggression, the United States has increased its support for Kyiv, with more than $600 million yearly in development and security aid (Committee on Foreign Relations, 2016). Before the crisis, Ukraine was the leading destination for U.S. foreign aid, averaging more than $200 million a year. The U.S. military has provided training and equipment to Ukrainian troops, including sniper rifles, grenade launchers, night vision equipment, radar, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and patrol boats. NATO allies hold annual joint military exercises with Ukraine, including Sea Breeze and Rapid Trident.

Relations between the United States and Ukraine continue to this day, with the United States being led by President Joe Biden, who took office in 2021. Since the beginning of his reign, Biden has sought to strengthen ties with Ukraine. One of Biden's efforts is to send Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm to the Crimean Platform Summit in Kyiv in August 2021. The following approach is President Zelensky's visit to the White House from August to September 2021. During the visit, the Ukrainian government requested additional military assistance from the United States to fight separatist groups in eastern Ukraine supported by Russia. In addition, President Zelensky also asked for support from the United States to join a NATO alliance.

The United States has said it will send reinforcements to the eastern flank of NATO countries in response to Russia's invasion. Subsequently, the U.S. also imposed stricter

new economic measures, which were announced as a warning to Moscow through the talks between Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin. Biden further explained to Putin that if Russia attacked Ukraine, the United States would not hesitate to prioritize Ukraine's membership as a future NATO alliance (Roth & Julian, 2021).

The Biden administration has stated that the United States is a "full partner" in pushing for reform efforts in Ukraine's domestic sphere. But faced with a real threat from Russia, the United States will focus first on helping Ukraine counter the threat of invasion from Russia. Quoted from a press statement by Blinken and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2021), Antony Blinken said Ukraine currently faces a double challenge. Namely, external aggression by Russia that will invade Ukraine and internal aggression arising from internal problems such as corruption, oligarchy, and other issues that outweigh the interests of the Ukrainian people.

The United States under Joe Biden has supported Ukraine's human rights violations in the Russian-occupied Crimea region. Biden criticized Russia for creating tensions that threatened Ukraine. The White House supported by reaffirming efforts to advance the implementation of the Minsk agreement to resolve tensions in the Donbas region. The White House expressed concern about Russia's growing military build-up in the Ukrainian border region. America has emphasized that any step crossing the border is another invasion, so if Russia violates it, America will impose further sanctions on Russia (Kirby, 2022).

The United States itself is known to have deployed tens of thousands of troops to parts of Western Europe to stand by against a Russian attack on Ukraine. Earlier, the Joe Biden administration had approved an additional $200 million in aid projected to Ukraine as a defensive security aid. CNBC Indonesia (2022) mentioned that other NATO member states also joined the United States' readiness by sending warships and fighter jets to conduct joint military exercises near Ukraine.

Until the attack on Ukraine by Russia, the United States, one of the world leaders, continued to support Ukraine. In a political message from President Joe Biden during a press conference at the White House on February 22, 2022, Biden imposed new sanctions on Russia for its efforts to take the first step of an invasion of Ukraine. The United States, Britain, and Europe have imposed economic sanctions on Russia. The punishment on this economic sector is intended as a sanction so that Russia immediately stops its invasion and makes peace with Ukraine. The sanctions include cutting off access to SWIFT services and, at a more stringent stage, the imposition of an embargo by Western countries on Russia's energy exports.

V. Conclusion

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia was originally just a conflict between two countries fighting over the Crimean Peninsula. However, the intensity of the conflict increased after Russia sent military troops to the Ukrainian border. The deployment of Russian forces in border areas has attracted the sympathy of the United States and the European Union as Ukraine's closest partners so that they stand ready to assist Ukraine in confronting the threat of attack from Russia. The United States' intervention efforts based on a request for assistance from the Ukrainian President are legitimate in the eyes of international law. However, they did their best not to be directly involved militarily at the beginning of the

American intervention movement. The administration of the new President of the United States, Joe Biden, recently cracked down on Russia for daring to deploy troops in the Ukrainian region. The U.S. and its allies did not hesitate to impose economic sanctions on Russia. Especially after the Russian military invasion on February 24, 2022, which killed many Ukrainian citizens and devastated the country.

Works Cited

Bowen, A. S., 2022. *Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects,* s.l.: Congressional Research Service.

Brown, D., 2022. *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?.* [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694 [Accessed 16 April 2022].

CNBC Indonesia, 2022. *Awas! Bumi Terancam Perang.* s.l.:s.n.

CNN Indonesia, 2017. *Donald Trump Resmi Teken UU Sanksi Untuk Rusia.* [Online] Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20170803005357-134-232070/donald-trump-resmi-teken-uu-sanksi-untuk-rusia [Accessed 14 April 2022].

