

WIMAYA

Interdisciplinary Journal of International Affairs

Research Articles

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Thaingi Khin Htwe

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on the Establishment of Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements
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Aim and Scope

WIMAYA is an international scholarly journal devoted to international affairs. Published twice a year by the International Relations Department, Pembangunan Nasional Veteran East Java, the journal aims to promote the importance of interdisciplinary approach to analyze various international issues. The journal welcomes empirical and theoretical research articles that seek to cut across disciplines in order to capture the complexity of a phenomenon. The editors also welcome discursive book reviews that contribute to the literature.

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Research Article

Geopolitics of the Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Myanmar

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Abstract

This article aims to examine the implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Myanmar. BRI is an economic and strategic agenda of China. Because of its strategic geographical location, Myanmar becomes an important area of China in implementing its BRI projects. Beijing has raised the multi-level engagement in Myanmar such as economic and infrastructure cooperation; provide assist for the government's peace process, and stand at Myanmar's side in the international community. Therefore, BRI could have implications for Myanmar. This research answers the following questions: what are the implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative for Myanmar; why Myanmar is important for China and how will Myanmar benefit from China's BRI.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, Myanmar

I. Introduction

China's 21st Century grand strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) was adopted by President Xi Jinping in 2013. BRI is comprised of both a land component - the Silk Road Economic Belt - and a sea-component named the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The strategic logic supporting the BRI's geographical span can be interpreted through geopolitical theories of Halford J Mackinder (Heartland Theory) and Nicholas Spykman (Rimland Theory). In implementing its BRI

projects, Myanmar becomes an important area for China because of its strategic geographical location. In this context, this paper aims to highlight the implications of China's BRI for Myanmar. The main research question of this study is to examine how do China's BRI impact on Myanmar. According to the necessity of research flows, this paper is composed of four sections. Firstly, this paper will clarify President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative. Next, this study will examine China's approach to Mackinder and Spykman's Theories. Then, it will explore the geostrategic significance of Myanmar in China's BRI. Finally, this paper will analyze implications of China's BRI for Myanmar.

II. President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative

President Xi's one of the most ambitious foreign and economic policies is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase Eurasian economic integration (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 3). During his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, President Xi proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt and then extended the initiative to include the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in October 2013 for promoting greater connectivity between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Mohan Malik, 2017, p. 3).

On 25 March 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China issued "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (Chin, et al., 2015, p. 2). The Visions and Actions state the intention to build all forms of industrial parks such as overseas economic and trade

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cooperation zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones and promote industrial cluster development (Tekdal, 2018).

BRI will link more than sixty-nine countries that are home to over sixty-three percentages of the world's population and accounting for over twenty-nine percentage of the world's GDP. BRI will include a series of ports, railways, and highways as well as facilities for telecommunications, healthcare, education, and energy (Lehman Brown Accountants, 2018). The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road will connect coastal ports of China with ports in Asia, East Africa, and Europe while the Silk Road Economic Belt will connect northwest China to Europe through Central Asia. As part of the overall "Go Global" strategy that was formulated and developed by the government of China in the late 1990s to promote Chinese investments abroad, the BRI aims to increase economic activities of China with Asia, Europe as well as Africa, resulted in helping Chinese companies to widen market access, improve global competitiveness and fulfill natural resources requirements (Taeying, 2019)

After the Visions and Actions of BRI had been issued by China in March 2015, Chinese delegations including diplomats and scholars were sent abroad to advertise the BRI (Callahan, 2016). Besides, President Xi's overseas visits and holding several international summits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Uzbekistan in June 2016 and the China and Central and Eastern European Countries Summit in November 2016 intended to promote the BRI. Therefore, dozens of bilateral trade and investment agreements within the framework of the BRI were signed during President Xi's overseas visits (Tekdal, 2018).




Fig. 1. Belt and Road Initiative: Six Economic Corridors Spanning Asia, Europe and Africa
Source: Lehman Brown Accountants (2018)

According to Fig.1., BRI comprises six international "corridors" that spanning Asia, Europe and Africa. They are Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM); China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC); China-Indochina Peninsular Economic Corridor (CICPEC); China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC); New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELB); and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Among Six Corridors of BRI, four corridors are land routes, including the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, and China-Pakistan corridors. In contrast, the China-Indochina Peninsula corridor is an ocean route and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor is an amphibious route. Myanmar is involved in these two that together make up the "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" (Lehman Brown Accountants, 2018). To fund BRI projects, China has founded a US\$40 billion Silk Road Fund and a US\$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Mohan Malik, 2017, p. 4). Moreover, China proposed a sub-regional initiative called the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) at the 17th ASEAN-China Summit in Myanmar in 2014 to manage BRI projects and enhance its political and economic objectives in mainland Southeast Asia (Vannarith, 2018).

III. China's Approach to Mackinder and Spykman's Theories

Geopolitics means the contest among countries to control geographic space to get security against potential enemies, expansion power, and influence over others, and ensure access to resources and markets (Arase, 2016, p. 1). Over the previous two centuries, many scholars put forth several theories to realize the dynamic of geopolitics occurred during certain eras of history. In 1904, the prominent geopolitical scholars Halford J Mackinder originated the Heartland Theory that highlighted land power strength. Mackinder supposed the world as a huge and uniform bloc including the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe and termed this bloc the World-Island, with a pivot area covering the landmasses of Asia, Europe, or Eurasia. Mackinder noted, 'who commands East Europe rules the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who commands the World-Island rules the World.' His core argument was control of the pivot area offers access to natural resources and that protection from any vulnerability from the maritime (Mudiyanselage & Wijesinghe, 2018, pp. 155-156).

In 1942, Nicholas Spykman proposed a theory that countered the Heartland Theory of Mackinder. Spykman argued that the Rimland of Eurasia, the buffer zone or coastal area, is the importance of controlling the World-Island, not the Heartland. According to Spykman, who rules the Rimland commands Eurasia, and who commands Eurasia rules the world (Mudiyanselage & Wijesinghe, 2018, p. 155).

These two theories highlighted that Eurasia is an important place for controlling world power. China's BRI revolves around the world's geostrategic centers and pursues the agenda of inter-regional connectivity through the Silk Road Economic Belt (land route) and the Maritime Silk Road (sea route) (Elahi, 2015,

p. 34). China's Silk Road Economic Belt designs to create a new Heartland, which will include a huge landmass of China, Central Asia, and Europe, a geographical place similar to the original landmass of Mackinder, but not involve Russia (Wey, 2019). Additionally, China is building several commercial and maritime facilities along the Rimland. The port development projects of China at Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar reveal China's maritime ability and its developing 'Blue Water Navy' ambition (Khan, 2018, p. 93). The BRI scheme highlights the outsized ambition of China in its neighboring countries. These projects will use masses of Chinese cement, financing, steel, expertise, technology, and workers to increase the geopolitical influence of Beijing and bind other countries more firmly into its fold (Hiebert, 2020, p. 37). If the BRI successful, it will create a new pivot of power that will have a strong influence over Eurasia. It will stipulate China with massive economic benefits and assured its strategic interests. It will support China to acquire new land trade roads that will operate as a key alternative to China's present dependence on maritime routes for its trade as well as strategic supplies, to develop its western regions, and to save its energy supplies (Wey, 2019).

IV. Geostrategic Significance of Myanmar in the Implementation of BRI

Southeast Asia is a significant strategic partner in China's BRI. The region serves as an important connection in the BRI's Maritime Silk Road that aims to connect China's coast to South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe across the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean (Vineles, 2019). In his speech at the People's Representative Council of Indonesia in 2013, President Xi also stated that Southeast Asia has

been an important hub along Asian Maritime Silk Road since ancient times (Xi, 2019).

Being one of the Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar becomes an important country for China in implementing its BRI project. Myanmar is involved in BRI's two corridors (the China-Indochina Peninsula corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor) that together make up the "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" (Lehman Brown Accountants, 2018). The major aim of China's BRI in Myanmar is to find a strategic route from Yunnan Province in Southwest China through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean that is an essential part of BRI for the development of Maritime Silk Road. Myanmar is China's best shortcut to the Indian Ocean because it is located between India, China, and other ASEAN countries (Chenyang & Shaojun, 2018, p. 319). With its maritime ambition of transforming into a 'Blue Water Navy' by 2030, the Indian Ocean Region remains Beijing's primary focus of interest. In the long-term, the region is significant as a 'land bridge' for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to reach the Indian Ocean through the Myanmar-controlled Coco Islands. The PLAN would be able to shorten the distance by 3000 km, reducing the voyage by five to six days by not passing across the Strait of Malacca to reach the Bay of Bengal. It has now arisen as a potential target of China's long-term strategic ambition, which includes transforming the whole region as part of a golden 'quadrangle' regional trade zone with Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Yunnan (Singh, 2013).

Besides, Beijing is worried about preserving peace and security near its southern boundary with Myanmar and safety that fighting between the Myanmar military and armed ethnic groups does not drive migrants into China. Myanmar's political stability is vital for the security of China. Any armed clash on Myanmar-China border regions determined to border stability and

security of China (Myoe, 2015, p. 27). Furthermore, China has an important economic interest in Myanmar, particularly in the resource-rich northern areas. China has been investing in, obtaining, and importing natural resources for decades, containing lumber, jade, energy, and metals (United States Institute of Peace, 2018).

V. Implications of China's BRI for Myanmar

a. Opportunities for Myanmar

Politically, China's BRI could bring the development of the domestic peace process in Myanmar. To support Myanmar's effort for national reconciliation and peace process, Beijing initiated peace talks with the Myanmar government and the Northern Alliance, which did not sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). During the peace talks that took place in January 2019, the Northern Alliance has agreed to collaborate in government peace efforts. This is a significant landmark because it will reduce challenges for the CMEC projects in the Myanmar-China border region (Williams, 2019).

Concerning the Rakhine issues, China has provided diplomatic protection for the Myanmar government by using its veto power. For example, China did not support the November 2017 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution against the Myanmar government although it condemned violence in Rakhine state by adopting a statement. The Chinese government encouraged to negotiate between Myanmar and Bangladesh governments and offered a three-phase proposal for solving the problem between the two countries. The proposal includes such factors as a ceasefire by the Myanmar military, negotiations between the two governments to resolve refugees' repatriation problem, and the international community's assisting to reconstruct the war-

devastated Rakhine State (United States Institute of Peace, 2018).

In November 2019, China donated US\$ 900,000 for financing the Myanmar peace process during Special Envoy Mr. Sun's visit to Myanmar. Moreover, as part of humanitarian assistance, Beijing has contributed 1000 units of houses for refugees and 200 million kyats to Rakhine state. By allocation, its aids via government channels, Beijing has prioritized Kachin and Rakhine States due to both conflict-prone states are China's economic and strategic areas (The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2019).

Economically, China's BRI projects could make a significant contribution to the infrastructure and economic developments in Myanmar. In 2013, China agreed to provide Myanmar US\$12 million for upgrading the Beeluchaung hydropower project, US\$70 million to construct Hsedawgyi dam, US\$150 million for a new highway, which would connect Yangon to Mandalay, and US\$224 million for a telecommunication network project (Yue, 2015, p. 270). During Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Myanmar in 2014, the two governments signed many MoUs and Agreements including the Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement on the Design, Supply, Installation, and Commissioning of Hydraulic Steel Structure and Electromechanical Works Projects for Upper Yeywa Hydropower Station (The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2019).

During the State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's visit to China in August 2016, the two countries signed for the implementation of two infrastructure development projects, including one for electrification in Myingyan Township of Mandalay Region and the other for a highway to run from Shwe Li-Mandalay-Nay Pyi Taw-Mon State, worth US\$20 billion that fall under the framework of the AIB (Sein, 2018). In September 2018, Myanmar and China signed MoU on the China-Myanmar

Economic Corridor (CMEC), the importance corridor for BRI in Myanmar (Gyi, 2019, p. 108).



Fig. 2. China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

Source: Myanmar Times (2019)

The CMEC is a Y-shape corridor as shown in Figure 2 that aims to connect Kunming to Mandalay and Yangon and a SEZ in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine. The CMEC estimates 1700-Kilometers-long and includes over twenty projects worth about US\$2 billion (Gyi, 2019, pp. 110-111). Although there are twenty-four proposed CMEC projects, Myanmar has agreed to speed up the process of such major projects such as the Kyaukphyu SEZ, the Kyaukpyu-Kunming high-speed railway, the Kyaukpyu deepwater port, and SEZs on the Myanmar-China border in Kachin and Shan states as well as the New Yangon City development in Yangon (Williams, 2019).

The CMEC, under BRI, becomes an opportunity for Myanmar in fostering Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) and 2030 Agenda. The modernized and effective infrastructure is significant for Myanmar to develop a market economy. The construction of road and railway under the CMEC would connect important urban centers and people across Myanmar and with major markets and capitals in neighboring countries, especially China, India, and Bangladesh. For instance, the Muse-Mandalay railway line can play a significant role in improving connectivity between China and Myanmar and other countries of Southeast Asia. In addition, port development could enable Myanmar to become a regional center (Taidong, 2019).

