RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Failures of the United Nations Security Council's Resolutions in Addressing the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Case Study of Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015

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Abstract
This study aims to analyze the failure of Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015, issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to address the conflict between Russia and Ukraine during 2014-2015. This research falls within the realm of qualitative research, utilizing a descriptive-analytical method and data collection through a literature review including books, journals, official documents, and relevant research. Johan Galtung's Conflict Transformation theory supports the research to analyze the failure of this resolution from the perspective of its inability to transform the conflict from internal to multi-dimension based on the variable of conflict transformation. The findings indicate that the resolution failed to build peace of the Russia-Ukraine conflict due to the non-implementation of the resolution's points. The UNSC should prepare legal enforcement measures through the UN General Assembly to restrict Russia's decision-making concerning the Ukrainian crisis.

Keywords: conflict resolution, conflict transformation, United Nations Security Council, Russia, Ukraine

I. Introduction

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine stems from an unstable political situation, where the Ukrainian population was divided into pro-Russia and pro-Europe factions. This conflict was also influenced by the clash of interests between Russia and Ukraine, particularly following the ousting of President Yanukovych. The situation was further exacerbated by Russia's military intervention as the Putin's military doctrine towards the situation.

During Yanukovych's presidency of Ukraine (2010-2014), tensions between Russia and Ukraine grew as Yanukovych fostered close relations with the European Union and signed an association agreement aimed at establishing political ties aligned with European values and principles. This threatened Russia's national security, leading Russia to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine by cutting off energy supplies and blocking Ukrainian imports, which plunged Ukraine's economy into crisis (Febriansyah, 2019). As a result, Yanukovych decided to cancel the agreement between Ukraine and the European Union in November 2013 and accepted a debt loan from Russia amounting to 198 trillion rupiah.

This decision led to protests from the people of Western Ukraine, who preferred that Ukraine establish cooperation with the

European Union. Consequently, demonstrations against Yanukovych's decision, known as the Euromaidan events, erupted, leading to internal unrest between Ukrainian police and protesters.

One of Ukraine's internal crises was the Crimea Referendum held on March 16, 2014, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol after Russian forces occupied Crimea. The referendum asked the people of Crimea whether they wished to rejoin Russia or remain part of Ukraine. The result of the referendum showed that the people of Crimea and Sevastopol wanted to join Russia (Kamasa and Fransisca, 2017). Ukraine could not accept the referendum as it violated the Ukrainian constitution, leading to a new phase of conflict between the two countries. The pro-Russian protesters eventually took control of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and established the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). This exacerbated Ukraine's internal conflict. The crisis in Ukraine was one of the reasons Russia had to change its military policy after the signing of the 2014 Military Doctrine and implemented the doctrine as of April 21st, 2014 (Febriansyah, 2019).

The crisis was further exacerbated following the election of Petro Poroshenko as President of Ukraine in the March 25, 2014, general elections. Poroshenko expressed his support for Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union, marked by the signing of an association agreement on economic cooperation on June 27, 2014, followed by the ratification of political and economic agreements with the EU on September 16,

2014 (Huachen Fu, 2022). As a result of this decision, the Ukraine crisis expanded further and drew responses from the international community.

To address the conflict, the UNSC issued Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015, which called on the parties involved to fully implement the 'Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements', including a comprehensive ceasefire as outlined in the resolution. It also emphasized the importance of the full implementation of the Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014, and the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

After the resolution was implemented, both parties agreed to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of weapons, and full control by the Ukrainian government over the conflict areas (Susetio, 2022). However, peace-building efforts lasted for about seven years until the leadership of Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-2024), when Russia launched a large-scale invasion in February 2022, leading to the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine.

The conflict resolution that has been created certainly considers how the conflict can be transformed from internal conflict (only highlighting Ukrainian political problems) to multi-dimesion conflict (covered the resolution that solving internal, bilateral and geopolitical conflict) so that neither party reignites the conflict. The researcher aims to analyze the implementation of Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015 in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the post-conflict period of 2014-2015 up to 2022, before the war

between the two countries erupted. To achieve this, the researcher examines how the resolution implemented transformed the conflict and achieved positive peace.