CNN Indonesia, 2021. *Rusia Tuduh Balik Ukraina kirim 125 Ribu Pasukan Zona Konflik.* [Online] Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20211201160934-134-728561/rusia-tuduh-balik-ukraina-kirim-125-ribu-pasukan-ke-zona-konflik [Accessed 12 April 2022].

CNN World, 2022. *Tensions Are High on Ukraine's Border with Russia. Here's What You Need To Know.* [Online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/20/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions-explainer-cmd-intl/index.html [Accessed 14 April 2022].

Committee on Foreign Relations, 2016. *Russian Violations of Borders, Treaties and Human Rights,* Washington: US Government Publishing Office.

Fawaati, S., 2017. Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia dalam Kerjasama Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia dan United States Defense Institutional Reform Initiatives. *Jurnal Diplomasi Pertahanan,* 3(1), p. 4.

Hanifah, U. R. N. M., 2017. Embargo Ekonomi sebagai Strategi Konfrontasi Uni Eropa terhadap Rusia pada Masa Konflik Ukraina 2013-2015. *Jurnal Sospol,* 3(2), pp. 169-195.

Hauss, C., 2003. *Military Intervention.* [Online] Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/military-intervention [Accessed 13 April 2022].

Jackson, R., 2007. Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Intrastate War. *Government and Opposition,* 41(1), pp. 121-137.

Kamasa, F., 2016. Krisis Ukraina dan Dampaknya Terhadap Tatanan Politik Global dan Regional. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik,* 11(1), pp. 79-108.

Kartini, I., 2016. Aneksasi Rusia di Krimea dan Konsekuensi bagi Ukraina. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik. Kementerian Pendidikan, Kebudayaan, Riset dan Teknologi,* 11(2), p. 14.

Kirby, P., 2022. *Is Russia Preparing to Invade Ukraine? And Other Questions.* [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589 [Accessed 14 April 2022].

Kisihandi, F., 2014. *Ukraina Minta Bantuan Militer.* [Online] Available at: ttps://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/internasional-koran/14/09/19/nc4tw96-ukraina-minta-bantuan-militer [Accessed 18 April 2022].

Lamusu, M. S. M. a. R., 2022. Kebijakan Luar Negeri Vladimir Putin dalam

Menanggapi Konflik Ukraina. *Jurnal Politico,* 11(2), p. 14.

Mamfaluthy, 2015. Legalitas Intervensi Militer Rusia Terhadap The Autonomous Republic Of Crimea, Ukraina. *Al-Ijtimai: International Journal of Government and Social Science,* 1(1), pp. 29-36.

Preztacznik, J. a. L. T., 2022. *Russia's War on Ukraine: Military Balance of Power,* s.l.: European Parliament Research Service (EPRS).

Reuters, 2022. *Timeline: The Events Leading Up to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine.* [Online]
Available   at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/
[Accessed 18 April 2022].

US Department of States, 2021. *U.S. Relations With Ukraine – Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet.*   [Online]
Available   at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ukraine/
[Accessed 23 April 2022].

Welt, C., 2021. *Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and US Policy,* s.l.: Congressional Research Service.

Zellatiffany, C. M. a. B. M., 2018. Tipe Penelitian Deskripsi Dalam Ilmu Komunikasi. *Jurnal Diakom,* 1(2).

Research Article

European Union's Securitization and Favoritism Phenomenon: Lesson Learned from the 2015 Europe's Migrant Crisis

Firsty Chintya Laksmi Perbawani[1]
Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur University, Indonesian Community for European Studies
firsty.chintya.hi@upnjatim.ac.id

Abstract
This research article aims to portray the phenomenon of how Europe's perspective and attitudes toward migration. Race, culture, and politics all play a prominent role in Europe's reception of migrants. This article precisely focused on the role of the European Union (EU) during the 2015 migrant crisis. As Europe faced the struggle where 1.3 million refugees and migrants illegally entered Europe by sea in 2015, compared to roughly 200,000 in 2014. Moreover, the current 2022 Ukraine war resulted in over 4.9 million refugees with 3.3 million of them having filed for temporary residence in few European countries. The author argues that European countries have responded to the issue differently, with some welcoming migrants and others rejecting them. This article founds the reasons, namely: (1) securitization within the EU, i.e., raising the issue of migration as a "matter of European security"; and (2) the phenomenon of favoritism, as evidenced by selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. This article attests that both securitization and favoritism culture in Europe must be recalculated and used as lessons learned so that there is no bias in allowing forthcoming migrants and so that the EU continues to exist.