Then, Chinese projects create job opportunities for Myanmar people. For example, more than 6,000 local people of Myanmar acquired job opportunities in the building of the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipeline project under CMEC, and over 220 Myanmar enterprises were included in the project with their workers being technologically trained (Consult-Myanmar, 2013).

Likewise, as the significant corporate social responsibility campaigns, Chinese companies donate to improve public relations. For example, the state-owned China National Petroleum Company has pledged US\$6 million to build clinics, a hospital, and schools in the areas of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline. Chinese state-owned company that carried out a feasibility study on part of BRI railway project in Myanmar and a local privately owned company has made a joint donation of US\$100,000 to a charity established by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Su Kyi that work on educating awareness of environmental preservation (Thant, 2019, p. 176). China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) founded its office in Myanmar in 2018 offered the scholarship to 600 university students in Myanmar as part of China's Paukphaw Scholarship Project (Thant, 2019, p. 177).

The "Belt and Road Brotherhood", a medical aid program that was initiated by Charity Federations of China and Yunnan and Fuwai Yunnan Cardiovascular Hospital, offered free medical treatment for congenital heart diseases affected children from lack sufficient healthcare system areas in Myanmar. The renovation of the former Bahan Women's Hospital was funded by China Foundation for Peace and Development and the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. Later, this hospital was renamed as Daw Khin Kyi Women's Hospital (Thant, 2019).

b. Challenges for Myanmar

Politically, there are many concerns in Myanmar that the economic dependence would allow Beijing to gain serious influence within Myanmar's political affairs using the debt to pressure decisions. Under economic pressure, Myanmar has been looking for foreign investment to stimulate its weak and stagnant economy. The attracting overseas investments have proved difficult for Myanmar due to the crisis in Rakhine state. Therefore, Myanmar has recently relied upon diplomatic support from Beijing amidst the Western pressure and criticism. This has presumably informed the government's recent call to currently back the BRI infrastructure and investment opportunities (Williams, 2019). When collaborating with China under BRI, many Myanmar people worries about Myanmar's sovereignty, security, and influence of China in Myanmar. They concern that increased Chinese business existence throughout the world will finally lead to an increased military presence. For example, China founded its first external military center in Djibouti in 2017 (Gyi, 2019, pp. 106-113).

Economically, BRI spending in developing states has increased serious concerns about the debt crisis. Some BRI recipient countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Pakistan, and Mongolia are at a high risk of debt concern because of BRI loans (Gerstel, 2018). The external debt of Myanmar mainly comes from China. In 2018, more than half of Myanmar's foreign debt comes from China's debt with US\$ 3.8 billion that was followed by Japan's US\$ 2.1 billion. Due to the higher interest rates of China's debt (over 1.5%) than Japan's interest rate (about 0.01%), some media completely different views on Japan and China's debt (Tian, 2019, p. 159).

Some BRI projects have been criticized for creating employment problems in many host countries, including Myanmar. At the Port of Gwadar, one of the important BRI

projects, about half of the labors are Chinese. Also, in Laos, Laotians complaint regarding the fact that the majority of the Chinese labor on the railway line. Myanmar locals are unsatisfied because China-backed projects hire Chinese citizens for management positions, and that local people from Myanmar are only used for labor-intensive work (Mon, 2018).

Furthermore, there have been many complaints and reports concerned about human rights violations by accusing land grab and environmental degradation because of Chinese companies' land acquisition and industrial activities. Much of the land in Myanmar, particularly in the ethnically different areas, is often not legally recognized. Therefore, it is difficult for them to challenges concerning investment projects of China. For instance, although the farmers in Kyaukphyu Township have cultivated the lands for generations, it is extremely difficult for them to challenge the appropriation of land because much of the land chosen for Kyaukphyu SEZ is considered legally vacant. Nearly 20,000 residents of Kyaukphyu Township are at the probability of losing their land and livelihoods because of the land acquisition for developing a SEZ (Crowther, 2020).

Likewise, there are concerns that China's BRI projects in Myanmar could have negative environmental implications. The BRI corridors cross through the areas of the Ayeyarwady River basin and its surrounding areas that accommodate nearly 25 million people who rely on the natural capita not only to gain water supply but also to reduce risk from natural disasters. BRI projects could be undermined by considerable socio-economic and environmental costs that would happen if roads were built without taking into account the environment, wildlife, and its implications on communities (Helsingen, et al., 2017, p. 1).

VI. Conclusion

BRI is the important geostrategic agenda of China in the 21st Century. As part of the overall "Go Global" strategy, the BRI aims to increase economic activities of China with Asia (Central Asia and Southeast Asia), Europe as well as Africa, resulted in helping Chinese companies to widen market access, improve global competitiveness, and fulfill natural resource requirements. The partnership of the theories of Halford J Mackinder (Heartland) and Nicholas Spykman (Rimland Theory) can be found within China's BRI project. Myanmar is strategically located in China's BRI and it is involved in the "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road". Although China's BRI could not give a win-win situation for Myanmar, it could provide opportunities for Myanmar to implement its MSDP and 2030 Agenda. Therefore, Myanmar needs to adopt policies and apply the rights to be a respectful geopolitical pivot of Indo-Pacific geopolitical players while maximizing its national interests from its geostrategic strength.

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Research Article

The Impact of Indonesia-Bangladesh Railway Cooperation on the Establishment of Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements

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Abstract

This research discusses the railway cooperation between Indonesia and Bangladesh which is motivated by the interest of Bangladesh to revitalize railways and increase the domestic demand for railways. This research aims to find out why the Indonesia-Bangladesh cooperation in the railway sector has a significant impact on the formation of the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) in 2018. This research using interview and literature study methods. The theory used in this research is the theory of interdependence and economic integration. The conclusion of this research is that the Indonesia-Bangladesh railroad cooperation has a significant impact, causing a sense of mutual dependence. The two countries finally agreed to form economic integration in the form of PTA in order to improve the economies of each country.

Keywords: Preferential Trade Agreement, Indonesia, Bangladesh, railways

I. Introduction

Bangladesh is a country with a population of 160 million people and the majority of them use rail transportation every day. In fact, just before Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-

Adha, they are willing to jostle until they climb and hang on the train just to return to their hometown. Men, women and children dare to die to climb the roof of the train and find a gap so they can take the train to their destination. However, this condition is not supported by adequate railway facilities. For example, in 2015 the Bangladesh railway had 1182 MG type passenger trains (meter gauge)³, some of which have been operating for more than 30 years. Meanwhile, there are 324 BG (broad gauge)⁴ trains, half of which have been running for more than 30 years. In addition, there are several trains that are considered unworthy of the road and only 18 trains that use air conditioning or air conditioning.

With a very dense population and a poor transportation management system, especially in the railway sector, the Bangladeshi government is motivated to hold a tender for the procurement of passenger trains to meet the transportation needs of its people. In several tenders held by the Bangladesh Railway Company, Indonesia has won the tender three times, namely in 2005, then the second and third tenders in 2014 and 2017. Indonesia's victory at the train tender in Bangladesh was the beginning of Indonesia's cooperative relationship. -Bangladesh in the railway sector.

Indonesia's victory at the tender held by the Bangladesh Railway Company was inseparable from the role of PT Industri Kereta Api (Persero) which is commonly abbreviated as PT INKA (Persero). PT INKA (Persero) is the first integrated state-owned company (BUMN) in Southeast Asia. The focus of this state-owned company is to produce high quality products in the railways sector. (PT.INKA, 2017)

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³ Meter Gauge (MG) type trains are used on rails or tracks with a width of 1,000 mm.

⁴ Broad Gauge (BG) type trains are used on rails or tracks with a width of 1,676 mm.

The tender held by the Bangladesh Railway Company in 2006 for the procurement of 50 passenger trains was valued at USD 13.8 million. A further tender in 2014 signed a contract worth USD 72.39 million for the delivery of 150 passenger trains. In the 2017 tender, PT INKA (Persero) also signed a contract to export 250 passenger trains with a total contract value of USD 100.89 million. (PT.INKA, 2019)

On 28 January 2018, Indonesian President Joko Widodo held a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina at the Prime Minister's Office, Dhaka. During the meeting, Indonesia and Bangladesh agreed that the two countries wanted to strengthen cooperation in the economic sector and create new cooperation.

After the bilateral meeting, the two countries produced 5 cooperation agreements.

First, the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) on Foreign Office Consultation. Second, Joint Communiqué on the cooperation to Combat IUUF (Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing). Third, the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Launching of the Negotiations for Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA). Fourth, the MoU between the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and PT Pertamina regarding the Integrated Power Project. Fifth, the LoI (Letter of Intent) regarding the LNG supply agreement from Pertamina to Petrobangla. (Kantor Staff Presiden, 2018)

Prior to 2018, free trade relations between Indonesia and Bangladesh were carried out multilaterally through the 2006 Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with the D-8 (Developing 8 Countries) group, including Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. (Husein, 2015) Meanwhile, the IB-PTA, which was

formed in 2018, is the first Indonesia-Bangladesh free trade cooperation carried out on a bilateral basis, moreover, the IB-PTA covers the railroad car trade that has never been done before.

The third point in the cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Bangladesh, namely the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Launching of the Negotiations for Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA), was formed to create free trade, namely by removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs on goods agreed by the two countries so that trade flows become larger and mutually beneficial. In the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh, so far there has not been a specific IBPTA, so the tariffs for goods and services are still subject to high fees.

The formation of the IB-PTA in 2018 was carried out after PT INKA (Persero) succeeded in winning three consecutive train tenders by the Bangladesh Railway Company, namely in 2005, 2014 and 2017. The nation's children's train is considered to have succeeded in supporting the development of connectivity in Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh are satisfied and proud of this super-fast and super strong train made in Indonesia which is able to cut the travel time from the Rajshashi-Dhaka route which was previously 6 hours to 4.5 hours.

In a bilateral meeting between Indonesia and Bangladesh on January 28, 2018, before the two countries agreed to form the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA), President Joko Widodo first expressed his praise for Bangladesh who had trusted PT INKA (Persero) to help in developing connectivity in Bangladesh. In total there are 400 passenger train cars sent by PT INKA (Persero) to Bangladesh. The achievement of PT INKA (Persero) has initiated President Joko Widodo

to submit an MoU for Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA).

II. Methodology

a. Theoretical Framework: Interdependence

According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the definition of interdependence is interdependence between countries which will lead to wider cooperation and reduce armed conflict. A country will not be able to meet the needs of its own country without assistance from other countries. So that cooperation is considered very necessary to complement and benefit each other. The establishment of cooperative relations between countries will make countries become interdependent with one another. (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008, p. 3)

Keohane and Nye have another model of interdependence, namely complex interdependence. Complex interdependence theory has three main characteristics namely: (1) The usage of multiple channels between societies in interstate, trans governmental and transnational relations; (2) The absence of hierarchy among issues (Multiple Issues); (3) Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. (Rifda, 2018, pp. 11-13)

b. Theoretical Framework: Economic Integration

In a book entitled *The Theory of Economic Integration*, Bela Balassa defines economic integration as:

“Economic integration as a process and as a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to

different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.” (Balassa, 1969, p. 1)

According to the definition of Bela Balassa, that economic integration is a process and a condition. It is seen as a process, because it includes measures designed to eliminate discrimination between the economic units belonging to different countries and is considered a condition, because it can be represented in the absence of various forms of discrimination between the national economies. The purpose of the concept of economic integration is to increase trade flows, open markets and facilitate trade between member countries. The existence of economic integration is expected to be able to provide benefits and eliminate trade barriers such as high tariffs, differences in regulations and long and long export-import procedures. There are 6 stages of economic integration according to the meaning of Bela Balassa, namely: (Balassa, 1961, p. 176) (1) Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA); (2) Free Trade Area (FTA); (3) Custom Union; (4) Common Market; (5) Economic Union; (6) Political Union. Of the six stages of economic integration, the author refers to the first stage, namely PTA to analyze the Indonesia-Bangladesh cooperation in the railroad sector.

The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is formed by two (bilateral) or several (multilateral) countries that both agree on reducing tariffs and eliminating trade barriers between member countries and differentiating them from non-member countries. This stage is the easiest and earliest type of economic integration. Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is usually carried out through bilateral relations because it is considered more effective in achieving free trade and can be implemented by countries

that are not regionally close to each other, such as Indonesia and Nigeria.

c. Method

The approach used in this research is qualitative explanative. Explanative research provides explanations and reasons in the form of causal relationships. Explanative research trying to answer the question "why". (Morissan, 2019, p. 29) Researchers use explanative qualitative because they want to explain the cause and effect relationship based on facts in the field. Then the facts that occur in the field will be implemented with the relevant theory. This method was chosen because it is believed to be able to explain the significant impact of cooperation between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the railway sector on the formation of the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) in 2018.