II. Theoretical Framework: Conflict Transformation

Conflicts are cyclical, they emerge, reach a peak of highly emotional and violent conflict, then subside, fade away and sometimes reappear. Conflicts are often related to the goals of nations and states. When these goals do not align, a contradiction is born that leads to problems (Galtung and Dietrich, 2013). The actors involved will feel frustrated when their goals are not realized and leading to an attitude of hatred that leads to aggression towards the other party, especially those who hinder these goals. Normally, conflicts have many actors, goals and problems that are not easy to map.

Fig.1. The Life Cycle of Conflict According to Johan Galtung
Source: Galtung and Dietrich (2013)

A conflict is divided into three phases: before-violence, during-violence and after-violence. By considering the three aspects of violent cultures, violent structures and violent actors, the conflict can be transformed. It should be noted that before-violence to during-violence, there is a lag time to trigger division. Likewise, the phases during-violence and after-violence also have a pause to trigger a ceasefire. These pauses are important events to pay attention to.

The before-violence phase is also known as the prevention phase to avoid violence. A conflict will trigger suffering for the people and parties involved and is enough to warrant serious attention from the rest of the world. In this phase, what should be done is to find the positive goals of the parties involved and find imaginative ways to combine these goals without using violence (Galtung and Dietrich, 2013). During the before-violence phase, there are two indicators of resolution, namely: 1) Sustainable peace initiative efforts, where the conflicting parties are sought to conduct peace dialogues to resolve conflicts without the use of violence.; 2) Conflict mapping, where it is necessary to find out the root causes of the ongoing conflict based on violent cultures, violent structures, and violent actors.

The during-violence phase, where the main task that needs to be done is to stop the violence so that the conflict does not deepen and is difficult to resolve (Galtung and Dietrich, 2013). During the during-violence phase, peace-keeping efforts need to be carried out which include: 1) Compliance with Chapter 6 of the UN Charter to resolve conflicts peacefully; 2) Use of military force; 3) Use of police capabilities; 4) Focus on non-violent efforts; 5)

Mediation; 6) Women's participation in war casualty management.

The after-violence phase is the most difficult and complex stage compared to the previous stages because many heavy tasks need to be completed (Galtung and Dietrich, 2013). The indicators for completing the after-violence phase are as follows: 1) A resolution is produced that can resolve the root of the conflict; 2) Post-conflict reconstruction efforts; 3) Reconciliation efforts or improved relations between conflicting parties.

The failure of the conflict transformation (acknowledge the conflict as multi-dimension conflict) is caused by the failure of conflict resolution in resolving the root of the conflict which results in worse culture, worse structure, and worse actors so that a conflict becomes a prolonged conflict. And the after-violence phase easily becomes before-violence.

III. Methodology and Data

The research uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method. That way, this research is expected to provide a pattern that discusses the failure of conflict resolution produced by the UN Security Council to handle the conflict between Russia and Ukraine clearly and later become aligned to answer questions from the formulation of predetermined problems.

The data obtained comes from journals, books, and websites related to the situation of the Russian and Ukrainian conflicts in 2014-2015 and the draft resolutions that have been made. The data will go through a process of categorizing the data, sorting the data into manageable units, summarizing and looking for and finding patterns and finding important things that can be told to others.

IV. Findings and Discussions

a. Root Conflict Identification in the Before-violence Phase

The before-violence stage is also called the prevention stage to avoid violence. What must be done is to find the positive goals of the parties involved and find imaginative ways to combine these goals without using violence (Galtung and Dietrich, 2013). In the case of Russia and Ukraine, violence occurred after the enactment of the Military Doctrine on April 21, 2014, so that the period before that was the before-violence stage where the UN Security Council identified and mapped conflicts and conflict resolution.

To map the conflict, there are three main focuses that must be considered to handle the conflict that occurred. These focuses are changing the culture of violence, reconstructing the structure of violence and considering the actors of violence (Galtung and Fischer 2013, 63). Therefore, the UNSC must include these three things in making a resolution. Through several meetings, the UNSC finally produced a resolution even though it was ultimately rejected by Russia and failed to be implemented.