Keywords: Europe, favoritism, migrant, racism, securitization

I. Introduction

The unprecedented surge of migrants who entered Europe in 2015 led to a crisis for the region, not only a migration phenomenon. As 1.3 million refugees and migrants reached Europe's borders, around 3,550 people lost their lives *en route* to Europe. Over 75% of them had escaped persecution and war in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq (Spindler, 2015). The route they were taking was very perilous, either from the 'Central Mediterranean route' from Libya to Italy; or the 'Western Balkan route' from Turkey to Greece, through the Balkans to Central Europe. Prior to July 2015, the Western Balkans route by sea crossing was favored owing to its shorter distance and cheaper rates for smugglers. More than 90% of the sea arrivals in Greece were Syrians and Afghanis, whereas the sea arrivals in Italy are considerably more diverse, including Eritreans, Nigerians, and Somalis (Wagner, 2015). But the problem that arise is European Union (EU) member states responded to the crisis in discord. There were contentious disputes among member states, which resulted in reinstating border restrictions and amending laws to tighten legislation and limit the rights of asylum seekers.

Fig. 1. Monthly arrivals in the Mediterranean Sea (persons)

---

[1] Lecturer of the Department of International Relations, UPN "Veteran" Jawa Timur

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016, p. 6)

From the figure above, the comparison number of arrivals is a huge gap. Starting in April 2015 and reaching its peak in October 2015. The author perceives that arguably reasonable to say this is not merely migration, but *a crisis* since its rapid increase in numbers of arrivals. This crisis can be stated as the *departure point* of this research. Later, the following question is how Europe has responded to the crisis.

António Guterres, the head of the United Nations (UN) refugee agency, now UN Secretary-General, enacted a series of essential principles or key guidelines on September 4, 2015, to shatter the present fragmented approach that has led to Europe as a whole failing to develop an effective shared response. Guterres asserts that "Europe cannot continue to react to the crisis piecemeal or incrementally. No state can do it on its alone, and no state can refuse to contribute" (Clayton, 2015). Conclusively, this involves taking immediate, brave steps to stabilize the situation and then sharing responsibilities. The EU must be prepared to offer immediate welcome, assistance, and registration with the agreement and cooperation of the appropriate states, particularly Greece, Hungary, and Italy. With the support of the UN High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and civil society, the EU should activate its asylum, migration, and civil protection agencies and procedures (Clayton, 2015).

Genuinely, migration has been a top issue for the EU for many years. Several efforts have been implemented to regulate migratory flows and enhance the asylum system. For the 2014-2020 budget, the EU raised its funding for migration and asylum by €10 billion (Vermeulen, 2019). European Commission also enhanced its Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as recognized in the 1951 Geneva Convention for its protection of refugees. In addition, a Dublin System reform to properly distribute asylum seekers across EU nations was implemented in 2016. However, member states were unable to achieve an agreement on how to share responsibilities (European Parliament, 2021). This article aims to explain why the EU responded to the crisis in discord and what lessons can be learned.

II. Methods

This research involves qualitative data analysis, with the author adjusting the data and keywords through three stages. The first is data reduction, were selecting and riveting data becomes a sharper and classed analysis. The author will organize the data to conclude. The second is data presentation, which might include narrative text and graphics. Third, the conclusion, where the method for developing an explanatory pattern till generating the proposition plot to answer research problem formulae (Klotz & Prakash, 2008, pp. 11-15). The author begins to consider the theoretical framework to help for situating and interpret the findings. The author uses a theory of securitization and the concept of favoritism to strengthen the argument.

a. Securitization Theory

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) first mentioned securitization, called Copenhagen School through their book called 'A New Framework for Analysis'. Securitization is a perspective on security based on the idea that the world (including security threats) is socially-created, making it hard to

determine whether threats are 'real' or not. Securitization adds to security studies by broadening security concerns beyond the typical military and political spheres to include non-state actors as security agents, with people serving as the referent object alongside the state. According to this viewpoint, security occurs on a spectrum, ranging from non-politicized to securitized issues (Tafese, 2017, p. 565). In short, how to bring the issue into a 'matter of security'.

To calculate whether the securitization process happened, there are four elements should be existed: (1) *securitizing actor,* someone who acts and tries to persuade the issues to move into a matter of security, not merely in the normal political sphere; (2) *existential threat,* something that may interfere the security and the survival of the community; (3) *referent object,* a thing that is vulnerable and must be secured; and (4) *audience,* a final target from securitization who must be convinced and acknowledge the issue as a security threat (Buzan, et al., 1998).

As a result, the securitizing actors should address the audience's interests, feelings, and experiences throughout the *speech act* in their language to mobilize the audience towards the securitized threat. A speech act is an action made by the securitizing actor to convey the issue as an extensive danger that might affect the audience (Tafese, 2017, p. 566). For instance, the irregular migration and the sudden numbers of arrivals on Europe shores are an existential threat in the Europe region and are framed as security questions through an act of securitization.

b. Favoritism

In literal translation, favoritism is unfair support shown to one person or group, especially by someone in authority (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). This conception was chosen by the author to see the continuity of the phenomenon that resulted because of the securitization of the member states. Matteo Camboni & Michael Porcellacchia (2020, pp. 1-2) demonstrated a theoretical study of how government policy favoritism inevitably originates and creates conflict in communities. Begin with the act of 'discrimination', followed by asymmetric power that divides the society into classes, which unknowingly become the root of internal conflicts. As this article argues that securitization leads to favoritism phenomena, such as the practices of racism in life in Europe.

c. Structure of the Article

This part mentions the writing flow of this article, which begin with the surging number of arrivals in 2015 to Europe as the departure point until the conclusion. The author shows the framework of thinking to make this article more understandable, as drawn below.