III. Analysis and Discussion

a. Indonesia-Bangladesh Cooperation in the Railway Sector

Indonesia and Bangladesh have cooperated in the procurement of railroad cars since 2005. Prior to 2005, Indonesia had never collaborated in the transportation and connectivity sector, especially railways. 2005 saw the beginning of this good relationship, namely with the participation of Indonesia in the tender for the procurement of railroad cars held by Bangladesh. The tender was won by PT INKA (Persero) from Indonesia which was able to get rid of China and India as competitors. The number of train orders in the first tender was 50 passenger trains of type BG.

According to Nungki Kus Lutfiani as the Marketing Division Staff of PT INKA (Persero), Participants in the tender for the procurement of passenger train cars are train

manufacturers from China and India which have the characteristics of the lower middle market and have good quality and affordable prices. This is different from the European and Japanese markets which target countries with the upper middle class market.

In 2014, the Bangladesh Railway Company (BR) again opened an open tender for the procurement of passenger train cars, which was participated in by 3 countries, namely: 1. China (CNR Tangshan and CSR Nanjing Puzhen), 2. India (Rites Limited) and 3. Indonesia (PT INKA). The train specifications specified by Bangladesh are MG and BG types of passenger trains that use Air Conditioned and Non-Air Conditioned trains, generator trains, and dining trains. The number of passenger seats for the Meter Gauge train is 55 seats for the train type that uses air conditioning and 60 seats for the train type that doesn't use air conditioning. While the Broad Gauge train has 90 seats, both for the type of train that uses air conditioning or not.

Indonesia through PT Industri Kereta Api (Persero), or commonly known as PT INKA (Persero), succeeded in winning the 2nd tender with a total order of 150 passenger train cars, which is worth a contract of USD 73 million. In 2017, Bangladesh again opened the 3rd tender for the procurement of 250 train carriages participated by the same 3 countries with the same specifications and several other additions. In that year, Indonesia again won the tender with a total contract value of USD 100.8 million or equivalent to IDR 1.4 trillion.

According to Haryo Prasodjo, a train observer and a lecturer in international relations at the Muhamadiyah University in Malang, he said that there were 6 important factors for Indonesia's victory, namely: 1) cheaper prices compared to China and India. 2) good quality, reliable and super strong trains 3) delivery and completion of fast trains 4) There is operational assistance and a guarantee for 2 years 5) There is cooperation

with MNC in Bangladesh which helps Indonesia in the tender process 6) there is an emotional connection with Indonesia because Bangladesh prefers Muslim majority countries.¹⁵

b. The Role of Railway Cooperation for Indonesia and Bangladesh

The role of Indonesia-Bangladesh cooperation in the railroad sector for Indonesia has a positive impact on the country's economy and is in line with its national interests. It is proven that in 2016 the export value of Indonesian trains entered the 10 countries with the largest train exports in the world with a sales value of 66 million USD. This number makes Indonesia the 8th railroad exporting country followed by the Netherlands and Norway under it. This railway cooperation is in line with

Indonesia's National Interest, including: achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), as a Go International effort from the railroad sector, to become a leader in the development of the rail industry in the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia's steps to expand to South Asia, Africa, Australia and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the role of this cooperation for Bangladesh is that since 2005, Indonesia has helped solve various problems related to rail transportation in one of the countries in the South Asian region. The problems that are addressed start from developing and improving inter-city connectivity, meeting domestic rail needs, improving the railway transportation management system and developing the railway industry as well as revitalizing Railways. (ANTARA, 2019)

c. Establishment of Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) 2018

On January 28, 2018, the President of Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo and his staff

made a state visit to Bangladesh. The results of the meeting were 5 cooperation agreements, namely: First, the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) on foreign office consultations. Second, a joint communique about cooperation in fighting IUUF (Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing). Third, Mutual Agreement on Launching of negotiations for a preferential trade agreement (IB-PTA). Fourth, the MoU between the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and PT Pertamina regarding the Integrated Power Project. Fifth, the Lol (Letter of Intent) regarding the LNG supply agreement from Pertamina to Petrobangla. (Kantor Staff Presiden, 2018)

As a follow-up to the agreement, early 2019 the two countries held the first meeting for the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) in Bangladesh and agreed on the timeline and work plan for the IB-PTA negotiations. Meanwhile, the second meeting for the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) was held in Bali, Indonesia on 22-23 July 2019. This second TNC meeting, representatives of Indonesia and Bangladesh, successfully finished discussing the text of the IB-PTA agreement and began discussing the text of the provisions of the certificate of origin (Rules of Origin / ROO) in addition to the agreement. Indonesia and Bangladesh have also agreed on a schedule for exchanging demand and supply lists regarding market access and tariff reductions proposed by Indonesia.

The success of establishing a PTA between Indonesia and Bangladesh is based on the satisfaction of cooperation between the two countries that has been going on since 2005. Several important points have prompted the two countries to apply the concept of economic integration in the form of a PTA, namely: (1) Indonesia and Bangladesh agree to continue to strengthen cooperation economy; (2) Cooperation in

various fields which keeps increasing from year to year between Bangladesh and Indonesia; (3) The existence of enormous economic potential in the Indian Ocean region made Indonesia and Bangladesh agree to move the economic wheels in the region; (4) The spirit of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* of the two countries with a majority Muslim population encourages Indonesia and Bangladesh to spread the values of tolerance and peace and help each other to prosper Muslims around the world through cooperation in various international forums, one of which is the OIC. In this regard, the two countries agreed to form the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) to strengthen the economies of each country and improve the welfare of their people. Lowering tariffs and removing other trade barriers make trade flows bigger and mutually beneficial.

d. The Interdependence Relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the Railway Sector

The theory of interdependence explains the interdependence between countries which will lead to broader cooperation and reduce armed conflict. In this study, the interdependence theory shows the interdependence between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the railways sector which then encourages the formation of the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA).

The principle of mutual dependence that occurs in the relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh is seen as a relationship of interdependence between the two countries, especially in the railway sector. The interdependence of the two countries in the railroad sector has made Indonesia and Bangladesh able to fulfill matters relating to the interests of their countries. Indonesia needs Bangladesh to expand the Indonesian

market to non-traditional countries, increase the number of rail exports, while Bangladesh needs the Indonesian state to increase and develop intercity connectivity, improve the railway management system and meet domestic rail needs. This sense of interdependence shows a reciprocal effect.

The interdependence relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh corresponds to three main characteristics of interdependence, namely:

a) The usage of multiple channels between societies in interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations. Interdependence between the two countries is created not only because of the interaction of state actors, but also non-state actors. Actors who take part in the train trade from the Indonesian side consist of the central government, PT INKA (Persero), a number of large industries and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) who act as suppliers for the needs of the railroad industry, such as the train component industry, the steel industry, the machinery industry, the foundry industry as well as to SME players who partner with PT INKA (Persero).

Meanwhile, actors from the Bangladesh party include the Government of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Railway Company and the Multinational Corporation, namely Biswas Construction.

b) The absence of hierarchy among issues (Multiple Issues). In this context, it appears that the issues that are prioritized by the two countries, namely Low Politics issues, are no longer High Politics issues. Indonesia and Bangladesh see the issue of trade as a major issue which is also important for the country. The trade in passenger railcars between Indonesia and Bangladesh, which was marked by a winning bid by Indonesia, is an example of a Low Politics issue. The issue of rail trade is very important for the two

countries for the sustainability of the economies of Indonesia and Bangladesh.

Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. In this case there is no link between the procurement of railroad cars by Bangladesh and the use of military force. The railroad cooperation that is connected between Bangladesh and Indonesia puts forward the cooperation in the economic sector.

e. The Interdependence Relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh Encourages Economic Integration in the IB-PTA 2018 Forum

The interdependence relationship between Indonesia and Bangladesh began with cooperation in the railroad sector in 2005, when PT INKA (Persero) won a train tender held by the Bangladesh Railway Company, which then continued in the 2014 and 2017 train tenders. The continuity of the two countries creates mutual dependence on one another. The interdependence between Indonesia and Bangladesh on the rail trade has had a stronger impact than trade in other commodities such as palm oil and coal that have previously existed. This is because Bangladesh really needs Indonesian trains because Indonesian-made trains have the advantage of being better quality than trains made by competitors. Meanwhile, Indonesia also needs Bangladesh for rail exports and market expansion to non-traditional countries. This mutual dependence has prompted the two countries to form economic integration under the IB-PTA forum in 2018, right after Indonesia received the Bangladesh train tender in 2017. The mutual dependence of the two countries on the rail trade is a strong reason for forming economic integration.

Indonesia and Bangladesh agreed to integrate their economies by forming the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) to remove trade barriers between them, given that the export value of the two countries is increasing from year to year, especially with the interdependence relationship in the field railways that make export-import activities between the two countries even higher. The formation of the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA) was based on the high export-import taxes between the two countries which have been an obstacle to their economic cooperation so far. The long and complicated bureaucracy was also in the spotlight of the two countries, so they decided to remove these obstacles in the form of the Indonesia Bangladesh Preferential Trade Agreement (IB-PTA). This is in accordance with the Bela Balassa theory which defines economic integration as an effort or steps to eliminate differentiation of treatment between different state-owned economic units and is considered a condition, because it can be represented in the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.

This IB-PTA makes trade between Indonesia and Bangladesh more effective because free trade is carried out bilaterally. Bilateral free trade can open up wider export opportunities and make it easier to discuss negotiations, take into account impacts and management. The export and import commodities of the two countries will also experience a reduction in tariffs.

Trade is an important factor in achieving the interests of the state. The impact of economic integration will create prosperity and improve the economies of Indonesia and Bangladesh because economic integration will remove trade barriers and lower tariffs for goods and services. This was proven by the second IB-PTA Trade

Negotiation Committee (TNC) meeting, Indonesia and Bangladesh began agreeing on a list of product requests and offers for tariff reduction. This tariff reduction will benefit both parties.

IV. Conclusion

Cooperation in the rail sector between Indonesia and Bangladesh has a significant impact on the formation of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) because this cooperation creates interdependence between the two countries. There is a sense of interdependence between the two of them which in turn leads to economic integration.

The interdependence between Indonesia and Bangladesh is in accordance with 3 characteristics of interdependence, namely, the interaction between actors from the two countries, both state and non-state actors, the issues used are Low Politics, namely trade issues, and the absence of military use by Indonesia and Bangladesh because they are focused on economic cooperation. This interdependence can ultimately achieve the interests of each country. Indonesia can increase export value and expand its market to non-traditional countries, while Bangladesh can develop connectivity between cities and meet domestic rail needs.

Furthermore, the interdependence between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the railway sector encourages the formation of economic integration in the form of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). A special trade agreement or PTA is said to be an economic integration because it requires the elimination of trade barriers in the form of tariffs. Through the IB-PTA, Indonesia and Bangladesh agreed to reduce trade rates between the two countries, both for trains and other commodities, so that it would make

trade easier and more profitable for the two countries.

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Research Articles

The Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Environment: Environmental Diplomacy on Handling Covid-19 Medical Waste in Indonesia

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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the environment. The enormous need for personal protective equipment (PPE) masks (both medical and non-medical masks), protective clothing, face shields, gloves to hand sanitizers and disinfectants has resulted in the accumulation of medical waste in some regions in Indonesia. This paper aims to describe the environmental diplomacy and international cooperation efforts undertaken by the Indonesian government to address these problems. The author finds that Indonesia's environmental diplomacy was carried out before the pandemic occurred, but not much has focused on medical waste management. International cooperation to overcome the problem of medical waste accumulation has been carried out with some countries such as Japan, ASEAN and also WHO. Of course, considering that this pandemic is still ongoing, it is hoped that this paper can be the start of research and can be used as a stepping stone for further research.

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Keywords: Covid-19 Pandemic, Environment Diplomacy, Medical Waste, International Cooperation, Indonesia

I. Introduction

The coronavirus pandemic is not over. This virus has spread to all continents of the world. The virus originated from Wuhan, China, started on 16 December 2019, where a patient experienced a disease similar to the SARS-Cov2 virus (Shalihah, 2020). Then 30 December 2019, Ai Fen Hospital China posted a photo of a laboratory report on social media that spread to doctors. The Chinese government found dozens of cases of similar diseases in Wuhan later. On 3 January 2020, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan also experienced this SARS-like outbreak. Checks for people with fever began to be implemented at the airport for passengers' arrival from Wuhan (Shalihah, 2020).

On 11 January 2020, Shanghai scientists sequenced and published the Coronavirus's complete genome in an online discussion forum for epidemiologists. (Gusman, 2020) On 13 January 2020, Thailand confirmed the first cases, followed by Japan, Beijing and Southern Guangdong on 20 January 2020. After the incident, Chinese infectious disease expert Zhong Nanshan confirmed that the virus had spread among humans on state television. 23 January 2020, the Chinese Government lockdown Wuhan and Hubei Province to control the Coronavirus spread (Gusman, 2020). After the incident, Chinese infectious disease expert Zhong Nanshan confirmed that the virus had spread among humans on state television.