No.	Topic	Meeting Code	Date
1.		S/PV.7123	February 28th
2.	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the	S/PV.7124	March 1st
3.	Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the	S/PV.7125	March 3rd
4.	United Nations addressed to the President of the	S/PV.7131	March 10th
5.	Security Council (S/2014/136)	S/PV.7134	March 13th
6.		S/PV.7138	March 15th
7.		S/PV.7144	March 19th
8.	Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the	S.PV.7154	April 13th
9.	United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	S.PV.7157	April 16th

Tab. 1. List of UNSC Meetings (28 February – 16 April 2014)

Source: UN Security Council Meetings and Outcomes (2014)

The UNSC first met to discuss the crisis between Russia and Ukraine after Ukraine sent a letter No. S/2014/136 on February 28, 2014. In the letter, the Ukrainian representative urged the UNSC to hold a meeting regarding the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, which threatens Ukraine's territorial integrity and has the potential to cause disturbances to international peace and security following articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter. In addition, the Ukrainian representatives also proposed their participation in the meeting to make a statement as stipulated in article 37 of the UN Charter.

The UNSC considers that Russia is pressuring Ukraine under fabricated pretexts and says that Russia's concerns can be addressed by sending monitoring missions instead of military intervention. The facts also show that Russia has taken over almost all military bases and emphasized that there is no evidence that ethnic Russians are in a threatened position (UN Security Council Meeting Outcomes S/PV.7125, 2014).

In addition, Russia's interests can be obtained through diplomacy without the use of force through some action steps.First, Russia should directly engage the Government of Ukraine. Secondly, international monitors and observers, including from the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), should be sent to Ukraine. That is the best way to get the facts, monitor conduct and prevent any abuses. Russia is a leading member of both institutions and can participate actively to ensure that its interests are upheld. The immediate deployment of international observers from either the OSCE or the United Nations to Crimea would also provide transparency about the movements and activities of military and paramilitary forces in the region, and defuse the tensions between different groups. We are also working to stand up an international mediation mission to the Crimea to begin to de-escalate the situation and facilitate productive and peaceful political dialogue among all Ukrainian parties (UN Security Council Meeting Outcomes S/PV.7124, 2014).

At this meeting, it appears that the UNSC has realized the motives or interests that Russia wants to obtain through this military intervention. However, the UNSC has not been able to establish a dispute resolution mechanism due to the lack of transparency from both parties.

Ukraine is fighting for open dialogue and negotiations to resolve the conflict. Meanwhile, Russia made a statement that it did not want the situation to get worse or even start a war. Russia asked to look at the facts objectively in order to understand the source of the situation (UN Security Council Meeting

Outcomes S/PV.7134, 2014). Through this meeting, the UNSC interpreted the motives between the two parties where basically both countries did not want the conflict situation to get worse and called for a peaceful settlement.

The UN Security Council produced a draft resolution with the number S/2014/189. The resolution states unequivocally that Russia's actions interfering with Ukraine's territorial integrity and interfering with Ukraine's sovereignty violate Article 2 of the UN Charter, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975), and the Budapest Memorandum (1994). However, the draft resolution passed with 13 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention. Russia used its veto right to reject the enactment of the resolution. In the resolution, the UNSC explicitly stated that Russia violated Ukraine's sovereignty by intervening. Russia's use of its veto right caused the discussion on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia to continue (UN Security Council Meeting Outcomes S/PV.7138, 2014).

Variables	Findings	Solution Offered by UNSC
Actor	The Ukrainian government is a violent actor in the sphere of domestic conflict by exerting force and power to suppress the DPR and LPR and their aspirations.	Mapped by UNSC
	Russia became a violent actor that used all its power and strength to justify its actions.	
Culture	The Ukrainian government deployed military forces to suppress the separatist groups (DPR and LPR) and force a unilateral end to the internal conflict.	Urge all parties to resolve disputes through peaceful means.
	Russia intervened militarily and violated Ukraine's borders under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine.	
Structure	The Ukrainian government did not listen to the demands of the separatist groups (DPR and LPR) and used military force to suppress the DPR and LPR.	Call on Ukraine to protect and listen to the rights of all its citizens.
	Russia intervened in Ukraine's sovereignty by violating its borders due to Ukraine's desire to join the European Union.	Affirmation of Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Tab. 2. Conflict Mapping of Russia and Ukraine by UNSC

Source: Data processed by researchers based on UN Security Council Meetings and Outcomes (2014)

In terms of the culture of violence, the resolution of the conflict directs both parties to conduct dialogue and decide on an agreement that satisfies both parties, rather than trying to win the existing conflict. Then in terms of the structure of violence, in the meetings that have been held by the UNSC that have been discussed previously, it is clear that Ukraine as a country that depends on Russia makes Russia have greater power and authority. Therefore, in the draft resolution, the UNSC emphasized that Russia respects Ukraine's sovereignty as stated in the UN Charter where every country is obliged to comply with the principle of sovereignty.