Fig. 2. Research Framework
**Source:** Author

Arguably, the *departure points* to start this article begins with the 2015 Europe migrant crisis as stated in the introductory (section I). That crisis *promotes* the member states responded differently, they prioritize their national security first rather than helping or sharing the responsibility with other EU member states called securitization of migration,

explained in section III. Next, the act of securitization *leads* to the favoritism phenomenon in Europe, which is later discussed in section IV. Ultimately, ended with the conclusion in section V, where the author sums up and mentions the lesson learned can be used for the upcoming migration challenges in the EU.

III. Securitization of Migration in the EU

This is where the results and discussion section begin. After the momentum of the 2015 migrant crisis, Europe downs into several responses. The first major reason to answer that is that there is a securitization of migration. What Copenhagen school has taught about the securitization theory, is that the process of securitization succeeds only if meets the four elements, namely: securitizing actor, existential threat, referent object, and audience. Thus, through an act of securitization, the problem is framed as a security threat, and a securitizing actor articulates an already politicized issue as an existential threat to a referent object (Tafese, 2017, p. 565).

Fig. 3. The Process of EU's Securitization of Migration
Source: Author

That figure shows that securitizing actors, such as state governments, political actors, and even the media, may help to initiate the securitization of migration. They conduct verbal acts or activities to highlight problems as an actor. The securitization actor said and identified that Europe was facing an existential threat or in this article a surge in migration in 2015 by asylum seekers who came from the Mediterranean Sea and entered several frontline countries such as Italy and Greece in a movement or statement through a speech act. The speech act is done through *framing* agenda, namely the accompaniment of issues and information on the mindset of the community. In Europe, many governments demonstrate a strong link between migration to terrorism, transnational crime, and border control. Furthermore, there is a risk of spillover in terms of how the community would compete with the refugees for employment and control of existing resource assets (Huysmans, 2000, p. 756). Securitization measures are required since there are referent objects that are threatened and must be secured promptly, in this article are Europe's homogeneity and the security of each EU member state. Interestingly, they may accept the problem of migration as a security concern in the fourth factor, namely the audience or those who are the targets of this securitization effort; none other than the targeted audience is individuals from numerous EU member nations. The audience showed any racism agenda, bias, and prejudice towards migrants; later be explained in section IV.

The atmosphere of securitization can be proved through differences in each country's response to the EU's collective policies. In September 2015, the EU, along with its EU Plans, is attempting to address the situation of migrant overcrowding in Italy, Greece, and Hungary by

implementing a policy of *Quota Schemes,* which is a distribution plan for migrants who must be moved (by allocating a minimum quota) by each EU member state. Within two years, the relocation plan is projected to be able to move 160,000 migrants. Depending on the state's geography and per capita income, each country is saddled with varying numbers. The top three countries with the most relocation quotas are the following: Germany has a proportion of 25.1%, which translates to 40,206 refugees; France has a percentage of 19.2%, which translates to 30,783 refugees; and Spain has a percentage of 125, which translates to 19,219 refugees (Batchelor, 2015).

However, even though the majority of EU nations favor the idea of *quota schemes*, the *Visegrad* (V4): Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia opposed the quota being set; and Finland abstained. Migration poses a threat to EU unity and migration is being securitized issue. Despite that, in the end, Finland came close to reaching the relocation objective, relocating 1,975 people or 95% of the target. Then, Romania and Slovakia are still relocating 728 and 16 people, or 17.4% and 1.8% of the target, respectively (Sabic, 2017, p. 6). The *Visegrad* countries, especially Hungary showed the empirical facts that securitization of migration happened.