On 30 January 2020, the WHO finally declared the pandemic a global emergency (Gusman, 2020). After the virus spread to Asia, countries made various travel restriction policies. An example of a case in Asia is Japan, with more than 3600 passengers on the Diamond Princess Cruise ship quarantined for two weeks on board since 5 February. The result is that the virus has infected 600 passengers, and six died. In South Korea, the virus spreads very fast. However, it can be handled quickly because of the Rapid Test

carried out massively and promptly, even without quarantine, lockdown, or business closure.

The spread of the Coronavirus in Europe began when France reported its first death on 14 February 2019. In Europe, Italy, the epicenter of the outbreak, implemented a national lockdown on 9 March 2002. Spain followed this as the country with the second-highest number of deaths in the world at that time. In the US, the outbreak started on 29 February 2020; however, because testing rates are still low, detection rates are still low. The United States declared the corona outbreak a national emergency on 13 March 2020. After massive testing, the United States is currently among the top countries in this pandemic (Gusman, 2020).

The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in many countries implementing lockdown policies. Governments in major countries such as Spain and the United States are taking action and taking lockdown measures to reduce Coronavirus expansion. Things that were done during the lockdown period included limiting international travel, restricting the people's movement, and limiting people on a large scale in the general public. This lockdown policy was taken because other countries saw China's condition slowly improving after implementing this policy (BBC, 2020).

However, over time, the lockdown policy turned out to have a positive effect on the environment. The amount of carbon emissions in the air has dropped dramatically. This is a result of many industries, transportation and companies that have closed down. According to news from the BBC, this year alone, the air pollution level in New York has decreased by almost 50%. (Anwar, 2020) In other countries such as China, emission levels reduced by 25% at the beginning of 2020 when the pandemic began to spread in China. Many factories closed, and coal use in China's six largest power plants fell by 40%. In the end, good air quality rose to 11.4% in China. According to the BBC, satellites show nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) emissions disappearing over Northern Italy,

Spain, and the UK. In the transportation sector, for example, it accounts for 23% of total global carbon emissions. Transport-related carbon emissions are seen to fall in countries that restrict the movement of citizens as a policy. Driving and flying are the main contributors to emissions from transportation, namely 72% and 11% of greenhouse gas emissions (Anwar, 2020; Aqil, A., Muh. Ibnu Aqil and Arya Dipa, 2020).

In Indonesia, air quality improvement is also seen in Jakarta and surrounding areas. The Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) imposed by the Provincial Government starting early April 2020 also plays a role in improving the area's air quality. Based on aerial monitoring, through satellite photos, nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) levels in the air in Jakarta and its surroundings have decreased by 40% compared to the previous year (Climate Tracker, 2020). The environmental group, the Commission for the Elimination of Lead Gasoline (KPBB), monitors data from AirNow, stating that the PM_{2.5} concentration in Central Jakarta in 2019 was 40.10 mcg / cbm (Aqil, A. dan Muh. Ibnu, 2020). Daily average March 16-25, 2020 is 30.13 mcg / cbm and 15.48 mcg / cbm on March 26 to April 4, 2020 (Aqil, A. dan Muh. Ibnu, 2020). Particulates (PM_{2.5}) are airborne particles smaller than 2.5 micron (micrometer). (BMKG, 2020) The particulate is a measure of air quality.




Fig. 1. Satellite Photo of Jakarta and Banten Region: Comparison of NO₂ Levels in the Air from 12 March 2020, to 5 May 2020 (Left) and 2019 (Right)

Source: (Climate Tracker, 2020)

Despite improving air quality, the Covid-19 pandemic has also negatively impacted the environment, namely an increase in waste, especially medical waste, and the increasing need for Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. Almost all countries affected by the Covid-19 pandemic require the use of masks for everyone leaving the house and also require the use of hand sanitizers, which usually use plastic bottles as storage containers. Also, handling Covid-19 in the hospital by medical personnel requires gloves, hazmat suits, masks, face shields, most of which are only disposable goods. This, of course, creates a large amount of medical waste.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on medical waste management during the Covid-19 pandemic stated that big cities in Southeast Asia, such as Manila (Philippines), Jakarta (Indonesia), Bangkok (Thailand), Ha Noi (Vietnam), and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) produced more than 60,000 tons of medical waste for 60 days collectively. (Fernandez, 2020) In comparison, for the Jakarta area alone, with a population of 10.6 million people, before the Covid-19 pandemic has produced 35 tons of medical waste per day. When the pandemic occurred, there was an additional 212 tons of medical waste per day, so it is estimated that within 60 days, the total medical waste in Jakarta could reach 12,720 tons (Fernandez, 2020).

City	Population (World Population Review)	Medical waste generated (tonnes per day before Covid-19)	Additional medical waste (tonnes per day)	Total possible production over 60 Days
Manila	14 million	47	280	16,800
Jakarta	10.6 million	35	212	12,720
Bangkok	10.5 million	35	210	12,600
Ha Noi	8 million	27	160	9,600
Kuala Lumpur	7.7 million	26	154	9,240
Total			1,016	60,960

Tab. 1. ADB Report on Medical Waste Management During the Covid-19 Pandemic in the Capitals of Southeast Asian Countries

Source: (Fernandez, 2020)

This research is a descriptive study that discusses the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the environment, especially regarding medical waste in Indonesia and the

Indonesian government's efforts in overcoming it. This research focuses on environmental diplomacy carried out by the Indonesian government to address medical waste in Indonesia, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. Environmental diplomacy is a variety of diplomatic actions in bilateral and multilateral forums between one country and another, directly or indirectly discussing the protection, use and management of the environment, land, water and atmosphere, and related ecosystems and the broad biosphere (Scoullou, M. and A. Roniotes, 2013, p. 13). In practice, environmental diplomacy aims to fight for a country's national interests and get generous support from other countries. Environmental diplomacy is diplomacy that combines ecological problems involving other countries and uses negotiation as a solution.

Based on research conducted by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (1998), environmental diplomacy has contributed to environmental improvements in countries worldwide. Environmental diplomacy can be defined as a combination of tools and approaches to help solve problems through cooperation, build trust, and resolve related conflicts on environmental issues and natural resources. Several literature studies also discuss environmental diplomacy as one of Indonesia's efforts to overcome environmental problems due to increasing public awareness regarding environmental issues (Kurniaty, 2020). Starting from environmental diplomacy, Indonesia's Government carries out bilateral and multilateral cooperation to address environmental problems in Indonesia.

The first part of this paper describes the problem of medical waste during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia. The next section describes the efforts to tackle Covid-19 medical waste that has been carried out by the central and regional governments. Then regarding international relations, the author discusses environmental diplomacy and international cooperation carried out by the Indonesian government to deal with medical waste.

II. The Problem of Medical Waste in Indonesia during the Covid-19 Pandemic

Before the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia had experienced problems with the imported plastic waste throughout 2019. Data recorded by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) of the Republic of Indonesia stated that 882 containers contained plastic scrap and paper scraps imported into Indonesia within the five months from April to August 2019 (ANTARA, 2019). Three hundred eighteen containers contained the remaining plastic material mixed with toxic and Dangerous (B3) waste materials, including medical waste. Some plastic waste mixed with B3 waste has been re-exported to Australia's country of origin by the Indonesian government (ANTARA, 2019). The problem of importing plastic waste has not been resolved until 2020, and Indonesia has been faced with a new problem related to the Covid-19 pandemic, namely medical waste.

Medical waste is the result of residue from a medical activity that can include infectious, pathological, chemical, pharmaceutical or radioactive waste. China, the first country to experience the Covid-19 outbreak, has experienced an increase in medical waste from 4,902.8 tons per day to 6,066 tons per day (Violetta, 2020). Indonesia has also experienced a growth in medical waste since the entry of the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020. Secretary-General of the Indonesian Environmental Scientist Association (IESA) Dr. Lina Tri Mugi Astuti, as reported by Antara news, stated that each Covid-19 patient could contribute 14.3 kg of medical waste per day (Violetta, 2020). Patients and medical personnel handling this pandemic also contributed to medical waste because the PPE used is all disposable, such as masks, gloves, clothes, including face shields. This increase in medical waste volume has occurred since March 2020 at RSPI Sulianti Saroso, a Covid-19 referral hospital. The hospital processed 2,750 kg of medical waste in January 2020, and in March, 4,500 kg of medical waste entered their incinerator (Violetta, 2020).

Data from the Ministry of Health in March 2020 stated that 2,820 hospitals and 9,884 Puskesmas in Indonesia produce up to 290 tons of medical waste every day (Aqil, A., Muh. Ibnu Aqil and Arya Dipa, 2020). There are ten licensed medical waste treatment plants in Indonesia with a combined total capacity of 170 ton of waste per day. Simultaneously, only 87 hospitals have incinerators to process waste on-site, with a combined daily capacity of up to 60 tons (Aqil, A., Muh. Ibnu Aqil and Arya Dipa, 2020). Medical waste processing facilities' daily capacity is not comparable to the medical waste generated every day, resulting in an accumulation of medical waste waiting to be processed.

In May 2020, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) stated that the volume of B3 waste (hazardous and toxic materials) from the Covid-19 pandemic increased by 30%. (Yulianto, Agus and Dedy Darmawan Nasution, 2020) As of 8 June 2020, Indonesia's medical waste reached more than 1,100 tons from 30 provinces in Indonesia (ANTARA, 2020). This figure was mentioned by the Minister of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia Siti Nurbaya, at the Work Meeting of Commission IV of the House of Representatives in Jakarta on 24 June 2020. The enormous medical waste came from Java, namely 478.18 tons, followed by Bali and Nusa Tenggara as much as 200.36 tonnes, Kalimantan 168.76 tons, Sumatra 147.62 tons, Sulawesi 94.89 tons, and Maluku Papua 18.73 tons (Majni, 2020).




Fig. 2. Amount of Medical Waste during the Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia

Source: (Majni, 2020)

The PPE used to handle the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia is local PPE and dominated by imported PPE. During January-May 2020, the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) recorded 2,993 tons of PPE imports, equivalent to US\$ 43.47 million (Thomas, 2020). The import of PPE, around 82%, was carried out during March-May, which is part of the program to accelerate the handling of Covid-19. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, in January-February, PPE imports only reached US\$ 7.66 million. In March, the Covid-19 pandemic started in Indonesia, the volume increased to US\$ 3.31 million, rising to US\$ 10.98 million in April and US\$ 21.52 million in May (Thomas, 2020). Most of these PPE imports came from China, namely US\$ 31.98 million, followed by Hong Kong with US\$ 5.42 million; Vietnam US\$ 1,46 million; South Korea US\$ 1.39 million; Japan, US\$ 679 thousand; and other countries amounting to US\$ 2.53 million. The Indonesian government also imported 62,817 tons of PPE raw materials for protective clothing until May 2020 (Thomas, 2020).




Fig. 4. Indonesia's PPE Import Volume, January-May 2020

Source: Thomas (2020)

Regarding the import of PPE, the Indonesian Textile Association (API) had expressed a protest to the government because domestic PPE was considered sufficient to meet domestic needs. However, because the PPE import tap opened, the domestic PPE experienced a surplus, so it was export abroad (Thomas, 2020). This means that most of the medical waste generated during the Covid-19 pandemic comes from imported PPE from China and other countries.

III. Handling Covid-19 Medical Waste in Indonesia

Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has issued circular containing regulations to manage Covid-19 medical waste. Circular Number: SE.02/PSLB3/PLB.3/3/2020 concerning Management of Infective Waste (B3) and Household Waste from Handling Corona Virus Disease signed by the Minister of Environment and Forestry on 24 March 2020 states that infectious medical waste is necessary managed as B3 waste at the same time to control and stop the transmission of Covid-19 (KLHK, 2020). Health care facilities must store infectious medical waste in closed containers for two days after being generated.

The medical waste must then be burned in an incinerator with a minimum temperature of 800 degrees Celsius. The remainder of the processing must be packed in a particular container, and then given the symbol "toxic," then handed over to the B3 waste manager (Violetta, 2020). For household waste that contains ODP (a person under monitoring) Covid-19, the family concerned must collect masks, gloves and protective clothing in a closed container and then dispose of them in a waste management facility. After wearing masks, healthy people have to cut the masks and pack them neatly before throwing them in the trash (Violetta, 2020).

Although the government has issued a regulation on medical waste management, the fact is that not all health care facilities have adequate incinerators to deal with infectious medical waste. Facilities for infectious medical waste management are only available in Riau Islands, Timor-Leste, Kalimantan, Banten, South Sulawesi, West Java, Central Java and East Java (Majni, 2020). Meanwhile, West Sumatra, Bengkulu, North Kalimantan, Gorontalo, North Maluku, Maluku, West Papua and Papua do not have B3 waste treatment facilities with operational permits (Majni, 2020).

Siti Nurbaya, Minister of Environment and Forestry, at the Work Meeting of Commission IV of the House of Representatives in Jakarta on 24 June 2020, said that the Director-General of Waste Management and Toxic and Hazardous Waste (PSLB3) asked to implement a systemized medical waste management guide and plan (ANTARA, 2020). Previously, the Director-General of Waste, Waste and B3 Management of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Rosa Vivien Ratnawati, had also stated that her party had made a quick response to handling the Covid-19 pandemic waste. He said he invited local governments to prepare facilities and infrastructure such as dropboxes and ensure medical waste from health care facilities adequately managed (Yulianto, Agus and Dedy Darmawan Nasution, 2020).