Furthermore, regarding the actors of violence, in the UNSC meetings that have been discussed previously, it is clear that Russia is the main actor of violence and it would be fatal to ignore the actors of violence along with the goals they want to achieve. In this regard, the UNSC is aware that Russia will become more aggressive if its goals are not achieved and Russia cannot be stopped only by the courts or sanctions. This situation made the UNSC emphasize in the draft resolution that was made that both parties try to refrain from using actions that could increase tensions and encourage both parties to take a peaceful path in resolving the conflict through direct dialogue or international media without using violence. Efforts to transform the conflict carried out by the UNSC through conflict mapping by considering each other's interests based on aspects of the culture of violence, the

structure of violence and the actors of violence have failed. This failure did not come from the UNSC's inability to map the conflict, but from Russia's unwillingness to engage in dialogue or mediation. Supporting factors for the failure of the UNSC in the before violence stage were also influenced by Russia's power as a permanent member of the UNSC which has the privilege to reject resolutions through veto rights.

Conflict transformation efforts carried out by the UN Security Council through conflict mapping have considered the interests of each based on aspects of the culture of violence, the structure of violence and violent actors, but violence still occurs. The failure does not come from the inability of the UNSC to map the conflict, but the failure comes from the unwillingness of all parties to conduct dialogue or mediation. There are at least three main points that are the roots of the conflict in Ukraine, namely domestic factors in Ukraine, Russian military intervention and the impact of Western policies (Kovalov in Ramadhan, 2020). These points have been found by the UNSC and then formulated into a draft resolution number S/2014/189. But, Ukraine government doesn't want to listen and rejected the proposal of DPR and LPR regarding their interest to be separated and using forces to suppress them while Russian rejected the proposal of Ukraine to have bilateral meeting. Also, no response or action step that Europe Union and NATO could do because the limitation of its influence.

b. Peace-keeping Efforts in the During-violence Phase

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly in Eastern Ukraine, has raised issues that are at the core of international law. This conflict contains several elements, namely the focus on secession, the right to self-determination, and respect for the sovereignty of a country in terms of territorial integrity (Zavoli, 2017). To overcome these problems, the UN Security Council seeks to find a legal solution to the conflict, stop violence between the parties to the conflict and resolve the problem through peaceful means. These goals are implemented by the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.

The acting President of Ukraine, Aleksander Turchynov, asked then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to send peacekeeping forces to coordinate with Ukrainian forces in anti-terrorist operations but the request was cancelled due to Russia's use of veto rights, thus not fulfilling the requirement that there is no opposition (Alter, 2014).

The demand for peacekeeping in Ukraine has gone beyond what the UNSC can do and therefore, President Petro Poroshenko signed a new law allowing access for foreign troops to conduct peacekeeping operations in place of the UN with the restriction that countries that have launched armed aggression against Ukraine are prohibited from participating (Ciorici, 2017). Thus, Russia and some regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions cannot carry out such missions such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), OSCE, European Union or NATO.

Although the OSCE cannot send military troops to carry out peacekeeping missions, it is still taking action to maintain peace in Ukraine by running an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) and an OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoint in Gukovo. These missions involve police forces tasked with policing the border area to prevent Russian arms supplies from entering for use by militants from pro-Russian separatist groups. In addition, the OSCE also joined the Trilateral Contact Group as a forum for diplomatic talks between Russia and Ukraine and the separatist groups (Filipchuck, 2016).

To defuse the conflict, the UN can only send the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) to carry out a humanitarian mission through the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). The purpose of this mission is to ensure that human rights are not violated as well as to assist in meeting technical, legal, and other needs that can contribute to addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. UNHCR's involvement helped to calm psycho-social aspects and encouraged peacebuilding activities such as ceasefires, demobilization, and negotiations (Ciorici, 2017).