IV. Favoritism Phenomenon in European Perspective towards Migration

As securitization of migration occurred, it leads to the next undeniable phenomenon that the author argued is the *favoritism* phenomenon. Where the audience, in this case, is EU citizens who perceive migrants in everyday life. In this section, the discussions focused on the phenomenon of selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Firstly, the existence of selective solidarity. Begin with the fact that European society already had *'us' and 'them' scenario* that distinguishes one group from another, in this case, native locals and migrants since the 1980s (Huysmans, 2000, p. 759). That scenario develops a sense of superiority over others and creates inequality. According to Magni (2020, p. 3), inequality causes selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality favor redistribution if it benefits native-born citizens. Inequality encourages the view that natives receive welfare priority and deepens the gap between natives and migrants in daily life. In 2016, the crisis of solidarity was proven by the EU's failure to agree on the reform of the Dublin Regulation in sharing responsibilities for fairly hosting migrants (Fine, 2019). As a result, they continue to argue over who should take in asylum seekers and other migrants who arrive on Europe's borders – being selective. The selective solidarity recently continues in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine resulting in 2.5 to 6.5 million persons will be internally displaced and 1.2 to 3.2 million will flee the country. According to UNHCR, Europe is experiencing the 'fastest-growing refugee crisis since World War II' (Fenix Aid, 2022). On March 2, 2022, European Commission activated the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainians. Poland and Hungary which refused to relocate refugees from the Middle East during the 2015 crisis are now, greeting thousands of Ukrainians with open arms – this proves Europe's selective humanity (Aghi, 2022). The contrasting treatment of asylum seekers from Ukraine and asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa once again confirms the selective sympathy and racism in the EU (Ciobanu, 2022).

Secondly, the racism in Europe is just the continuation of being 'selective' and one form of favoritism phenomenon. Under the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) Shadow Report 2015-2016, thousands of racist attacks against migrants were reported across the EU. In 2016, 3,729 assaults against refugees and asylum seekers were documented in Germany, amounting to more than 10 hate crimes every day. In Greece, 75 racist acts against immigrants and refugees were recorded in 2015, up from 60% in 2014 (Georgina, 2017). Another act of racism is shown by exploitation in the labor market. Any form of discrimination or lack of recognition of qualifications happened in 60% of migrant-background employees in Belgium (Georgina, 2017). Moreover, many scholars argued that Europe experienced *racist backlash* through the closure of the Balkan route to hold thousands of migrants in Greece. That has sparked a xenophobic response throughout Europe, alleging the need to protect his country's security. Several countries, like Macedonia, Croatia, and Serbia, have purposefully refused to accept refugees, and the V4 countries have announced an ideological battle to secure the Balkan route. The Islamophobic narrative promoted by Hungary's Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, is their motive for closing migration and refugee routes. PM Orban is renowned across Europe as an opponent of liberal democracy and a protector of Christianity against Islamization (Fotiadis, 2015). Those are examples of how racism is arising across Europe.

Lastly, one essential securitizing actor is the media. In this section, the author proved how effective the anti-immigrant rhetoric is in the favoritism phenomenon. A study led by the University of Torino Italy explained that over the past two decades, anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media has grown, possibly lowering prosocial behavior and boosting outgroup hatred against migrants while developing favoritism for natives. The negative portrayals of migration in public and media discourse promote prejudice and distrust against migrants (Conzo, et al., 2021, pp. 2-3). Myriad politicians and media commentators in several member states, like Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania clarified that irregular and particularly Muslim migrants are not welcomed through their spread of anti-migrant statements and racist hate speech. The rhetoric continues by the use of harassing diction in describing migrants, such as "human *garbage*" mentioned by Polish politician, Janusz Korwin-Mikke; "what is closer, *shoot* all" tweeted by Slovenian journalist, Sebastjan Erlah (ENAR, 2016, pp. 9-10); "*migrants flood* trains in desperate bid to leave Italy" reported by BBC News (Bell, 2015); "stop the immigration *flood"* reported by the Washington Times (Thomas, 2015). From those dictions: human garbage, shoot all, migrants flood can be stated for fostering any anti-migrant narratives.

V. Conclusion

To sum up, this article shows the intertwined factors that cause discord responses among V4 countries namely securitization and favoritism. Begin with the sudden upsurge of migrants entering Europe's shores in 2015 triggered myriad responses from the member states. This is a challenge to the EU's integrity. Because the region was unprepared to accommodate an influx of 1.3 million asylum seekers, this became a "migration catastrophe." The crisis *promotes* the securing of migration. This is illustrated by the growing importance of migration as a threat nexus. Securitization actors ranging from governments and politicians to European media execute speech actions to

persuade the public that uncontrolled migratory surges endanger European homogeneity and security. The EU Plans are also ineffective; the EU migration strategy simply underlines the presence of a "solidarity crisis" in the region.

Furthermore, securitization *leads to* favoritism, such as selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. If the 2015 crisis may be used as a lesson, it is useful to remind the people that the EU still has numerous flaws. Racism, favoritism, and securitization are still prevalent. The author hopes for the EU to avoid bias and prejudice in the future. For example, when Russia invades Ukraine in 2022, partiality must be abolished to create fair receptions in order to promote European migration in the future.

Works Cited

Aghi, A., 2022. *Europe's Selective Humanity.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.mironline.ca/europes-selective-humanity/
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Batchelor, T., 2015. *MAPPED: How many refugees each European country will take under EU plans.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607349/Migrant-crisis-map-EU-refugee-quota
[Accessed 11 May 2020].