Sinta Saptarina Soemiarni (the Director for Performance Assessment of Hazardous and Non-B3 Waste Management,

Ministry of Environment and Forestry) also stated that the government would build 32 medical, hazardous waste disposal facilities in 2020-2024 with the Ministry of Environment's State Budget and Forestry. Those facilities will be handed over and managed by the respective local governments (KLHK, 2020). These areas include West Sumatra, Aceh, South Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) in 2020 (ANTARA, 2020). From 2021 to 2024, the government will develop medical waste management facilities in Jambi, West Papua, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Southeast Sulawesi, Papua, Maluku, South Sumatra and North Kalimantan (ANTARA, 2020). This facility's existence aims to support health facilities to focus on improving medical services for the community. The facility performance monitoring system is also a priority for monitoring the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Furthermore, local governments are expected to meet four requirements: availability of land according to spatial planning, the commitment of Regional Leaders, management units and environmental documents (KLHK, 2020).

The construction of medical waste processing facilities is still in the process, while the amount of medical waste increases every day. Therefore, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry also involved a cement factory dealing with Covid-19 medical waste (Rikin, 2020). Cement kilns can destroy medical waste, with temperatures reaching 1,000 degrees Celsius. Medical waste must be destroyed with a minimum temperature of 800 degrees Celsius to be safe for the environment.

In addition to efforts to tackle the Covid-19 medical waste problem by the central government, local governments are also trying to tackle medical waste by inviting Regional-Owned Enterprises (BUMD) to collaborate in processing medical waste. The West Java government has collaborated with PT Java Medinvest to anticipate an increase in Covid-19 medical waste. PT Java Medinvest is a subsidiary of Jasa Sarana BUMD, which focuses on medical waste management. This company is located in the Dawsan area,

Karawang Regency. According to Olivia Allan, Director of Services for PT Java Medivest, the company is capable of handling 24 tons of B3 waste per day (Prabawanti, 2020).

IV. Indonesian Environmental Diplomacy and International Cooperation on Handling Covid-19 Medical Waste

Apart from domestic efforts, the Indonesian government has also carried out environmental diplomacy to address environmental problems related to waste management. Environmental diplomacy has become an instrument of foreign policy that is increasingly central to Indonesian diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to oversee various environmental issues that directly intersect with Indonesia.

These issues are manifested in environmental diplomacy carried out by the Indonesian government both in international forums and in bilateral relations. In 2007, Indonesia was active in the UNFCCC, including hosting the 13th COP which gave birth to the Bali 17 Action Plan. Indonesia also signed a moratorium on forest conversion, implemented a REDD+ cooperation agreement with Norway and ratified the AATHP. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) is the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Air Pollution which was ratified by Indonesia in 2014. REDD+ (Reduction of Emission from Forest Degradation and Deforestation) is a mechanism for assistance and cooperation between countries and companies in developing various activities to reduce emissions globally. REDD+ is essential for Indonesia, considering Indonesia's vast forest ownership. (Sinaga, Obsatar, Yayan Mochamad Yani & Verdinand Robertua Siahaan, 2018, p. 30) The REDD+ Agreement between Indonesia and Norway has resulted in several programs such as law enforcement, fire management, and Green Village (Ningsih, 2019). In addition, there is another environmental diplomacy carried out by Indonesia during the last decade. However, not much of this environmental diplomacy

focuses on B3 waste management, including medical waste.

The Indonesian government carries out environmental diplomacy which includes a discussion of B3 waste management through its participation in the United Nations Environmental Assembly (UNEA) which is the highest decision-making mechanism in the environmental sector at the global level.

The UNEA meeting is held every two years to agree on various priorities for global environmental policy and become a reference for the development of international environmental law. UNEA-4 was held March 11-15, 2019, in Nairobi, Kenya, involving 4,700 delegates from 198 countries and dozens of observers from NGOs, UN agencies and other groups. The UNEA-4 meeting had the theme of "Innovative solutions for environmental challenges and sustainable consumption and production." It focused on three main points, namely: environmental challenges related to issues of poverty and natural resource management including sustainable food systems, food security and halting biodiversity loss; resource efficiency, energy, chemicals and waste management through life-cycle approaches; and innovative and sustainable business development following technological developments (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2019)

In the plenary session, Indonesia delivered a national statement that put forward two main things. First, the importance of international cooperation and Indonesia's commitment to continuously strive to advance development, without neglecting efforts to overcome environmental problems. Second, various breakthroughs in Indonesia, such as preserving mangrove, peat and coral reef ecosystems, set targets for reducing marine plastic waste, and declared an independent regional capacity center on marine protection from land-based activities in Bali and the International Tropical Peatlands Center (ITPC) at Bogor (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2019)

The Indonesian government's international collaboration with other countries related to medical waste processing was also carried out before the Covid-19

pandemic. At the multilateral level, Indonesia is one of the countries that have ratified the Basel Convention. The convention includes the Basel Ban Amendment, namely the preamble to the Basel Convention, which does not allow participating states to send B3 waste (including medical waste), both for final disposal and recycling purposes. Return to a country that does not have an environmentally friendly waste management capacity. However, the Basel Ban Amendment has not been enforced due to rejection from several countries such as Canada, Australia, Britain, and Germany. Many member countries still need ratification so that the amendments can take effect (Khairunnisa, 2017)

Indonesia's bilateral cooperation regarding medical waste has also been carried out with Japan. Bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and Japan was carried out in 2018. At that time, The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) held a meeting with the Japanese Ministry of Environment to discuss cooperation in improving Citarum river water quality, handling medical waste, managing mercury, and handling marine debris (Setiawan, 2018). The Indonesia-Japan cooperation was proposed because, at that time, Indonesian medical waste had accumulated. The amount of medical waste was estimated at around 300-340 tons per day from 2,781 hospitals. This buildup is caused by the limited number of medical waste processing services and the limited number of hospitals with licensed incinerators (Setiawan, 2018).

The scope of cooperation between the two countries regarding medical waste includes the transfer of knowledge in hospital policies that focus on medical services and do not produce medical waste. Another policy knowledge transfer that is also needed is the mechanism for treating medical waste from the hospital to a zone-based destruction service. Head of Public Relations Bureau, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Djati Witjaksono Hadi, stated that in addition to policy matters, Indonesia also hopes that Japan will help with methods and technology for managing non-incinerator medical waste.

Transfer of knowledge about local government and private sector involvement in non-assisted medical waste management activities (KLHK, 2018).

After the Covid-19 outbreak entered Indonesia, international cooperation to tackle the problem of medical waste continued. At the ASEAN regional level, on 13 July 2020, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and the Institute for Economic Research for ASEAN (ERIA) held a virtual meeting of the "Online Joint Dialogue on Waste Management in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic" to implement the General Assembly resolution. AIPA 40 on waste management in ASEAN countries to achieve sustainable development goals. During the meeting, Indonesia was represented by the Deputy Chair of the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation (BKSAP) of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Putu Supadma Rudana, and BKSAP Member Dyah Roro Esti. The meeting was also attended by legislators from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The legislators held a thorough discussion on urban waste management and increasing medical waste amid the COVID-19 pandemic (B.K.S.A.P., 2020).

The meeting opened up data showing that the call to stay at home has increased household plastic waste. This is due to the increasing shopping behavior of people who are shifting to online shopping. Besides, protective equipment for medical workers in hospitals and medical waste from COVID-19 patients also contributed to the increased medical waste volume (B.K.S.A.P., 2020).

The dialogue between the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN (ERIA) also discussed the most common problems faced by ASEAN countries in waste management, namely related to limit resources a financial and technological perspective. Dyah Roro Esti (Committee Member for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation) shared his observation. She said that all energy and efforts had been devoted to health and socio-economic issues amid the current COVID-19 pandemic. Environmental

problems such as waste production, particularly waste medical, received relatively little attention. Therefore, Commission VII DPR Indonesia members invited all the panelists to think of solutions to ensure informal workers' safety who make a living from collecting garbage because the increasing amount of medical waste will undoubtedly harm their health. AIPA and ERIA drafted a resolution due to the Joint Dialogue for submission to the 41st AIPA General Assembly, held September 8-10, 2020, in Hanoi, Vietnam (B.K.S.A.P., 2020).

The international cooperation carried out by the Indonesian government regarding medical waste, most importantly, in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO has supported the Ministry of Health to provide education about medical waste management in Indonesia during the COVID-19 pandemic. Throughout June and early July 2020, WHO, KLHK and the Ministry of Health have organized a series of web seminars to inform the latest policies and national protocols on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and medical waste management in health facilities. They also share about the use of safe incinerators and autoclaves to avoid transmission of COVID-19. The web seminar was attended by more than ten thousand participants from 34 provinces throughout Indonesia. WHO introduced the WASH for Facility Improvement Tools (WASH FIT) for use in facilities that are preparing for, or responding to, cases of COVID-19. WHO recommends using the WASH FIT to assess WASH in health facilities, make necessary improvements, and maintain quality WASH infrastructure services during this pandemic (WHO, 2020).

In the series of webinars, several challenges in waste management were highlighted by the Ministry of Health and were discussed by the participants, including the availability and use of waste processing facilities in health facilities. Although some hospitals have incinerators to dispose of the resulting medical waste, they do not have the necessary permits to operate them. Out of a total of 2,889 hospitals, only 82 have licensed incinerators in their area. Hospitals that do

not have their own incinerators contract with private health service waste management providers, 92% of which are located on the island of Java. The long-distance from the hospital to the final medical waste disposal site can increase the risk of illegal disposal, cross-contamination and disease transmission due to the increased likelihood of accidents or human error during the extended transport time (WHO, 2020).

In addition to increasing local capacity, WHO continues to support the Ministry of Health by providing information, education and communication (IEC) materials on waste management. WHO also helps the process of procuring four autoclaves. Furthermore, four incinerators to reduce the buildup of medical waste from COVID-19 health care activities (WHO, 2020).

V. Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic has a positive and negative impact on the country's environment globally, including Indonesia. The positive impact is in the form of improving air quality which is the result of the lockdown policy implemented by most countries in the world. Air quality improved as the government restricted the movement of people to minimal social and economic activities. On the other hand, the Covid-19 pandemic has also harmed increasing medical waste because preventing the transmission of this disease requires disposable PPE, such as masks, personal protective clothing, gloves and face shields. Most of the medical waste in Indonesia is the result of imported PPE carried out by the Indonesian government since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Indonesia has experienced a massive increase in medical waste, demanding the Indonesian government to handle Covid-19 medical waste during the pandemic. Countermeasures carried out by the Indonesian government are carried out internally and externally through environmental diplomacy. Indonesia carried out environmental diplomacy related to medical waste management before the

pandemic, one of which was through UNTEA in 2019. The Indonesian government has also held several international collaborations with Japan, ASEAN and WHO to address the problem of medical waste accumulation due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

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Research Articles

The Influences of Fashion as a Soft Power Towards France's Economic Growth

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Abstract

As time changes, there are various ways to achieve national interests. The focus to gain is no longer only on coercion through military force or economic threat but also could be reached through perspective, culture, or ideology or also known as soft power. France is widely recognized as one of the fashions and luxury country. Indeed, fashion is a part of France's social and cultural life. The industry of fashion is dominated in France. By this common knowledge, the author starts the research with aims to show the success of France by using fashion as an instrument of soft power and the contribution of the fashion industry towards the country's economy, specifically economic growth. The author provides an overview of the concepts of soft power and economic growth in this paper, and fashion as a culture in France. The author also includes data as reinforcement of this paper. Therefore, it is easier for readers to get information about soft power, economic growth, fashion, and the relations between those three.

Keywords: fashion, France, soft-power, economic growth

I. Introduction

According to the Oxford dictionary, Fashion is a popular style of clothes, accessories, hair, at a particular time or place. Fashion is defined as "the cultural constructions of the embodied identity" (Steele, 1997). That means it encompasses all forms of fashion, either it is elite fashion or everyday fashion, such as street style or self-fashioning. Fashion comes and goes, but fashion has always been relevant; it is an essential part of human life. There are fashions in furniture, automobiles, and other objects, as well as in clothing. However, more considerable attention is paid to sartorial fashion, probably because clothing has such an intimate relationship with the physical body, and by extensions, the personal identity of the individual. Fashion become one of the most critical things in the world (Steele, 2005). People have a different attitude towards fashion, but that is how people define themselves and others.

Fashion has a long history in France. Since the seventeenth century, Paris was the capital of Europe fashion and still known as a fashion capital country. The French original fashion icon, King Louis XIV, or "Sun King," had a particularly lavish taste from the way that he dressed (Goodman, 2012). King Louis XIV recognizes the importance of luxury goods to the national economy and brought numbers of artistic industries. For centuries to come, the highest quality fabric can be found in France (Bergin, 2018). The spread of democracy and the rise of industrialization in the nineteenth century made fashion became more and more popular. The high mass production and the top fashion brand (*haute couture*) had evolved in France. Indeed, the fashion industry is dominated by Paris. As mentioned by Arnold (2009), fashion is not merely about clothes, style, nor just a collection of images. It is a vibrant sort of visual and material culture that plays an essential role in social and cultural life. It is also a significant economic force, amongst some countries. Fashion is a part of social and cultural life in France and is essential to France's financial aspect.