On June 6, 2014, diplomatic discussions were held involving the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia under the auspices of the President of France, François Hollande and the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel in the Normandy Format or N4. The meeting was considered by the European Union to be a step towards achieving peace between Russia and Ukraine. Another round of negotiations took place on June 23, 2014, in a Trilateral Contact

Group (TCG) of Ukrainian and Russian representatives mediated by the OSCE and involving representatives of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) (Ramadhan, 2020). The meeting contained several important items: granting partial amnesty to the rebels, plans for joint police patrols in the conflict zone after the ceasefire, decentralization efforts (including the election of an executive committee, the defence of the Russian language and draft constitutional changes), local and parliamentary elections before the term of office, the appointment of a joint governor, an agreement on a ten-kilometre buffer zone from the Russian-Ukrainian border to stop the supply of weapons to the rebels, and the dissolution of the LPR and DPR (Arbatova, 2022).

As the UNSC wanted, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia needed to be resolved through peaceful means. With the N4 and TCG, Russia and Ukraine finally found a platform for negotiations that led to the formulation and signing of the Minsk Agreements. The first Minsk negotiations were held in September 2014 and resulted in the Minsk Agreements which were signed on September 5, 2014. The Minsk Agreement was the result of a compromise that had been attempted to end the conflict through a ceasefire. The implementation of the agreement had many obstacles due to conflicting legal bases that led to ceasefire violations and in November 2014 the rebel-held regions held local elections that further complicated the issue until the armed conflict reached its peak at the end of 2014 (Wittke, 2019). Given this situation, the N4 and TCG

met again in February 2015 and produced the Minsk II Agreement.

This agreement included demands that all parties withdraw their troops; that local elections be held in accordance with Ukrainian law; and that the Ukrainian parliament determine the regions that would be under the special regime within thirty days. It also included the organization of elections in line with international standards that were discussed and agreed upon with representatives of the LPR and DPR as well as demands for reform of the Ukrainian constitution (Wittke, 2019). The Minsk II agreement focused on resolving Ukraine's internal conflicts with the LPR and DPR and tightened demands for troop withdrawal from all parties including Russia. The Minsk II Agreement was finally agreed and signed on February 12, 2015. With the Minsk Agreement, Russia and Ukraine entered a ceasefire period and ended the during-violence stage.

c. The Failure of Conflict Transformation Efforts in the After-violence Phase

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly in Eastern Ukraine, has raised issues that are at the core of international law. This conflict contains several elements, namely the focus on secession, the right to self-determination, and respect for the sovereignty of a country in terms of territorial integrity (Zavoli, 2017). To overcome these problems, the UN Security Council seeks to find a legal solution to the conflict, stop violence between the parties to the conflict and resolve the problem through peaceful means. These goals are implemented by the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.

The demand for peacekeeping in Ukraine has exceeded what the UNSC can do and therefore, President Petro Poroshenko signed a new law allowing access for foreign troops to conduct peacekeeping operations in place of the UN with the restriction that countries that have launched armed aggression against Ukraine are prohibited from participating (Ciorici 2017, 189). This means that Russia and some regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions cannot carry out the mission such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), OSCE, the European Union or NATO.

On February 17, 2015 a meeting was held to discuss resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. During this meeting, Russia pushed for the adoption of a resolution based on the Minsk II Agreement on the basis of its commitment to maintaining peace while the conflict was instigated by Russia itself. The Russian representative responded by questioning the triggering factor for the conflict, which was the unapproved reunification of Crimea with Russia. On the other hand, Ukrainian representatives emphasized that the Crimean reunification mentioned by Russia was a form of occupation by annexation and aggression (UN Security Council Meeting Outcomes S/PV.73844, 2015). The meeting still contains debate between Russia and Ukraine where Ukraine stated that Russia has violated international law by interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs. While Russia considers that the conflict was triggered because Ukraine violated the principle of self-determination for the Crimean people who want to reunite with Russia.

At this meeting, the UN Security Council finally adopted resolution number S/RES/2202 (2015) with the main point of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements which contains thirteen actions that must be taken by the parties involved.

Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015 adopting the Minsk II Agreement was enacted with the hope of resolving the conflict. However, in reality, the Minsk II Agreement failed in its implementation. The failure of the Minsk II Agreement means that Resolution Number S/RES/2202/2015 also failed.