Bell, B., 2015. *Migrants flood trains in desperate bid to leave Italy.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33204681
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Buzan, B., Waever, O. & de Wilde, J., 1998. *A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Camboni, M. & Porcellacchia, M., 2020. A Theory of Political Favoritism and Internal Conflict. *AEA Journals,* pp. 1-73.

Cambridge Dictionary, 2022. *Favoritism.* [Online]
Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/favoritism
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Ciobanu, C., 2022. *SELECTIVE SYMPATHY: POLAND'S CONTRASTING TREATMENT OF THOSE SEEKING REFUGE.* [Online]
Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/03/selective-sympathy-polands-contrasting-treatment-of-those-seeking-refuge/
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Clayton, J., 2015. *UNHCR chief issues key guidelines for dealing with Europe's refugee crisis.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/55e9793b6.html
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Conzo, P. et al., 2021. Negative media portrayals of immigrants increase ingroup favoritism and hostile physiological and emotional reactions. *Scientific Reports,* 11(16407), pp. 1-11.

ENAR, 2016. *Racism and Discrimination in the Context of Migration in Europe,* Brussels: European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

European Parliament, 2021. *Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Fenix Aid, 2022. *Europe's Selective Solidarity: The Emerging Double Standard Applied to Those Seeking Safety in the EU.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.fenixaid.org/articles/europes-selective-solidarity-the-emerging-

double-standard-applied-to-those-seeking-safety-in-the-eu
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Fine, S., 2019. *All at sea: Europe's crisis of solidarity on migration.* [Online]
Available at:
https://ecfr.eu/publication/all_at_sea_europes_crisis_of_solidarity_on_migration/
[Accessed 11 May 2022].

Fotiadis, A., 2015. *This racist backlash against refugees is the real crisis in Europe.* [Online]
Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/25/racist-backlash-against-refugees-greece-real-crisis-europe
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Georgina, 2017. *RACISM PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN MIGRANTS' EXCLUSION AND VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.enar-eu.org/Racism-plays-a-key-role-in-migrants-exclusion-and-violations-of-rights-in-the/
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

Huysmans, J., 2000. The European Union and Securitization of Migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 38(5).

Klotz, A. & Prakash, D., 2008. *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide.* 1st ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Magni, G., 2020. Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism. *British Journal of Political Science,* pp. 1-24.

Sabic, S., 2017. *The Relocation of Refugees in the European Union.* Bonn: Friedricebert Stiftung Zagreb.

Spindler, W., 2015. *2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis.* [Online]
Available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Tafese, T., 2017. Theory of Securitization to Counter Ebola: The Nigerian Approach. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications,* 7(11), pp. 561-9.

Thomas, C., 2015. *Stop the immigration flood.* [Online]
Available at:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/25/cal-thomas-stop-immigration-flood/
[Accessed 12 May 2022].

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016. *Monthly Mediterranean Sea arrivals 2014–2015,* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Vermeulen, M., 2019. *Ten questions that explain the EU migration policy.* [Online]
Available at:
https://thecorrespondent.com/93/10-questions-that-explain-the-european-unions-migration-policy/12299086041-3a16f02d
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Wagner, M., 2015. *2015 in review: how Europe reacted to the refugee crisis.* [Online]
Available at:
https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2015/2015-in-review-how-europe-reacted-to-the-refugee-crisis
[Accessed 10 May 2022].

Book Reviews

Teaching to Transgress: Education as The Practice of Freedom. **By Bell Hooks. Routledge, 1994. ISBN: 9780415908085.**

The purpose of education remains as a discourse rendered to be the center of the field's scholarship. Bell Hooks (pseudonym of Gloria Jean Watkins) theorized hers as the "engaged pedagogy" as outlined throughout this book. She was inspired by Paulo Fraire's work on liberatory pedagogy and her own experience as a minority student and later a professor in predominantly white institutions in the United States. In arguing for the need to shift teaching and learning from Fraire's "banking of education" system, Hooks brings up her experience and knowledge as a Black girl in a segregated and later a desegregated one for evidence. In the introduction, the specificity of her experience includes, but not limited to, how "for Black children, education was no longer about the practice of freedom" (p. 3) in the latter setting. Within a racialized capitalist society like the United States, Hooks argues that education that she experienced as "merely strives to reinforce domination" (p. 4). Later, her undergraduate learning at Stanford further cemented her critical take on education as the tool for the oppressor to maintain the status quo.

In Chapter 1, Hooks proposes her translated version of Freire's "conscientization" with "critical awareness and engagement," (p. 14) as she goes on to interpret what education as the practice of freedom means. As a Buddhist practitioner, she also brings up the "engaged Buddhism" philosophy coined by Thich Nhat Hanh, a Buddhist monk. In Chapter 4, Hooks reveals Freire's sexism and phallocentrism in his works as her rationale to posit a merge of liberatory and engaged pedagogies. Despite the limitation to Freire's theory, Hooks chooses to keep using liberation as her paradigm in theorizing as readers can see from Chapter 5. She argues that while the personal experience matters especially in relation to her being as a Black woman in a white supremacist country like the United States, theorizing the experience is liberatory.