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Fashion has become one of the sources of power for France's economy. Fashion and luxury goods are French areas of excellence and international success. It has become a strength for France to obtain economic profits and economic growth. Economic growth could be interpreted as a process of changing the country's economic condition within a specified period to better economic conditions. Economic growth is identical to the increase in production capacity, which is realized through an increase in national income. In international relations, the actors, especially the state, need the power that can be used to influence others for achieving their interests. There are two ways to gain power, which are hard power and soft power. Fashion as social and cultural life in France and a form of soft power helps in spreading the influence of France and even the impacts on France's economy. This paper discusses how fashion can be used as instrument of soft power to affect economic growth, in particular France's economic growth. In the case of France's fashion industry, soft power is seen from the economic point of view.

II. Theoretical Framework

a. The concepts of Soft Power

All forms of politics are about power. When it comes to the definition of power, it is vital to know and noted whose definition is referring to. Power is the ability to influence others to do what the other one wants. According to Nye (1990), power is the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals. Traditionally, war is the way to prove a great power. As time goes on, the digital revolution has emerged, the technology has evolved, and the sources of power have shifted. Technology helps to accelerate the diffusion of power.

Precisely, there are two characteristics of power through the changing character of power, which are Hard Power and Soft Power. Hard Power or hard "command" power is the ability to exercise

international influences utilizing a country's military or economic capabilities (by economic sanctions). In short, hard power is hard and coercive to make others do what the other one wants. In the other hand, Nye (2008) defined soft power as "co-optive" power, which means the power that occurs when a country gets other countries to want what it wants or rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others by attraction instead of coercion (Heywood, 2011). In short soft power is a power of attraction. Soft power has the ability to persuade others by being an attractive example through cultural attraction, ideology, or the changing of point of view.

The concept of Soft Power was introduced by Joseph Nye (1990), he explained that power at the time is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier years. Power is turning into less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible. Geography, population, and raw materials seem to become less important than technology, education, external respect and reputation, and economic growth. The great powers of today are less to use traditional power resources. Five trends contribute to the diffusion of power; economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues (Nye, 1990). Besides, military power is more difficult to apply today than in the past because a social awakening in poor and weak states has stirred the nationalism.

Furthermore, as said before, Nye J. S (2008) stated that the soft power concept consists of three components - culture, political values, and foreign policy. In the cultural aspects, Nye J. S (2008) explained that culture is the set of practices that create meaning for society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish the culture between high cultures such as literature, art, and education, which usually appeals to elites. The other one is the popular culture that focuses on mass entertainment. Soft power seems to get more attractive, and this image let such states as France, and other 'average' countries, concerning their territory

and population, have a strong economic and political influence.

Soft power has become imperative, it is the ability to entice and attract, and it is seduction. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. Nevertheless, what makes soft power more relevant today is that if a state can make its power legitimate of others, it will encounter less resistance to its interest. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow (Nye, 1990). The right place to influence soft power is public diplomacy, where the role of society is important.

Historically speaking, public diplomacy has contributed considerably in a means of promoting country's soft power as see that how essential soft power was in the era of Cold War. Nye (2008) continues explains that smart public diplomacy necessitates an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism and civil society in generating soft power. In short, public diplomacy is an instrument of soft power to promote national interests through understanding, informing, and influencing the public widely globally. The government often use public diplomacy as an instrument that mobilize the resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the foreign publics, rather than merely their governments. Public diplomacy tries to attract the attention to these potential resources of power (soft power) either through broadcasting, exports, and so forth. Nye (2008) continues explain, if these efforts of public diplomacy that brought the country's culture, values, and policies are not attractive, the public diplomacy cannot produce soft power. In the other hand, if its attractive, the public diplomacy indeed played a big role to share and influence the soft power. This relation is tied in one another.

b. The Concepts and Indicators of Economic Growth

Economic growth is one of the country's economic health indicators. Economic growth, according to the website of (The World Bank, t.thn.) is measured by the change in the volume of its output or the real expenditure

or income of its residents and during relatively short periods, usually a year. The indicators of economics would help to analyze the economic activity nationally and globally.

In the theory of economy, economic growth implies an annual increase in material production expressed in value, the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or national income. Gross Domestic Product is one of the most well-known and frequently tracked for economic growth by measuring the value or amount of goods and services produced by the nation for sale over a period of time. It does not matter whether it sold domestically or overseas. Hence, the increase in GDP means an increase in in-country production. As defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), GDP is also equal to the sum of private consumption expenditures, gross private domestic investment, net exports of products and services, and government consumption expenditures and gross investment. In short, GDP includes either private and public consumption, private and public investment, and more exports fewer imports.

According to Dynan & Sheiner (2018), as described in the Bureau of Economic Analysis, there are two approaches to measuring the GDP. The first one, named "expenditure approach," that measures GDP as the sum of consumption, investment, government spending, and net exports, which is the most familiar to many people. It includes estimates of pieces and their components. The other one is named "income approach" in which GDP could be measured by adding up all of the income earned through production, and the income side of the national accounts includes the various types of income that goes into GDP. This approach is also known as Gross Domestic Income (GDI). There is also a "value-added approach," which measuring GDP that involves taking the difference between total sales and the value of intermediate inputs or summing up the "value-added" at each stage of the production process.

According to Pietak (2014), the classical economist theory saw the determinants of economic growth through

investment and production capacity improvement. On the other hand, the neoclassical economics that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century identified three economic growth factors: land, capital, and labor. It is also supported by the neoclassical economic growth model developed by Robert Solow. He received the Nobel Prize in 1987 for the model and other contributions to the theory of economic growth. According to Solow (1956), the economic growth under the neoclassical conditions is produced by labor and capital. Economic growth will be achieved if there is output growth, which will occur if it produces by two inputs; labor and capital. These points were enough to explain the causes of economic growth in capitalist countries and the more the factors utilized to produce output, so does the higher economic growth. By this theory, economic growth is expected to increase society's income as the owners of production factors.

Other than that, when a country has the ability to produce more goods and services, then there will always an increase in the production of its quantity and quality. In short, economic growth is indicated by the rise in demand and production capacity. The amount of capital would be increased, and so does the laborers. Thus, one of the economic growth indicators could be seen through the increase in the labor force.

III. Fashion as France's Soft Power

Fashion is an art, and a part of France's social and cultural life also is a part of France's soft power. Arnold (2009) also mentioned that it raises important ethical and moral questions and connects to fine art and popular culture. From Marie Antoinette to today's high fashion (*haute couture*), France has long ruled fashion. The list of top fashion designers from France includes Chanel, Pierre Cardin, Céline, Chloé, Dior, Givenchy, Jean-Paul Gaultier, Hermès, Lanvin, Rochas, Louis Vuitton, Saint Laurent, and many more (Paris Digest, t.thn.). Historically, French fashion served as both soft power and cultural

branding. In the article by France24 mentioned that Haute Couture is indeed a key component of France's soft power, how its influencing global fashion and propagating a specifically Parisian *savoir-faire* (know-how) (France24, 2017). Bekhrad (2019) wrote in his article that previously, after the defeat of France in the hand of Germany in the Franco – Prussian War (1870-1871) and the Paris Commune (1871) when the power got briefly seized by the revolutionary socialist government, the French used *haute couture* as a means of soft power. So, if they no longer had a significant economic or political force, at least the French had their culture and clothes.

On the development of fashion, haute couture had evolved in France. *Haute* means high, elevated, high class, and *couture* means dressmaking or sewing or needlework, and haute couture means the most elevated highest level of fashion. It is an elite form of fashion, with garments fitted on to individual clients (Arnold, 2009). Couture is the category of fashion that is the most expensive, created with the highest quality craftsmanship and shows off the most avant-garde and fashion-forward styles, color combination, silhouettes, and ideas. Couture looks impressive and creates an impact from a distance and also offers something special and unique to the wearer or clothes. Still, even with more standard traditional beading the design, color combination, craftsmanship, mixture of texture must be elevated and supreme. Fantastical outlandish shapes and drapes are other couture hallmarks in general and, of course, the unique embellishment that is a combination of beads, silk flowers, and any fantastic stitch. In France, there is a trade association called the Federation De La Haute Couture et de la Mode, which means the federation of haute couture and fashion that contributes to bolstering Paris in its role as a global fashion capital (FHCM Teams, t.thn.).

Not only the haute couture but also the ready-to-wear fashion from France's high fashion designer also had massive success in fashion. It could be seen through the numbers of Christian Dior boutiques in Asia or the increasingly popular Louis Vuitton's status

handbags. The sentence “as empires fall, brands rise” sounds perfect to describe this. According to Adamson (2017) back in 2017, Abu Dhabi bought the rights to use the Paris museum’s famous name at a price tag of over \$500 million for three decades for the opening of Louvre Abu Dhabi, and it was one of the examples of how traditional French cultural diplomacy is being supplanted by brand politics.

Many less-known French fashion brands such as; Armor Lux, Tara Jarmon, Comptoir des Cotonniers, Sézane, and Cyrillus also turn Paris into one of the most creative fashion cities in the world. These brands keep maintaining the touch of France in mixing elegance and design. France, specifically Paris indeed, is home for the fashion industry and one of the largest textile industries in the world. Not forget to mention that Paris has worked with numerous couture design houses and manufacturing facilities. The creativity of French designers starting new trends that influence the fashion industry and fashion devotees.

The projection of French culture abroad thus became a significant component of French diplomacy and economy. Big brands are exporting their products, and their collection is the effort to promote France via its luxury. The large companies for high brands such as Yves Saint Laurent, Christian Dior, and Louis Vuitton have a near stranglehold on the luxury markets in every global region and jointly had sales of \$58 billion in 2016. The way people outside France or foreign citizens might recognize France now through brands is a good thing, proving how significant the influence of the brands is. When foreign citizens talk about France, they might mention a romantic, fashionable, and sophisticated city.

With that being said, fashion as a soft power has a direct impact on the field of economy. According to the analysis of leadership brands by Simon Anholt, national brands index provided by Eurostat showed that an increase in economy and foreign investment depends on the strength of the country's brand. On the other hand, through the research by Rose (2015), the measure of

soft power shows that a country sells more exports to other countries, which perceive it as a reasonable force, holding other factors constant. The high numbers of exports could be viewed as the behavior admired by others, which are the purpose of soft power.

The influence of fashion can constitute a form of soft power. Everyone likes to look pretty, elegant, and fabulous, loved to see beautiful and classy stuff such as a chic bag, pretty shoes, elegant dress, nice suit, and everyone interested because it is something wearable. How soft power works in fashion is through cultural influence. Through soft power and its cultural branding, the emergence of haute couture, and the assiduous promotion of French fashion on behalf of France, Paris indeed have a reputation of seemingly undeniable chicness (Bekhrad, 2019). The connection between fashion and soft power will, therefore, remain intrinsic and enduring.

IV. The Contributions of Fashion on France’s Economic Growth

As explained earlier, this section will discuss further how economic growth in France and how the fashion industry contributes to France's economy. According to the report and website by Focus Economic, France’s economy is the fifth-largest in the world and represents around one-fifth of the Euro area gross domestic product (GDP). In the manufacturing section, France is known as one of the global leaders in the automotive, railway sectors, and cosmetics and luxury goods. Besides, France also has a highly educated labor force and the highest number of science graduates per thousand workers in Europe (Focus Economics, 2018; Focus Economics, 2019).

At first, French fashion focus revolved on women’s wear from the idea of *la Parisienne*-the ideal Parisian woman, stylish, culture, and discerning (Bekhrad, 2019). The big branded name, such as Louis Vuitton, Chanel, Christian Dior, Yves Saint Laurent, Balenciaga, Hermes, and many other lists of France’s fashion designers, is impactful. Society plays a

significant role in influencing public opinion. Bought it and then used the product is proof that people acknowledge France’s superiority. France influences others with its capability in production, and the store will be expanding through other countries.

As mentioned in Deloitte’s Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2018 report, France’s top luxury fashion brand names LVMH, L’Oréal, Kering, and Hermès account for nearly one-quarter of the total sales of the industry’s top 100 corporations (AFP-Relaxnews, 2018). Furthermore, The LVMH Group itself (and its 70 brands), topped the revenue-based ranking. Moreover, nine of the corporations featured in the ranking are French-owned and generated 24.3% of the ranking’s aggregate revenue. In addition, this figure below shows the forecasted revenue development of the fashion luxury goods market for each year (in million US\$).




Fig. 1. Revenue in the Fashion Luxury Goods market in France for each year.