No.	Package of Measures	Implementation
1.	A full and immediate cease-fire	Not implemented. As of 2021, there were at least 3,404 civilians killed as a result of ceasefire violations.
2.	Withdrawal of all heavy weapons and establishment of security zones	Not fully implemented. As of 2021, Russian military forces still occupy Ukrainian border areas.
3.	Monitoring of the ceasefire by the OSCE	Not fully implemented. Due to ceasefire violations, the OSCE had access difficulties.
4.	Local election modalities based on Ukrainian law regarding the special status of Donbas	Not fully implemented. Until 2021, Donbas remains divided into Ukrainian Government-controlled and separatist-controlled areas.
5.	Pardon and amnesty of figures involved in the conflict	Not implemented. The law regulating this has never been signed by the Government of Ukraine.
6.	Release and exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons	Not fully implemented. The last exchange took place in December 2019 and there are still detainees who have not been released due to Ukraine constantly reorganizing the list of detainees.
7.	Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need based on international mechanisms	Not implemented. As of 2021, there are 3.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance who are blocked by Russian military formations.
8.	Full restoration of social and economic relations with conflict-affected areas	Not fully implemented. Recovery is not being carried out on the territory of the DPR and LPR.
9.	Ukraine's full control of its border with Russia throughout the conflict zone	Not implemented. As of 2021, there are still 104,000 Russian military personnel on the Ukrainian border
10.	Withdrawal of foreign armed groups, weapons and mercenaries on the territory of Ukraine	Not implemented. Until 2021, conflicts continue to occur in border areas and separatist-held territories.
11.	Constitutional reforms including decentralization, special status for separatist regions	Not fully implemented. Draft constitutional and decentralization laws not fully adopted.
12.	Local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions based on OSCE standards	Not implemented. Elections were never held even during the simultaneous elections in Ukraine in 2020. In addition, until 2021, as many as 600,00 citizens moved to Russia.
13.	Intensification of TCG work	Limited. TCG's influence slowly weakened until the end of 2021.

Tab. 3. Failure of Resolution No. S/RES/2202 of 2015 (2015-2021)
Source: Data processed by researchers based on (Golanski, 2016), (Atland, 2020), (European Commission, 2022), and (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023).

There is a divergence of views between Russia and Ukraine with Ukraine prioritizing security

restoration by insisting on full control of the Russian border so as to contain the supply of weapons and mercenaries to separatist groups. Political recovery including local elections for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions can follow to ensure security. Meanwhile, Russia demands that Ukraine decentralize through local elections first (in order to legitimize its proxies in Donbas) and then give Ukraine full control over the border region.

According to Wolfgang Sporrer, one of the diplomats involved in drafting the Minsk II Agreement, the failure of the Minsk II Agreement occurred because (Brentler, 2023):
1. The Minsk II Agreement failed to address the root causes of the conflict. The core of the conflict is Russia's desire to influence the domestic and foreign policy orientation of the government in Kyiv. However, the Minsk II Agreement addressed a very different issue.
2. The low technical quality of the Minsk II Agreement was due to too many provisions for its verification, and the sequence of actions remained controversial until the end, as the agreement itself did not specify anything.
3. Russia's position on the Minsk II Agreement is unclear. Russia is actually not interested in this issue.

This ambiguity was utilized by Russia to put the conflict with Ukraine into a frozen conflict without achieving any peace at all, which made it the biggest weakness of the Minsk II Agreement and also the main failure of this resolution.

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V. Conclusion

The formulation of the Minsk II Agreement did not covered all of the dimensions of the conflict. It should be remembered that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a geopolitical, bilateral and internal conflict that occurs at the same time so that if only focus on one conflict, the causes of the conflict will never be resolved.

The implementation of resolution number S/RES/2202 of 2015 did not go as planned due to ambiguity regarding the order of implementation of the action points of the Minsk II Agreement and Russia's unclear position in the resolution. This led to a de-escalation of the conflict in Ukraine but did not bring the situation to peace. What happened was the freezing of the conflict, which only stopped the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, resolution number S/RES/2022 of 2015 failed to realize positive peace between Russia and Ukraine due to its system.

The UNSC should prepare an enforcement action through a UN General Assembly resolution to prohibit Russia from taking any decision in the Ukraine crisis and designate Russia as an aggressor state based on the UN Charter, resolution number 3314 of the UN General Assembly on the definition of aggression, the Convention on the Definition of Aggression and resolution number 377A of the UN General Assembly on unity for peace. Thus, Russia lost its voting rights in the UN Security Council under UN Charter article 27.

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