Indeed, feminism is also the highlight of this book considering that Hooks dedicates six chapters out of total 14 to explore feminist scholarship. Beginning on Chapter 5 on the need for women to theorize, Hooks presents Chapter 6 by articulating how feminism, in addition to sexism, also dissects other forms of oppressions like classism and racism. Consequently, the marginalized people who come into the classrooms as learners carrying their interlocking-oppression-based experience should be appreciated as knowledge owners by the teachers. Hooks' demand for educators to acknowledge the learners' experience as theory is almost similar to the way Fraire built his pedagogy for adult learners (1978). However, Hooks does not bring the most notable Fraire's work in this chapter. Rather, she constantly criticizes essentialism in teaching and learning proposed by Fuss (1989). Hooks challenges the Fuss's dismissive take on the oppositional voices in the classroom that come from experiential truths.

While constantly being critical of authoritative figures in the classroom who do not provide spaces for the marginalized learners, Hooks yearns for solidarity among feminist scholars simultaneously. In Chapter 7, 8, and 9 she lays out how to build one with white women, diverse learners, and fellow Black scholars consecutively. While maintaining her relatively justified skepticism towards white women due to the group's historical and ongoing anti-Black racism, Hooks reminds the readers to zoom out to the patriarchy as their common oppressor rather than uncritically comparing the two groups'

oppressions. Then, in Chapter 8, Hooks centers her diverse women's studies classes to expose the challenges in making learning meaningful for her students who might not have experienced the United States the way she and her other Black students have in the past. By doing so, she convinces readers how feminism is for everybody[1] from all backgrounds. Accordingly, Hooks express her hope on diverse feminist scholarship by diverse feminist scholars in Chapter 9.

In contrast with her experience in disintegrated schooling as she recounts in Chapter 2, Hooks values diversity in the United States, one of the global centers for international higher education, during her twenty years as an educator in one. In the same chapter, she encourages professors to deal with their fears of change in the students' composition and paradigm in learning for engaged pedagogy to take place. Further, she even dares her fellow educators to embrace that precise challenge of changing classrooms, as she asserts in Chapter 3. After all, change is the only constant in life[2]. By providing some examples on how to prepare the predominantly white higher institution to build an engaged learning in more diverse classrooms, Hooks devotes this chapter to details over how professors could meaningfully respond to their diverse students. The former must also be willing to learn from the latter to add richness to the practical approaches that reflect the paradigm shifts in both subjects.

Despite the constant changes, some things, particularly on the strategies enacted by the oppressors to maintain their power, remain consistent. In Chapter 11, by reflecting on the inherited wounds from colonialism experienced by the colonized, Hooks points out the way the oppressors continue to

weaponize standard English to "shame, humiliate, colonize" (p. 168) the oppressed today. Language was one of the most effective colonizers' tools in the past and remains to be one in our current neoliberal and globalized world. In education, discourse on language as the main vehicle for teaching and learning inside and outside the classrooms is not only relevant, but highly strategic for engaged pedagogy, too. Access to standard English is often determined by the learner's class status, regardless of their location. As Hooks unpacks the silence on class differences in classrooms through Chapter 12, readers are reminded as to why Hooks' perspective on feminism also interrogates the oppressions based on gender, location, race, and class. Readers also can't help but juxtapose her analysis on class with Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1978) yet again due to their similarities.

Hooks' arguably strong stand on classism, however, is understandably personal. She entered "acutely aware of class" (p. 177) one of the most prestigious higher education institutions in the United States for her undergraduate program due to her "non materially privileged background, from the working poor." (p. 177). Hooks apprises her fellow educators to be fully aware of class bias inside their classrooms to make room for inclusive and engaged pedagogy. Today, neoliberal-based privatization of the colleges and universities across the nations has severely limited, even denied learners from lower and poor working class their access to higher education (Buckner, 2017). In her conclusive reflection on engaged pedagogy in Chapter 14, Hooks critiques how meaningful and engaged dialogues, as she advocates in Chapter 10, barely transpire in the classrooms. Inevitably, the pernicious absence of other

---

[1] Six years later, in 2000, Hooks published her book titled "feminism is for everybody" to further analyze her paradigm on the matter.

[2] This famous aphorism is widely ascribed to Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher.

relevant issues mimics the silence on the class differences inside the classrooms. Without consistent dialogue on indispensable concerns, education cannot be valorized as liberatory because both learners and educators eschew the engaged pedagogy. To bell Hooks, education as the practice of freedom is those moments in the classrooms when we "face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond boundaries, to transgress" (p. 207).