Source: Statista (2020)

Besides the data above, a research study from Institut Français de la Mode (IFM) about the fashion industry’s contribution to the economy of France shows back in 2016 that France’s fashion generates more sales than its aerospace and automobile industries. The annual sales generated by the fashion industry in France totaled €150 billion (\$170 billion), compared with €102 billion for aerospace and €39 billion for cars. Furthermore, this figure 2 below shows the data of the sectors that generate more added value. The fashion industry contributes €37,5

billion of added value, representing 1,7% of the French GDP.




Fig. 2. The sales by the sector in France

Source: Institut Français de la Mode) (2016)

According to the research by Institut Français de la Mode (IFM), which was released in 2016, there were more than 300 annual numbers of fashion shows in Paris. These shows have total revenues of 1,2 billion euros, the amount of yearly economic benefits coming from fashion week in Paris. The table below shows the distribution of France’s fashion industry worth 150 billion euro on the direct turnover to the economy and has made 1 million jobs in the fashion industry.




Fig. 3. The Evolution Worth of Direct Turnover (in billion euro) and employment in 2015 and 2016.

Source: Institut Français de la Mode (2016)




Fig. 4. Share in Direct Turnover (in percentage) by Fashion Industry in France
Source: Institute Français de la Mode (2016)

Figure 5 shows the export growth rate. Furthermore, according to the report analysis by IFM, the increased exports sale achieved 35, 7 billion euro. Meanwhile, 80 % of the top 50 French businesses export the export rate in the fashion industry sector. As explained before in the previous section, Gross Domestic Products' growth includes the numbers of exports.




Fig. 5. The Export Growth Rate
Source: Institute Français de la Mode (2016)

According to the report by Institut Français de la Mode (IFM), on its indirect effects, fashion injects 21.2 billion euro of value-added in other sectors of activities. These include services and support for companies, transport and logistics, chemical industry, real estate, legal, accounting activities, architecture, and other sectors, and it is equivalent to 277.000 jobs.

Also, the effects induced by the distribution of income to employees in the fashion sector could be seen by the share of value-added produced in the branches of activity, such as; real estate activities, housing, and food services, beverages and tobacco, financial operations and insurance, health care, and other expenses—also, more

than 10.2 billion euros in additional value-added for the French economy. To understand better, this figure below would explain the economic estimating for fashion.




Fig. 6. Estimating the economic weight of fashion
Source: Institute Français de la Mode (2016)

The fashion industry is a significant contributor to France’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment numbers. Based on the explanation above, the total contribution of the Fashion industry in France could be seen in figures 6, the value added by direct effects contributed 37.5 billion euros with 670.000 jobs, induced effects did 115.000 jobs, and 10.2 billion euros. The total is 68.9 billion dollars equals 3.1 % of GDP, and about 1 million jobs from the fashion industry.




Fig. 7. The Total Contributions of Fashion
Source: Institute Français de la Mode (2016)

V. Conclusion

There are various ways to gain more power through soft power, for example. Soft power becomes relatable now, driving global change and pursuing national interests and

slowly taken place the forces and circumstances that are shaping international relations. Fashion, as a part of France's social and cultural life, has always been a part of France's soft power. Fashion has become one of the instruments of soft power through culture for France to spread their influence on around the globe by its products on fashion and luxury brands. The power that France had in the fashion industry is massive. Almost everyone knows the high-end luxury brand that France's had such as Chanel, Dior, Louis Vuitton, and many more as an example that has been mentioned in this paper. The target is the society through public diplomacy. Everyone who brought and used the products, acknowledge France's superiority in fashion. France's and the brand also expand their markets by branching out to other countries, as can be seen in the proliferation of luxury brand boutiques in Asia. Louis Vuitton's handbag that could be seen almost everywhere, Balenciaga's shoes, and many more. It is also beneficial for France's economy. Fashion in France is a significant contributor to GDP and the numbers of employment. France has its power by fame, name, and exposure, which will influence the increase of economic income and GDP. As explained before, fashion has contributed quite a lot to France's economy. When it comes to Fashion, people are thinking about France. Paris, specifically, still reigns internationally as a fashion metropolis for a variety of reasons. It is a home for some of the world's most prominent fashion conglomerates and dream country for the fashion enthusiast.

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Research Article

The Puzzle of ASEAN Instruments to Combat Human Trafficking

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Abstract

Human trafficking came to the public concern in the 1990s, caused by the movement of people and the operation of organized crime. As the problem grew more complex, collaboration was needed to enhance effective mechanisms to combat human trafficking. However, ASEAN Countries, after more than two decades in fighting against human trafficking issue, efforts in prevention and protection found limited results due to the fluctuating number of trafficked victims in the region. This paper aims to examine the mechanisms and the development of instruments to enhance the efforts in tackling human trafficking problems of ASEAN by employing the descriptive approach of policy analysis, focusing specifically on regional practices and policy development. Data were mainly collected English-based documents; it can be concluded that collaboration among ASEAN countries has been initiated various types of regional instruments. However, the success of practices following the existing regional framework remains murky.

Keywords: Human Trafficking, Regional framework, ASEAN, Trafficking in Persons

I. Introduction

Human trafficking, which is considered to be modern-day slavery, is one of the most

pressing global issues - the exploitation and victimization of human beings. In addition, actions against the illicit trade in human beings is a shared responsibility. It is a challenge that needs the global community, regional communities, and local communities to work together to take concrete actions with a commitment towards making substantive changes.

Human trafficking was only recognized as a crime in 2000, at which time the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was assigned to tackle all related organized criminal activities. The Trafficking in Persons Protocol was initiated as an instrument of global guidelines in preventing the causes and protecting the victims. However, after two decades, the dilemma of human trafficking remains unresolved due to ineffective data collection on the problems and management issues that each country has adopted and implemented in their national legislation at dissimilar levels (United States Department of State, 2019, p. 4).

In response to the crucial impact of human trafficking, the U.S. State Department has passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) on October 28, 2000. Likewise, guidelines were also initiated by the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), namely the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (A/55/383) (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2020) which also known as the Palermo Protocol, that went into effect on December 14, 2000. These two international instruments have been widely adopted as mechanisms for many countries facing human trafficking issues.

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While international instruments have been installed and evaluated, the results in lessening the number of victims remain unremarkable. According to data from the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018 that reported to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on the trend in number of trafficking victims detected by each region from 2007-2016, revealed a fluctuating numbers of victims from South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific, especially in the years 2011-2016 (UNODC, 2018). Additionally, statistics on women and children from South-East Asia who are considered trafficked victims resulted in one-third of the global trafficking trade (Derks, 2000).

Human trafficking has been recognized in the ASEAN transnational agenda since the 1990s. Even with various regulations implemented by human rights organizations, it can be seen that ASEAN has failed to bring about success in the implementation process, especially that of the monitoring system (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Recently, ASEAN by the newly mechanism, namely the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) has released the "Regional Review on Laws, Policies and Practice within ASEAN relating to the Identification, Management and Treatment of Victims of Trafficking, especially Women and Children", for the purpose of understanding the current situation of ASEAN Member State's regulations with contribute to the implementation of the latest regional regulation as the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP). However, this regional review mentioned that the common challenges among AMS mainly concern the prevention of trafficking and victim identification (ASEAN, 2016).

The development of regional frameworks to fight against human trafficking through the ASEAN mechanisms cannot be

claimed as a success due to the fluctuating number of trafficked persons. Additionally, government efforts among AMS to eliminate the trafficking of people under an international framework - The Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), has evaluated the efforts to solve the problems by AMS governments across various levels of practices. This paper aims to examine the instruments for combating human trafficking at both international and regional levels in an attempt to understand the status of practices and their challenges.

From previously mentioned, by looking at and evaluating the severity of the situation in combating human trafficking in South-East Asia, this paper attempts to examine the regional instruments through the ASEAN mechanism, with the aim to answer the question of why ASEAN's regulatory framework met limited results in combating human trafficking. Development progression of the ASEAN framework to combat human trafficking through its practices was tracing the emergence and implementation of its policies which drawing upon the descriptive approach that mainly focuses on the policy content (Hill & Varone, 2016), including the application of the international framework within the ASEAN context.

II. In Search of Instruments Combating Human Trafficking: International and Regional Regulatory Frameworks

Globally, human trafficking was recognized as a crime in 2000. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was assigned to tackle all related organized criminal activities, with the Trafficking in Persons Protocol initiated as a global guideline in preventing the causes and protecting the victims of human trafficking. However, after two decades, the instances of human trafficking remain unresolved due to ineffective data collection

and management issues that each country has adopted and implemented at their national legislation at dissimilar levels (United States Department of State, 2019, p. 4).

The UNODC (2018) categorized the forms of trafficking exploitation into three groups, which are: for sexual exploitation, for forced labor, and for organ removal and other purposes. Data from 2016 revealed that 59% of the people trafficked were victims of sexual exploitation, followed by 34% for forced labor, and 7% for organ removal and other purposes.

In an attempt to eliminate human trafficking, the UNODC released an international strategy in the year 2000 entitled, the "United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organization Crime, UNCTOC." In addition, the resolutions also covered supplementary protocols - the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air, and Sea (UNODC, n.d).

To encourage the global community to act in accordance with the UNCTOC, Human Trafficking Tier Placement was introduced. The results of tier placement are published in the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), which has been released annually since 2000. Tier placement criteria is mandated by the Trafficking Victims Protections Act (TVPA) and the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Palermo Protocol), utilizing a four-paradigm approach towards fighting against human trafficking known as the 4Ps - Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnerships, as the complementary means to accomplish the previous 3Ps (US Department of State, n.d).

Tier placement is based on a government's efforts to eliminate trafficking according to the TVPA's minimum standards. Tier 1, the top tier, indicates that a government fully complies with the TVPA minimum standards. Tier 2 denotes a government that it

is making efforts to eliminate trafficking but does not fully achieve the TVPA minimum standards. The Tier 2 Watch List reflects the government's efforts while recognizing that it is failing in other indicators. Tier 3, the lowest rank, means that the country's government is not showing any significant efforts to conform to the TVPA minimum standards (US Department of State, 2001). The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) was established in 2001 as a specific unit to support the global community to the missions related to human trafficking issues.

According to evaluation by the TIP Office as presented in the "2020 Trafficking in Persons Report" concerning government efforts regarding Prosecution, Protection and Prevention, ASEAN countries were ranked across all four tiers. The Philippines and Singapore topped the list in Tier 1, while Indonesia, Laos, and Thailand ranked in Tier 2. Among ASEAN countries, the Tier 2 Watch List consisted of Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, while Burma was placed in Tier 3 (US Department of States, 2020). The difference of accomplishment levels among ASEAN countries is worth examining by focusing closely on the regional frameworks in order to improve the capability of each member state and strengthen the collaboration of the ASEAN Community in fighting against transnational crime.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967, by the founding fathers of ten ASEAN countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, The Republic of Singapore, The Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. ASEAN Member States (AMS) adopted their fundamental principles in the

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976, establishing the non-interference of internal affairs, along with effective cooperation in peaceful manner. ASEAN policies, plans, strategies, and activities revolve around the notions of prosperity and peace. The ASEAN Community is composed of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APS), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASC) (ASEAN, n.d).

ASEAN instruments relating to the trafficking in persons has relied on a human rights approach and is committed to the international instruments of UNCTOC, the Palermo Protocol, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the UN Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons. While regional frameworks have covered the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children, Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons (ASEAN Practitioner Guidelines), and the ASEAN Leader's Joint Statement in Enhancing Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons in South East Asia. ASEAN Action plans that have also been launched include the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), which was signed in the 27th ASEAN Summit at Kuala Lumpur on 21 November 2015 (ASEAN, 2015).

ACTIP is a specific action plan that consolidates domestic laws and policies with the international framework against Trafficking in Persons in order to introduce better guidelines for effectively addressing the problems in this region. ASEAN Member States are obliged to respect the mission of prevention, protection, and prosecution, with regional and international cooperation and coordination. In addition, ACTIP requires

stronger obligations than UNC and the TIP protocol (Yusran, 2017).

To trace the progress of actions taken, ACWC published the "Regional Review on Laws, Policies, and Practices within ASEAN relating to the Identification, Management, and Treatment of Victims of Trafficking, especially Women and Children," in 2016. Similar to the TIP Report, this regional review focuses on the current stage of contributions followed by ACTIP. The Regional Review contains the international and regional instruments, situations, and context of AMS and the policy considerations across eight key thematic areas. Good Practice and Common challenges in accordance with laws, policies, and practices in the ASEAN Region are also addressed in the Regional Review. The assessments contribute to the regional picture and are not solely the efforts of each AMS.

As mentioned above, regional frameworks as seen through the ASEAN mechanism offer various guidelines to combat human trafficking with a prompt response to the international instruments. Regional instruments are initiated under a human rights approach. Even with legislation enacted and action plans provided, assessment as a way to reduce the gap between policy and actual practice still requires more attention.

III. Problems and Challenges of the ASEAN Framework in Combating human Trafficking

The ASEAN framework for fighting against human trafficking has been widely studied. With two decades of regional mechanisms relevant to these issues, the majority of the research findings highlighted the limitations of the ASEAN framework to effectively combat trafficking issues. Kranrattanasuit (2014) discussed the limitations of the two human rights bodies, the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on

Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Those limitations include inadequately countering human trafficking as well as providing the human rights bodies with sufficient powers for enforcement. Mok (2020) also highlighted the restrictions of ASEAN on eliminating transnational crime, in both its mechanism and resolution through the ASEAN way (Mok, 2020). Furthermore, the ASEAN's non-interference policy is considered an obstacle to progress in developing effective resolutions at a more rapid pace (Yazid & Septiyana, 2009; Yusran, 2017). Another explanation for their gradual development was proposed by Howe and Park (2017), who suggested that the ASEAN organization as a loosely structured intergovernmental association, with member-driven status, lends itself to the slower adoption of new principles and actions (Howe & Park, 2017).

There is a shared commitment towards preventing human trafficking and protecting its victims. The common challenges to this mission among ASEAN Member States addressed in the ACTIP are: 1) Decreasing the factors making people vulnerable to trafficking; 2) Creating appropriate legislative bodies; 3) Improve the capacity of border control officers; 4) Effectively identifying victims; 5) Increasing the prosecution of perpetrators; 6) Enhancing communication and coordination between AMS authorities; and 7) Enlisting regional legal mechanisms to combat human trafficking. This ASEAN Action Plan also includes an implementation mechanism to ensure its success by attempting to coordinate the programs and activities relating to this action plan with those of the AMS's national plan. The Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) Working Group appointed a supervisory unit

on implementation of this ASEAN Plan of Action (ASEAN, 2015).

Human trafficking cases in ASEAN countries are the result of numerous influences, with the one common key factor related to the connection between the brokers and the victims, as pointed out in a case of labor trafficking in Thailand (Srivatananukulkit & Smerchuar, 2011, p. 76). The 2020 TIP Report also highlighted labor trafficking as the top priority, due to the rapid increase of identified victims, up from 291 in 2018 to 7,687 in 2020 (US Department of States, 2020, p. 57).

In response to migration issues that directly involve trafficked persons, ASEAN has initiated guidelines for combating human trafficking in the fisheries and seafood sectors. The Southeast Asian Forum to End Trafficking in Persons and Forced Labor in Fisheries was conducted in 2019, with aims to promote fair recruiting information, data sharing, and consistent labor standards, while simultaneously enhancing coordination and supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of national and regional level anti-trafficking efforts (ILO, 2020). Additionally, raising awareness of the importance of migrant workers' rights should be addressed at the national government level, aligning with the governance of the ASEAN countries (Sangsuwan, 2015).

A lack of institutional capacity for rights advocacy among ASEAN members is considered to be an impediment to the progress to commit in ASEAN agreements to support migrant workers' rights in Southeast Asia (Bal & Gerard, 2018). Recently, the results from the 12th ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labor revealed that ASEAN member states agreed to suggest a concrete measure to facilitate a protection platform along with the employability of migrant workers (ASEAN, 2019). Continuity in forming a mutual understanding in ASEAN member states on this issue and tangible cooperation at the regional

level is still needed to combat the transnational crime of human trafficking.

An executive level meeting, held on 27 September 2017, sought to create a global plan of action to tackle human trafficking. Miroslav Lajcak, the President of the UN General Assembly, raised three main points aimed at the protection of human rights and dignity, which were: 1) Adopting a victim and survivor centered approach; 2) Strengthening prevention efforts and addressing root causes; and 3) Paying more attention to specific groups vulnerable to human trafficking, including displaced persons and refugees, particularly women and children (United Nations, 2017). In order to prevent trafficking throughout ASEAN countries, corruption among officials remains one of the most significant issues that must be addressed, in particular activities related to undocumented migrant workers and the downgrading of human trafficking charges (ASEAN, 2016).

ASEAN has initiated an abundant regulation framework in response to the rapid increase in human trafficking. The ASEAN instruments cover every aspect in fighting against human trafficking, with practical guidelines delivered to support the ASEAN Member States in accomplishing the global mission. Public awareness has been in place using prominent regional instruments, however monitoring and assessing activities are limited. Furthermore, the root causes of human trafficking profiles of ASEAN countries should be examined. Identifying the right problems will contribute to the resolution through collaboration mechanism, especially among countries that share national borders.

IV. Conclusion

ASEAN is known as both a human trafficking area of origin and a destination. Since 1990, a regional framework to fight against the trafficking in persons has been

gradually and continually developed using a human rights approach. Regional frameworks have been designed in accordance with international frameworks, most of which have been developed by the United Nations Organization. However, efforts to solve problems in each ASEAN country seem to have met with only limited success, as can be seen in the variation of tier placement of the TIP Report 2020. To improve the level of practice, leaning activity among AMS from the success stories of the countries that placed in a Tier placement system as Tier 1 should be initiated.

In summary, instruments at the regional level in ASEAN are limited in their ability to combat human trafficking. Due to the complexity of trafficking issues, the challenges of the ASEAN framework appear in regulations separating human trafficking from migration. In addition, ASEAN governance faces limitations of compliance due to its organization and non-interference principle.

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Book Reviews

***Imagining the Global: Transnational Media and Popular Culture Beyond East and West* by Fabienne Darling-Wolf. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018, vii + 192 pp, ISBN 978-0-472-12079-6 (e-book).**

While globalization allows interconnectedness, this book argues that “the global” itself is an imagination, either set by producers of cultural media products or created by consumers themselves. While discussions on globalization are usually centered on the relationship between the West and the Rest, the author offers a transnational approach on the triadization of the United States, France, and Japan – three most powerful global cultural producers – and the dynamics of cultural texts connecting them.

The book is divided based on case studies of globalized cultural products and their global/national/local negotiation. The first chapter, “Un-American Idols: How the global/national/local intersect,” talks about reality tv programs that allow national/local broadcasting media organizations to put some local twists to their episodes while maintaining their respective global format. This hybridity is further discussed through the example of Star Academy, a singing competition aired from 2001-2008 in France. Through stage and narrative productions, Star Academy tried to showcase the influence of French culture in “the global” to its domestic audience. The show was later selectively marketed to and adopted by about fifty cultural environments, mostly francophone, but this chapter does not include the presentation/adaptation of Star Academy in any of those environments.

The second one is about how international news has been used to create an overall discourse that “our country is better than them,” hence being titled “Holier-than-

thou: Representing the “Other” and vindicating ourselves in international news.” The focus is on three events, the Hurricane Katrina in the U.S., the 2005 civil unrest in France, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, as covered by The New York Times, Le Monde, and Yomiuri Shimbun. These three media organizations, writes Darling-Wolf, zoom in their respective domestic event to stories on individual stories or community initiatives, but portray the other two’s as their national system failure, which the press seemed to fail to identify “at home.”

In the third chapter, “Talking about *non-no*: (Re)fashioning race and gender in global magazines,” Darling-Wolf turns to Japan to investigate the negotiation between global dynamics of race and gender with a local context through the hybridity in Japanese fashion magazine targeting female readers, *non-no*. Through interviews with female Japanese, this chapter sought to understand why foreign faces, especially white female models, seem to fit into the hybrid mix of Japanese popular culture. It is also noted that the *non-no* is less fluid compared to *Men’s non-no* regarding the construction of race and gender, as the latter often use the imagery of androgynous models (including J-Pop idols) on its spreads. This portrayal of gender and race, says the author, was a part of the process of imagining “the global” in Japan and the possible consequences of such imagination on the female readers’ daily lives, *e.g.*, fashion choices or beauty standard.

Next, the book applies the transnational/translocal approach in examining hip-hop as global phenomenon as well as topic of scholarly debates. In the “Disjuncture and difference from the *banlieue* to the *ganba*: Embracing hip-hop as a global genre” chapter, hip-hop is understood as a cultural movement representing subaltern voices. The scholarly debates tend to only see hip-hop as African/Latin American, which this

book perceives problematic in discussions to comprehend hip-hop as a global genre, knowing that it has strong bases in France (in the form of French rap) and Japan (known as J-hip-hop). Through studying the lyrics of French rap songs and conversing with J-hip-hoppers, this chapter provides an insight into the non-U.S. hip-hoppers' imagination of being part of the global movement while bringing the local concerns into the mix. How the J-hip-hop portrays the global-local mix through its lyrics is yet to know.

The last cultural product discussed here is Japanese anime (animation) and manga (comic books), in the chapter titled as "What West is it? Anime and manga according to *Candy* and *Goldorak*." Anime and manga are frequently positioned as the representatives of Japanese culture, despite some of the text are not about Japan. For instance, *Candy* (original title: *Candy Candy*) is about an American girl, while *Goldorak* (original title: UFO Robot Grendizer) is about robots, which indicate how West is imagined and likely romanticized in mangas and animes. It is also identified that manga was not initially placed as part of the U.S. consumers' imagination of the global – owing it to the segmented marketing. This is different from French consumers who regularly watched animes on television growing up and attributed their cultural identity to these shows, *i.e.*, Goldorak generation is often used to refer to those grew up in late 1970s and early 1980s.

Later in this book, Darling-Wolf proposes a new term: glocamalgamation (most likely a combination of globalization, localization, and amalgamation) to understand the imagination of the global in different localities by blurring the boundaries of cultural representation. Whether the term will take off or not, it cannot be denied that this book has offered a rather fresh academical approach, *i.e.*, transnational/translocal, to discussions about cultural production and consumption

and their global/national/local intersection, despite how it may also complicate the imagination of "the global", "U.S. as the West", and challenge the long-standing binary of "the West and the East/rest."

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Book Reviews

***Pemikiran Politik Hukum Negara.* By Nur Rohim, Ida Susilowati, Muhammad Sholeh. POSKOLEGNAS collaboration with Faculty of Syariah and Law UIN Jakarta, 2018.**

Politic and law science are allied and complementary types of science. At least when you want to analyze a policy portrait issued by an elite policy maker must master that two sciences. The book entitled "Political Thought of Law State" written by Nur Rohim Yunus, Ida Susilowati, and Muhammad Sholeh seeks to explore various problems of contemporary issues that have occurred in the international community by using the lens of law political perspective.

This book is interesting to be enjoyed like, to borrow Hernowo's analogy, like eating a delicious slice of Pizza, for 2 reasons. The first reason, the author dare to raise and discuss sensitive contemporary issues. For example, the issue of terrorism and radicalism, the issue of identity politics in the Grand Reunion 212, the issue of maritime affairs. The second reason, for IR academics, this book is suitable as a reference if you want to understand issues related to Islam and Indonesia. Or IR audience who are taking subject of "Global Issues" and "Indonesian Politic and Government". Therefore, the author present a variety of relevant issues discussed in the class.

The authors review 6 issues in each chapter. All issues are discussed in a structured and systematic manner. In the first chapter, the writer makes a unique argument. It turns out that America did not have strong evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which so far have been used as basis of legitimacy of the American government to attack Iraq. The author tries sensitize the readers who have been treated to barrage of new about the WTC and Pentagon building

attacked by terrorists and Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

The second chapter, the authors describe the analysis of cultural issues of the practice of money politics in society. Eventhough the government made election regulations regarding the practice of money politics. Money politics is a form of violation that harms democratic value. The public is blinded by bribes. Who is able to give money then he will be chosen. Not the vision and mission are the main considerations. So whoever is chosen, the state is the same. There were no significant changes. Once the flow of thought if people choose apathy.

Next, in the third chapter, the writer lays out a theoretical explanation of political participation. The third chapter makes the issue of money politics practices carried out by the community as political participants that have been described in the second chapter to be more complete. The second chapter explains case studies. While the third chapter discusses theory. Complete the discussion on sensitive issues on the Indonesian Election stage. Good democracy must be supported by good political participants. A good political participant will influence good governance policies.

In the fourth chapter, the issue of identity politics in the Grand Reunion 212 is interestingly reviewed. Because, the author tries to explain the actual phenomenon of the emergence of 212 non-static action movements. The movement was active in being able to play a role in Indonesian politics which was considered less than optimal in applying the rule of law in the community. The author uses the Pancasila Democracy to be the main foundation in assessing the actions of the Great Reunion 212. Continues in the fifth chapter. The issue that was raised encompasses the problem of strengthening maritime sovereignty in the agenda "Indonesia as a Global Maritime Fulcrum"

which was promoted by president Joko Widodo in 2014. Indonesia as a maritime country wants to focus on development in the sea area.

Furthermore, in the last chapter, the issues of conflict resolution using the legality of Sharian law in Aceh becomes the closing issue of this book. The government was trying to reduce the conflict in Aceh in various ways. Aceh conflict events can be used as example in carrying out conflict resolution. That the use of the communicative dialogue methode between the two parties can be the best choice in solving domestic problems. Ending conflict without injury.

And then, the background of the writer coming from the santri circles is the capital of intellectual legitimacy to display Islamic world view in all his articles. Because this view will add the wealth of perspective in the realm of social science. Borrowing the term constructivist, worldview can shape the world. Religion s a view of life and view of life has a role in shaping the world. The authors of this book should be able to predict empty space in the social science treasures that are devoid of social analysis using Islamic world view.

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