Astri Napitupulu
University of Missouri St. Louis (UMSL)
abnndz@umsystem.edu

Book Reviews

The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement. **By Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2020. ISBN: 9780197501436.**

The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement is one of the most important books in the current study of terrorism. There are four advantages of this ISIS book: The Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement. First, this book states that a thorough understanding of ISIS terrorism is needed. In general, most people see the emergence of ISIS only in 2014 Indeed ISIS is famous after the group declared itself as the caliphate in 2014. However, the author of this book states that understanding ISIS terrorism should not be limited to just 2014 when the group declared itself a caliphate for the first time. An understanding of the ISIS phenomenon must be understood comprehensively. The seeds for the emergence of the ISIS movement have emerged from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the post-US invasion in 2003, Iraq was marked by political turmoil, sectarian conflicts, and security instability. Conflictual conditions allow the development of armed groups in Iraq. ISIS was born from a background of political instability that occurred in Iraq after the US invasion. This can be seen in statements in ISIS documents that call on Sunni community groups to join the ISIS caliphate and fight the Shia group that was in power in Iraq after the US invasion. Where in its various documents, ISIS describes that the United States conspired with Shia groups in dominating Iraqi politics after the fall of Saddam Hussain's regime in 2003.

Second, this book provides a chronological narrative in several systematic chapters. This book sequentially explains the seeds of the birth of ISIS, the heyday of ISIS,

until the defeat of ISIS. More specifically, this book describes the history of the struggle of Abu Mushab Zarqawi with his group Tauhid wal JIhad, which continued with the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, until jihadist groups in Iraq formed the Islamic State of Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq group then separated from Al Qaeda, claiming to be a legitimate caliphate institution for Muslims. With this chronological view, readers can see the history of the emergence of ISIS in its entirety. In addition, readers can examine the genealogy of ISIS thinking that consistently comes from the Abu Mushab Zarqawi group. This consistency, for example, can be seen in the priority of attack targets. Abu Mushab Zarqawi admits that the United States is the enemy of Muslims. However, according to Zarqawi, some enemies are more dangerous and must be prioritized in attack operations, namely the local government regime and Shia groups. This genealogy of thinking can be found in the ISIS movement which is more busy fighting Shia groups and local governments than prioritizing attacks on Western objects. This priority is confirmed in various reports in various media owned by ISIS.

Third, the most important thing in this book is that the author has succeeded in translating primary data about ISIS. The author of this book has succeeded in selecting primary sources from among the many available sources and then presenting them systematically. From the translation of primary data provided by the book, we can try to understand more deeply the ideology and strategy adopted by the ISIS group. This is what we do not find in other books that rely on secondary sources in discussing ISIS. This book has a similar pattern to the book entitled Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden and the book Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah which also presents primary sources from the jihad movement they lead. But what

distinguishes it from other similar books, ISIS: The Reader, this book features critical commentary on each chapter. So, this book combines primary sources and critical comments from the author. From these critical comments, readers can understand the context behind ISIS' statements contained in the primary sources. For example, in the final chapters of this book, it is stated that since 2016 ISIS has ordered its sympathizers to always be patient in the struggle and aggressively carry out attacks wherever they live. ISIS also cites verses from the Koran that tell about the wisdom behind the defeat in war. In his critical commentary, the author of this book explains that ISIS's speeches since 2016 which have more themes of firmness in the struggle and suggestions for global resistance are in line with the defeat of ISIS on various battle fronts in Iraq and Syria. In that context, ISIS leadership figures stated that the caliphate army must carry out attacks on the enemy wherever ISIS sympathizers live. According to ISIS, attacking an opponent in a place where the enemy lives is more frightening than a terror operation carried out in a place where ISIS is in power. ISIS stated that if its sympathizers could not carry out attacks on a large scale, ISIS sympathizers could carry out attacks on a small scale even if only by throwing stones at the enemy. The author of this book explains the fact that ISIS's suggestion to hold global resistance is in line with the increase in ISIS terror operations in various countries.

Fourth, by reading these primary sources, this book presents the fact that the jihadist movement is not monolithic. There is mutual criticism and debate between jihadist movements. In this book, we can see how the debate between Al Qaeda and ISIS is. For example, there are several statements from ISIS figures that criticize Al Qaeda. There are also several statements from ISIS leaders asking Al Qaeda to join together under the ISIS caliphate. On the other hand, it also describes how Al Qaeda criticizes ISIS, which is considered to have deviated from the jihad method.

ISIS the Reader is a monumental book. By translating primary documents, this book can make it easier for scientists or security forces to explore the latest genealogy of terrorism. This book is useful for scientists and security forces to understand the ISIS terrorist movement and then take policies in fighting terrorism in the future.

Prihandono Wibowo
Lecturer of International Relations Dept.
University of Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Jawa Timur
prihandono_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id